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1. Anthropology, Useful  
and Scientific:  
An Introduction
The essays gathered in this volume were all intended as contributions to 
what I would like to call a useful and scientific anthropology, two words 
that may seem a tad presumptuous and require an explanation.
First, the useful part. The essays address specific questions such as 
the following:
• Why do some social institutions seem ‘natural’ to many people 
across different cultures?
• How do people form their views of the economy?
• Why do human beings engage in ritual behaviors, either 
pathological (in compulsive disorders) or culturally 
sanctioned (like ceremonies)? What are the common features 
of these behaviors?
• How do people detect that someone has a mental disorder? 
Does this differ from one culture to another?
• What motivates conflict between groups?
• Do ethnic conflict and discrimination have an impact on 
people’s health? If so, how does that happen?
• What explains the differences between religions?
• Why are some political institutions stable and not others?
These are all questions of some social importance. It is not difficult to 
see that it would be a Good Thing, so to speak, to make progress in 
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addressing such issues. I do not claim that the essays gathered here 
are more useful than other attempts in the social sciences, but simply 
that the main motivation here is indeed to be useful, to provide models 
and findings that help us move closer to a proper explanation of these 
phenomena. That is the goal, the ambition, if perhaps not the actuality.
What about ‘scientific’? In my view, the main way for scholarship to 
be useful, indeed useable, in these domains, is to proceed in a scientific 
manner. By using this term, I certainly do not mean to claim or imply 
that the various statements contained here are true. In fact, making such 
a claim would be quite the unscientific thing to do. The implication is 
simpler and more modest, meaning that the models proposed can and 
should be examined in terms of empirical data, and that they may be 
found to be false or in serious need of revision on the basis of such data.
In all these essays we adopt the perspective of an ‘integrated’ 
social science, that addresses questions about cultures and societies 
in a deliberately eclectic manner, combining results and models from 
evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, economics, anthropology 
and history (Morin, 2016; Sperber, 1996; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). This 
approach is sometimes derided as ‘positivistic’ and ‘reductionistic’, and 
that is exactly what it is. It is blithely reductionist (explaining what 
happens at a high level of complexity in terms of the combinations of 
simpler, lower-level elements) and mostly positivist (if the term simply 
denotes the scientific aspiration). 
Why Science Isn’t and Should Not Be True to Life 
To some people, it may seem that this way of describing and explaining 
social phenomena robs them of much of their substance. The models 
may be compelling but they miss out the rich texture and detail of 
actual social interactions. We talk about rituals in general without 
considering the particular and highly varied social contexts in which 
they take place; we examine people’s views of economic processes, but 
we ignore the subtle individual differences in their construction; we 
consider widespread assumptions about madness, but not how they are 
modulated in each case… to these objections, the proper reply would be: 
Yes, YES! We do that, and that is exactly what we should do. Far from 
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being a problem, the exclusion of so much information is precisely the 
main virtue of this way of proceeding.
The point will seem quite obvious to some and strikingly wrong-
headed to others. For some people, doing science consists in discovering 
‘what really happens’, beyond error, prejudice and received wisdom. 
Scientists are seen as people who describe things the way they really 
are. So it seems that one’s theories should always be ‘true to life.’ That 
is very misleading.
In some sense, of course, scientific theories are ‘true to life’ 
because evidence is the only tribunal that judges right and wrong. An 
embarrassing, unexplained fact carries more weight than a satisfactory, 
elegant theory, and that is what makes scientific activities so frustrating 
sometimes.
In another sense, scientific theories are not, cannot be, and should not 
be ‘true to life.’ Producing a theory does not mean taking into account 
all possible aspects of the phenomena you describe. On the contrary, it 
means that you focus on some aspects that can be described in terms 
of abstract generalizations, assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that 
all other aspects are ‘equal’. The notion of ‘all else being equal’ seems 
entirely natural and compelling to some people; and it seems utterly 
alien to many others. As the Russian writer Alexander Zinoviev put 
it, the two styles of thinking are diametrically opposed: ‘the scientific 
principle produces abstractions, the anti-scientific principle destroys 
them on the grounds that such and such has not been considered. 
The scientific principle establishes strict concepts, the anti-scientific 
principle makes them ambiguous on the pretext of thus revealing their 
true variety’ (Zinoviev, 1979, p. 209).
Why Social Science Is Impossible (Or Nearly So)
Where do we stand, in our understanding of social phenomena? How 
much do we know? It often seems like we are nowhere near where we 
should be, given the amount of available information about human 
cultures and history. Analogies with other sciences are certainly 
difficult, but it may seem that we are at the same stage as chemistry 
was, say around the beginning of the nineteenth century. At the time, 
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chemists had at their disposal a vast number of facts about different 
substances and their interactions, but very little by way of a systematic 
understanding of these facts. Why would an acid and a base combine 
to form water and a salt? (For that matter, the distinction between acids 
and alkali would have been difficult to explain). 
One obstacle on the way to social science is, as it turns out, human 
minds themselves. The problem is that, in a sense, we already have all 
sorts of ideas about societies, what could be called a ‘folk-sociology’ 
(Boyer, 2018, pp. 216–237). Folk-sociology consists in a set of partly tacit 
assumptions, that we all use when trying to describe or explain social 
facts and processes. 
For instance, one major feature of our folk-sociology, found in the 
most diverse societies, is that we spontaneously construe human 
groups as agents. We talk about villages or social classes or nations as 
entities that want this, fear that, make decisions, fail to perceive what 
is happening, reward people or take revenge against them, are hostile 
towards other groups, and so on. All these terms suggest that, in some 
implicit way, we consider that what happens in social groups is very 
much the same as what happens in a human mind.
Another assumption of folk-sociology is that power is a kind of 
substance attached to particular individuals, and its operation is 
analogous to a physical force. This is manifest in such phrases as ‘she has 
power,’ ‘she lost power,’ ‘his power increased,’ and so on. This is not just a 
Western or European way of speaking. Such metaphors are familiar from 
many tribal societies, chiefdoms, and early states. We say that people 
‘have’ and ‘exercise’ power. We conceive of someone with power as able 
to ‘push’ others toward certain behaviors (as a physical force can move 
objects), we say that people who did not follow the leader are ‘resisting,’ 
that they are not ‘swayed’, they resent being ‘pushed around’, etc. 
These conceptions of social facts and processes are based on loose 
and misleading conventional metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). We 
vaguely perceive that social groups are not literally agents and that 
power is not literally a force, but it is very difficult to think outside the 
metaphors. Try to describe political power without ever using notions 
like ‘pushing’ and ‘resisting’; or try to describe international relations 
without ever saying that ‘Russia wanted this’ and ‘England realized 
that…’, and so forth. Indeed, the metaphors are so entrenched that they 
 51. Anthropology, Useful and Scientific: An Introduction  
may seem self-evidently true—which is why some social scientists, in 
the past, tried to argue that nations really were like agents and political 
power really was a force.
Now folk-sociology is a real hindrance, when you try to think about 
cultural phenomena in a scientific manner, because it hides the very 
problems we should try to solve. Seeing the nation or the ethnic group 
as agents conceals difficult questions, such as: why do people favor their 
group against others? Why would people behave as loyal members of 
an ethnic group, rather than defect to another one? In the same way, 
seeing power as a force makes it impossible to describe the complicated 
dynamics, whereby the preferences of some people (the leaders) seem 
to have effects on the behaviors of others (the followers). The notion 
of power as force indeed makes it impossible to understand how 
power relations change: why was the East German communist party so 
powerful in 1988 and so powerless in 1990?
Can we really discard folk-sociology? It is difficult for two reasons. 
The first one is that our social understandings are largely implicit. As 
the old saying goes, it is difficult to reason people out of something they 
were not reasoned into. The view that power is a force, for instance, 
is not usually an explicit, conscious representation of what political 
power consists of. A second, more familiar reason is that our ideas about 
society are not just a matter of detached consideration. They guide 
our own social interaction, and what happens in that interaction does 
matter to us. While abandoning your folk-theories in the domains of 
physics or biology does not come at much of a price, giving up on some 
ill-conceived notion of political power or gender roles may be a more 
delicate affair.
If all this is true, then doing social science in the scientific manner 
might seem well-nigh impossible. There may be both a natural inclination 
and some strong incentives not to consider social and cultural processes 
in scientific terms. On the contrary, there may be powerful reasons to 
adopt and preserve theories that are not entirely coherent, or do not have 
much supporting evidence, simply because they fit both our intuitive 
expectations and our particular projects.
That may explain why the results are decidedly mixed, why we are 
very much in the same position as chemists before Galton. While we 
can admire the great insights of luminaries like Montesquieu or Ibn 
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Khaldun, the prospect of a cumulative social science seems to recede 
almost as fast as we proceed.
Why Cultural Stability Is a Mystery
A standard answer to many questions in social science, such as those 
listed at the beginning of this introduction, is that people have particular 
mental representations, e.g., about what rituals to perform, or what 
the economy is like, or what is morally repugnant behavior, because 
those notions ‘are in their culture’. So, the fact that you consider, e.g., 
the economy as a large pie that can be divided in different ways, or a 
shaman’s rituals as required in order to combat witchcraft, these are 
notions that ‘are in the culture’ which would explain why people 
entertain them.
That cannot be a very good explanation, because it is not an 
explanation at all. To adopt a phrase from physicists, it is not even wrong. 
It makes little sense to say that most Zulu people like spicy foods, or 
that Mongols consult shamans because those preferences are in their 
culture—because what we mean when we say that some notion is ‘in 
the culture’ is simply that it is common among people in a particular 
place. So we are in effect saying that many Zulu people like spicy foods 
because many Zulu people like spicy foods. That is not a good start.
The only way that kind of strange statement could make sense would 
be if we assumed that ideas and values, representations and preferences, 
are always transmitted identically from generation to generation. That 
is, we might be implying that Mongols resort to shamanism because 
previous Mongols did that too. In this sense, ‘it is in their culture’ would 
mean ‘they adopted whatever their forebears did’.
That would be almost reasonable. Of course, it would also be largely 
false. Cultures change as much as they persist. But at least we are now 
talking about something that is not entirely tautological, and in fact 
introduces the most important theme in the study of cultures: What is 
‘in the culture’ depends on what is transmitted from one individual to 
another.
That is of course an old idea, but it is only very recently that social 
scientists took it seriously enough to build formal models of what is 
now called ‘cultural evolution’. A convenient date of birth for that 
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movement might be the publication of Culture and the Evolutionary 
Process by Boyd and Richerson (1985). The starting point of the model 
was that cultural material comes in different packets of information, 
called memes, transmitted from individual to individual. The notion of 
memes had originally been proposed by Richard Dawkins (1976), and 
it then formed the starting point of many attempts to describe cultural 
material. In this selectionist perspective, trends in cultural evolution, 
for instance, the persistence of a particular tradition or its downfall, the 
fact that some ideas can diffuse to large communities or on the contrary 
remain confined to a few individuals all stems from the relative selective 
success of different memes. This way of thinking transposed to cultural 
material the successful models of genetic evolution by random mutation 
and selective retention. 
There was a limitation in these selectionist models, however. Memes 
were construed as abstract realities that replicate by passing from one 
mind to another, but there was no explanation of how that happened. 
Or, people assumed that ‘imitation’ would be the explanation. This 
was consistent with another one of our folk-sociological assumptions, 
namely, that human cultures are by default stable. Social scientists for a 
long time assumed that there was nothing special to explain in the fact 
that many Venetian and Xhosa customs or ideas were very similar to 
what the Venetians and the Xhosa of the previous generation had been 
doing or thinking. In that view, stability is not mysterious, in fact it is 
invisible! And only change requires a special explanation. 
But it is stability that is mysterious. The Xhosa views about marriage 
or agriculture are conveyed through a vast number of communicative 
interactions between individuals. But human communication is a place 
of high entropy—it resembles a game of Chinese Whispers more than 
serial photocopying. What you get at the end is very different from 
the beginning, not just because of distortion, but mostly because of 
reconstruction (Morin, 2016). Distortion does happen when you make 
copies of copies of copies… but in Chinese Whispers, each individual 
in the chain is trying to construct something that would make sense, 
given what they heard. Human communication, even about ‘cultural’ 
matters like marriage or agriculture, is even more entropic, as people 
are in many cases not even trying to reproduce what they heard.
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The ‘epidemiology of culture’ promoted by Dan Sperber and others 
(and illustrated in several of the essays in this volume) assumed that 
these facts about human communication were crucial for understanding 
the apparent stability of some aspects of human cultures, or the fact that 
different individuals across space and time seem to have roughly similar 
mental representations (Sperber, 1985). Human communication has to 
be reconstructive, because much of what is conveyed is not said and need 
not be said. That is true of the simplest everyday conversations, as studies 
in linguistic pragmatics demonstrate (Grice, 1991). Sperber and others 
argued that this fact was essential to understanding human cultures. 
What makes them stable or changing is not the ‘memes’, the explicit 
statements and gestures, but the way these are completed, in the minds 
of the receivers, with all sorts of additional content (Sperber, 1985).
So, where does stability come from? The main factor here is not 
imitation or repetition, but similarities in the ‘additional content’ I just 
mentioned. That is where the view of communication inherited from 
pragmatics was combined with a view of the human mind promoted 
by cognitive psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). Human mental 
capacities were no longer described as a unified, multi-purpose 
computer that would absorb what the environment threw at it, but as a 
series of learning systems shaped by natural selection, and specialized 
in handling recurrent challenges of ancestral environments—how to 
find nutrition and avoid predators, for sure, but how to find the best 
possible mate, how to recruit social support, how to defend one’s group 
against enemies, and many more, as described by what is now called 
evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2016). 
Why Social Science Is Possible after All:  
A Field Without a Name
I of course assume that, against the odds, we can build scientific accounts 
and that we are in fact gaining ground in our models of human cultures. 
In this volume, my co-authors and I consider what could be described 
as questions of political science (What makes institutions stable, and 
compelling?), cultural anthropology (Why perform rituals? How do 
people detect mental illness?), sociology (How does ethnicity impact 
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health?) and economics (Do people’s view of the economy match their 
economic behavior?).
The list may seem a tad disparate, but it is not haphazard. These 
questions all spring from a common way of seeing human cultures, 
as the product of the interaction of evolved human capacities and 
preferences with variable environments. We take seriously the fact that 
natural selection provides not just an explanation for what we know 
of human nature, but also a source of rich hypotheses for what is still 
to be discovered. We also take as self-evident that economic models 
and game theory provide rich models for interactions between agents, 
that experimental psychology or neuroscience are the best sources for 
understanding human minds, and that the variation in human norms 
and concepts provides a wonderful opportunity to describe the envelope 
of human nature.
Is there a discipline that studies all that? Not if the term ‘discipline’ 
denotes traditional academic divisions. But those matter less and less 
to actual scholarly projects. Our field-without-a-name is making great 
progress, and it will prove both scientific and useful.
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2. Institutions and Human Nature
Introductory Note 
One of the most enduring and most damaging assumptions in the social 
sciences is the belief that it makes sense to talk about nature and culture, 
or to part the ‘innate’ from the ‘acquired’ in describing human behavior. 
Almost as misguided is the recommendation that we should describe 
behavior as some combination or mixture of these elements—an insipid 
counsel for moderation that only results in a stubborn incuriosity about 
what is being ‘mixed’ and how (Pinker, 2002).
Against all this, many biologists, anthropologists and psychologists 
have, for decades, tried to illustrate how these oppositions dissolve, 
when we consider human capacities and preferences from an 
evolutionary standpoint (Ridley, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). 
It is part of mankind’s evolved nature that we can acquire from our 
conspecifics vast amounts of information that constitute our ecological 
niche (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). This is possible because genetic selection 
fashioned a whole suite of learning mechanisms that orient the growing 
mind’s attention to specific cues in the environment, and govern that 
mind’s inferences. That is how we can acquire detailed and valuable 
information about, e.g., the physical relations between solid objects, 
the invisible beliefs and intentions that explain agents’ behaviors, the 
nature of the social bonds between people around us, the syntax of the 
local language, the best ways to extract resources from the natural world 
or to establish cooperation and garner social support. All this requires 
extensive learning, which requires extensively prepared systems—for a 
survey, see Boyer (2018, pp. 1–30) and Tooby & Cosmides (1992). 
How does this relate to the study of institutions? To be more 
specific, Michael Petersen and I were trying to address the very general 
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question, why do people adopt some institutions as quite ‘natural’, 
in the familiar sense, while others are much less compelling? Why is 
marriage apparently so self-evident, that in most cultures throughout 
history, no-one needed an explanation for it? Why would the rules of a 
deliberative democracy be a much more fragile construction?
We can describe institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ in complex 
social interaction (North, 1990). These rules can be very different, 
from time to time and place to place. From that diversity, many people 
would conclude that genetic evolution by natural selection is irrelevant. 
But historical or cultural differences are, just like commonalities, an 
outcome of our evolved dispositions (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). That 
is what Michael Petersen and I tried to illustrate in this article, using the 
contrasted cases of marriage institutions, criminal justice, and commons 
management as our examples. These display vast cultural and historical 
differences, and in fact some institutions are only found in some human 
societies. But in these different cases and, we would argue, many more 
besides these, we can see highly intuitive specific expectations at play, 
which make some parts of the local, historically specific institutional 
arrangements very easy to acquire, which in turn makes it relatively 
easy for people to coordinate their behaviors around common rules. The 
intuitive expectations are shaped by evolved learning systems, and in 
turn they shape the various institutions.
An important consequence of this model is that explanations of 
institutions are, by necessity, domain-specific. For instance, cultural 
rules about marriage are strongly constrained by human intuitions 
about mating, about the ways humans combine sexual access, care for 
their offspring and economic cooperation. By contrast, judicial rules 
are influenced by our moral intuitions and expectations concerning 
cooperation. So, to explain two different domains of institutions, we 
need to investigate two separate mental systems, each of which has its 
own domain of application, its computational rules, and its associated 
emotions. 
That is why general models or theories of institutions are, in our 
view, incomplete. True, political scientists and economists have put 
forward important models of, e.g., the conditions under which there 
is demand for and supply of institutional rules, especially in complex 
modern societies—in the article we discuss some of these, especially 
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from the neo-institutional economics literature. But institutions are not 
just systems of rules, they are also systems of rules mentally represented 
by individuals—in fact, in many cases they consist in individual mental 
representations about the mental representations of other individuals 
(Heintz, 2007). That is why, at some point in our explanations, we must 
consider the role of evolved domain-specific intuitions, which means 
that we leave aside a general theory of institutions and produce theories 
of particular kinds of institutions.
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The Naturalness of  
(Many) Social Institutions:  
Evolved Cognition as their Foundation1
with Michael Bang Petersen
Abstract: Most standard social science accounts only offer limited 
explanations of institutional design, i.e., why institutions have 
common features observed in many different human groups. 
Here, we suggest that these features are best explained as the 
outcome of evolved human cognition, in such domains as mating, 
moral judgment and social exchange. As empirical illustrations, 
we show how this evolved psychology makes marriage systems, 
legal norms and commons management systems intuitively 
obvious and compelling, thereby ensuring their occurrence and 
cultural stability. We extend this to propose under what conditions 
institutions can become ‘natural’, compelling and legitimate, and 
outline probable paths for institutional change given human 
cognitive dispositions. Explaining institutions in terms of 
these exogenous factors also suggests that a general theory of 
institutions as such is neither necessary nor in fact possible. What 
are required are domain-specific accounts of institutional design 
in different domains of evolved cognition.
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., & Petersen, MB. 
(2011). The naturalness of (many) social institutions: Evolutionary and Cognitive 
Background, Journal of Institutional Economics 8(1): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1744137411000300. Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press.
© 2021 Michael Bang Petersen, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0257.03
16 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
1. Introduction
General accounts of social institutions should provide plausible and 
testable answers to questions of institutional design, such as, why 
do social institutions have the specific features that we observe in 
human societies? Why do we observe common institutional features 
in otherwise very different cultural environments? Or, why do some 
institutions seem natural and compelling to participants, while others 
are considered alien or coercive? Here, we develop the view that present 
institutional theories do not properly address such design questions, 
and that this can be remedied only by taking into account what we call 
the ‘naturalness’ of institutions, their connection to human expectations 
and preferences that result from evolution by natural selection. This 
perspective may help us understand commonalities across cultures, but 
also why some institutions are more successful and compelling than 
others and why they change in particular directions.
To some extent, this suggestion echoes a defining feature of the 
neo-institutional approach. From the beginning, neo-institutionalism 
has been oriented towards developing realistic models of the actors, 
countering the Homo economicus model inherent in older institutional 
accounts and emphasizing the cognitive limits of human decision makers 
(Brousseau & Glachant, 2008). From this perspective, important lines 
of inquiry have been developed with regards to, first, how institutions 
carry a range of unintended consequences given the cognitive limits of 
their designers, and, second, how a function of institutions is to counter 
such limits (North, 1990). At the same time, however, this perspective 
of bounded rationality provides only a partial description of human 
cognition. While one line of research within the cognitive sciences has 
been preoccupied with the biased and fallible nature of human cognition, 
a complementary line of research has developed the view that human 
cognition is in fact ‘better than rational’ (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). 
Evolutionary psychologists have argued that human cognition 
includes a multitude of domain-specific cognitive programs, each 
optimally geared (within evolutionary constraints) to solve particular 
problems in the course of human evolutionary history (Barkow, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). The inferential power of these specialized 
programs comes from their content-rich nature. That is, they are loaded 
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with inbuilt assumptions about their domain. Environments that fit 
these inbuilt assumptions appear intuitive and readily understandable.
Our aim is to outline the argument that institutions are effective 
not despite human cognition but, in part, because of human cognition. 
Essentially, we argue that the content-rich nature of evolved intuitions 
provides a foundation which can be and is often used in the design 
of many social institutions. Institutions that fit these intuitions, we 
propose, develop more easily, require less effort to conform to, and are 
more culturally stable.
While evolutionary psychology is increasingly incorporated into 
social theory (Alford & Hibbing, 2004; Hodgson, 1999; McDermott, 
2006; Petersen, 2010), and some economists have been keen to integrate 
an evolutionary logic into their models (Dopfer, 2005; Enright, 1984), 
many social scientists may be unfamiliar with the approach. By way of 
developing our account, we therefore present a series of illustrations 
of how our knowledge of human evolution and cognition provides 
the tools for a causal, naturalistic understanding of social institutions 
such as marriage rules and norms, legal systems and social exchange 
mechanisms. In each instance, our point of departure will be the 
existence of specific cross-cultural features in the design of these 
institutions and how these can be seen as the institutionalization of 
evolved intuitions. From this, we show how these insights can inform 
the study of institutions, the naturalness of (many) social institutions 
and develop a range of novel predictions on how institutions develop 
and change.
2. Explaining Common Features
We focus here on named social institutions, that is, sets of norms and 
rules in which all culturally competent members of a group have explicit, 
accessible mental representations. For instance, football in England, 
marriage in the USA, potlatch among the Tlingit or meeting for Quakers 
are social institutions of the kind we consider here. The important point 
here is that people have some notion that, for example, there is such a 
thing as potlatch in their social environment and they have some notion 
of how observed behaviors can be seen as exemplars of these abstract 
notions, or violations of their rules (Searle, 1995). These named bundles 
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of concepts, norms and behaviors are what we call ‘institutions’ in the 
rest of this article (Ostrom, 2005). This is only a subset of ‘institutions’ in 
the neo-institutional sense, some of which remain implicit, such as, for 
example, a sense of fairness or simple habits.
Institutional models generally emphasize the contribution of both 
formal and informal aspects of such institutions, the former including 
laws, contracts, administrative rules and procedures, while the latter 
include implicit norms and routines. Here, we want to explore the 
cognitive processes that underpin both aspects of institutions. An 
institution such as ‘marriage’ in the USA combines legal norms and 
emotional preferences, contracts and moral intuitions; in short, both 
formal and informal aspects. The question for us is, what makes certain 
‘packages’ of informal and formal norms natural and compelling to 
participants?
In many domains, fairly similar institutions can be found in diverse 
cultural environments. For instance, despite obvious differences, many 
human groups know of interaction norms that (seemingly) correspond 
to what an English speaker would call ‘marriage’ (we will discuss, 
presently, whether that similarity is an illusion). An interesting fact is 
that such diverse institutions share not just very general properties, for 
example, conditions and limits of sexual relationships and parenting, 
but also many other features, for example, the association between 
long-term sexual intimacy and economic solidarity, the fact that the 
union is in principle exclusive, the fact that its inception requires public 
ceremonies, etc. These are common features, most of which may not 
be universal, but all of which are so widespread that this recurrence 
requires an explanation.
In the social sciences, different frameworks suggest very different 
ways of considering institutions and their common features. For instance, 
a culturalist account is the default position of much anthropological 
reflection on institutions. In this view, the latter are the way they are 
because they are congruent with the particular concepts, values, norms, 
etc. widespread in a particular place (Gudeman, 1986). A recurrent 
problem of anthropological culturalism is, of course, the presence 
of recurrent features of social institutions, which in a purely localist 
framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences. 
This is true for marriage but also for the emergence of similar patterns 
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in, for example, commons management, sports or political structures. To 
a large extent, classical functionalist accounts are fraught with similar 
problems. They require that most institutions emerge as solutions to 
particular classes of problems or situations, and survive to the extent 
that they fulfill that role in congruence with other institutions. However, 
again, this has proved insufficient to account for the recurrence of 
particular institutions (e.g., raising children in families) compared with 
other, possibly efficient alternatives (e.g., raising children in kibbutz-
like communities) (Merton, 1996).
A more promising account of institutions appeared in economics 
with the development of neo-institutional models. These extended the 
notion of institution to encompass both formal and informal, tacit or 
explicit ‘rules of the game’ that constrain interaction between economic 
agents (North, 1990). These rules decrease transaction costs and 
information costs in particular. Within the neo-institutional tradition, 
there are different accounts of how institutions are created. Since there 
is not the space to review such models in detail, for such surveys, see 
Knight and Sened (1995), North (2005) and Brousseau and Glachant 
(2008). Briefly, conventional accounts assume that institutions emerge 
out of the recurrent features of repeated economic interactions—they 
are simply regularities turned into rules (Sugden, 1986). Competitive 
accounts suggest that institutions develop out of original, small-scale 
norms by conferring competitive advantages to newcomers who 
participate in the new arrangement (Greif, 2006). Finally, bargaining 
models emphasize power asymmetries between parties in the creation 
or modifications of institutions (Knight, 1995). However, none of these 
accounts point to easy, natural answers to questions of design. Whether 
specific institutions are shaped by bargaining or convention is not 
sufficient to account for highly specific features, such as, for example, the 
link between intention and responsibility in the law, or the connection 
between economic sharing and sex in marriage norms.
Here, we present a complement to neo-institutional accounts. 
Institutions comprise rules or norms that most agents obey, expect most 
others to obey and expect most others to expect them to obey (Bicchieri, 
2006). But, for a rule or a norm to become an institution, it must be 
widely distributed in the minds of the members in a group (Sperber, 
1996). In order to explain how institutions are developed and changed, 
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we therefore need to understand how people adopt, modify and 
transmit rules and norms (Heintz, 2007). Most importantly, we need 
to understand which types of rules and norms are particularly likely to 
be transmitted and adopted without much modification, while others 
require significant effort, skill and special knowledge.
This leads to our main contention, that institutions are best 
understood against the background of a set of human psychological 
dispositions that influence the effort needed to adopt and accept 
certain social arrangements. To introduce this cognitive account of 
institutions, we illustrate how our evolved psychology makes an impact 
on the developments of common features in three different domains of 
institutional design.
3. Illustration (I). Marriage Norms  
and Mating Strategies
Institutional Framework
In most societies, there is a distinction between occasional or informal 
sexual encounters and arrangements (which may be approved, tolerated, 
frowned upon, prohibited, etc.) and more stable and formalized unions. 
The initiation of the latter kind of union is generally, at least in principle, 
marked by some public event. There are shared norms about what each 
party should expect from the other, given such ceremonies, and about 
how they should behave towards third parties. Finally, sanctions are 
associated with the violation of these norms. Why is all this so common?
A standard, and plausible initial answer would be that such norms 
reduce uncertainty in social interaction, a general feature of social 
institutions. Marriage norms and wedding ceremonies certainly have 
that effect, in several ways. First, marriage between two individuals 
conveys to third parties that the individuals concerned have rights in 
each other that (mutatis mutandis the local norms) are not available to 
other members of the group. There is, for example, a certain amount of 
resources or help that a husband may expect from a wife or vice versa, 
or a woman from her in-laws, but not from others. Second, marriage 
conveys to third parties that the individuals concerned have (again, 
with local variations) withdrawn from the pool of potential mates. 
The fact that there is a long-term stable union between the partners 
 212. Institutions and Human Nature
modifies third parties’ mating strategies and preferences towards 
either one of the partners. Ceremonies do not just signal this to a large 
number of people, but also inform them all at the same time in the 
same way. Third, marriage conveys to each party that the other is (at 
least overtly) committed to fulfilling their obligations as per the local 
norms. Regardless of intentions, the public commitment signal creates 
expectations against which either party can measure behaviors.
In other words, the most important effects of weddings seem to 
consist in signaling. In all human societies, weddings are of interest and 
great concern to outsiders, which is why for instance the ceremonies 
are often quite literally very noisy affairs (van Gennep, 1909). Internal 
signals between the married parties are equally important. The potential 
benefits of an efficient marriage are in part public goods, and in many 
cases cannot be achieved without sacrifices, given the spouses’ divergent 
preferences (E. Posner, 2000). So marriage requires honest, hard-to-
fake signals of commitment. These are provided in many societies by 
costly conditions for marriage, for example, the obligation for brides to 
leave their kin groups, for grooms to provide bride wealth, or to show 
adequate means to support a family, etc. Such conditions serve (in part) 
as signals, which may explain why, when they are relaxed as happened 
in many Western societies, they are replaced with informal signals 
such as occasional gifts (E. Posner, 2000). The occurrence of informal, 
‘spontaneous’ signals varies inversely with the precision of the group-
wide representation of marriage roles.
All this is fine, but falls short of a satisfactory answer to questions of 
design. Coordination and uncertainty-reduction effects do not explain 
why marriage is universally about two parties, so that polygamy is a 
series of two-party contracts, not a group arrangement; why polygyny is 
common and polyandry exceedingly rare; why a single institution binds 
sexual, economic and offspring-related norms in most societies; why 
divorce is often available but fixed-term marriage is generally not; and 
other such common features.
Evolutionary Background
The institutions may make more sense in the context of specific 
preferences and competences that arise from human evolution. 
Obviously, natural selection results in particular mating preferences 
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and processes in each species, and ours can be no exception (Symons, 
1979). It would be surprising if human competences and preferences 
in this domain had no influence on the design of marriage. Indeed, 
human reproduction and parenting display expected features given 
the specific history of our primate lineage (Van Schaik & Van Hooff, 
1983).
As in most other mammals, there is in humans a large asymmetry 
of reproductive costs between human males and females. The latter’s 
costs include a long gestation, an even longer nurturing period, with 
their associated energy and opportunity costs, as compared with the 
lesser cost incurred by males. This, as in comparable species, means 
that sexual selection has been important in favoring distinct behaviors 
and preferences in males and females. Females need to be much 
choosier than males in mate selection. Also, females should prefer 
males with demonstrable capacity and willingness to nurture their 
offspring. Differences between male and female preferences result in an 
equilibrium that includes relatively long-term paternal investment in 
children’s nurturing, conditional on fathers’ certainty that the children 
are their own biological offspring, as well as a certain but limited amount 
of philandering and ‘mate poaching’ in both sexes.
These evolutionary factors predict a whole variety of human 
behaviors which are actually observed in most human societies, such as: 
the general disposition towards long-term paternal investment; sexual 
differences in attractiveness criteria (Buss, 1989); differences between 
criteria for long- and short-term mates (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005); the 
ways in which attractiveness is turned off by childhood cohabitation and 
other cues, leading to incest avoidance (Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 
2003); the specific triggers of and gender differences in sexual and 
romantic jealousy (Buss, 2000); mechanisms of sexual coercion and 
attempts by men to control women’s sexuality and increase paternal 
certainty (Wilson & Daly, 1998); the general pattern of serial exclusive 
monogamy (and polygyny) observed in human societies (Van Schaik & 
Van Hooff, 1983); the male tendency to reject step-children (Anderson, 
Kaplan, Lam, & Lancaster, 1999; Anderson, Kaplan, & Lancaster, 1999; 
Daly & Wilson, 1988); the influence of male presence/absence on young 
women’s choices of reproductive strategies (Ellis, 1993); and many 
other behaviors.
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Naturally, most computations required by such behaviors are largely 
unconscious — only their results are available to conscious inspection. 
To cite but one example, it seems that women’s choice of early sexual 
activity and early pregnancy are directly affected by paternal presence 
during a critical period in early childhood (Ellis et al., 2003). This can 
be explained as learning from the environment which reproductive 
strategy is most appropriate, given low paternal investment in offspring 
(Quinlan, 2003). Obviously, young women never represent reproductive 
choices as a search for optimal fitness. They are responding to such 
proxies as the attractiveness of particular mates or a desire for children, 
and other here-and-now preferences for particular kinds of behaviors, 
all of which are the outcome of non-conscious cognitive processes.
An Integrated Perspective
An important point here is that human preferences and behaviors in 
the mating domain include the expectation of stable long-term unions 
between men and women that associate privileged or exclusive sexual 
access with economic solidarity. Note that this is largely intuitive, that 
is, most humans hold this expectation without necessarily having the 
explicit model or principles that would explain it. Also, this expectation 
is of course more abstract than the norms for such long-term unions in 
particular societies, which can vary in many respects such as number 
of people involved (polygyny versus monogamy), exclusiveness (e.g., 
societies with sanctioned ‘visiting’ lovers), required paternal investment 
in offspring (from full responsibility to occasional visits) and, most 
important, filiation and inheritance rules.
All this suggests that human beings are equipped with an evolved, 
domain-specific learning system that is prepared for and attentive to 
information about the particular ways in which marriage unions are 
locally defined and organized. In this perspective, the transmission 
of culturally specific information about marriage norms ‘free-rides’ 
on information supplied by our intuitive expectations. That is, people 
easily acquire their local marriage norms because the assumptions (e.g., 
that the union is heterosexual, that it is about long-term mating, that 
it associates sexual access with resource sharing, etc.) are among the 
evolved cognitive equipment of the species.
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This would explain why many aspects of marriage norms are not 
the object of explicit, deliberate transmission, and seem to ‘go without 
saying’ while others are the object of explicit norms. For instance, 
the assumption that marriage binds a man and a woman is intuitive 
enough that it is not actually specified in most cultures. By contrast, 
the permissible number of simultaneous unions, or the precise manner 
in which they can be broken up, are matters of explicitly transmitted 
information. The expectations that married people will contribute to 
each other’s welfare, or that an officially declared union must be officially 
dissolved, do not have to be made explicit. In this perspective, the social 
institution seems to consist in particular parameter settings of a marriage 
template that is spontaneously created by normally developing minds.
4. Illustration (II). Criminal Law and Moral Intuitions
Institutions
The emergence of ‘the law’ as a separate domain of norms and 
behaviors, distinct from other social norms, is confined to large polities 
with literacy (Goody, 1986; Maine, 1963). However, most human groups 
do have explicit norms for conflict resolution and the punishment of 
wrongs, even if these are not defined as different from ordinary, 
non-legal decision making (Hoebel, 1964). From these norms and 
procedures to the literate, codified legal systems of large states, there is a 
continuum of social complexification, along which some central aspects 
of legal norms are preserved. Legal systems all modify personal, face-
to-face conflict resolution on the basis of norms that are: (a) explicit; 
(b) (at least partly) de-contextualized (e.g., construed as the right way 
to sanction theft, rather than this particular act of theft); (c) (at least 
partly) impersonal, as they in principle apply to whole classes of agents 
or even to all possible agents; and (d) therefore more predictable than 
informal ones.
Why these common features? One possible explanation is that legal 
institutions are just economically efficient sets of conventions. Richard 
Posner, for instance, considers that standard economic models of utility 
maximization explain most features of legal systems (R. A. Posner, 
1981). Economic rationality would account for differences between the 
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custom-bound legal systems of small-scale traditional societies, and the 
legal codes of large-scale industrial polities. For instance, the former 
generally maintain strict (no-fault) liability, so that one (or one’s kin 
group) is responsible for whatever damage one has caused, whether 
or not one is guilty of a wrong or of negligence. This, as Richard Posner 
argues, makes sense in economic systems where the cost of information 
is particularly high, so that long inquiries into circumstances and 
intentions would be problematic. In the same way, the fact that litigants 
are generally asked to pay for arbitrage, in other words to hire a judge, 
makes sense as there is no institution for the public provision of 
magistrates (R. A. Posner, 1981).
Economic efficiency can certainly account for specific differences 
between the legal norms of various places, but it seems insufficient to 
explain the common features of these systems and the ways in which 
people generally find them compelling (Cosmides & Tooby, 2006). This 
is particularly clear in the domain of criminal justice, where apparently 
obvious features of the institutions, e.g., tacit assumptions about 
the relative severity of different crimes, only make sense against the 
background of cooperation in ancestral conditions. The naturalness of 
(many) social institutions arrangements are based on complex intuitive 
assumptions about behavior, intentions and fairness.
Relevant Cognitive Systems
In the last 20 years, convergent findings in developmental psychology, 
behavioral economics and cross-cultural psychology have suggested 
that human beings in very different groups evaluate the moral 
valence of actions on the basis of largely tacit, emotion-laden common 
intuitions (Haidt, 2007). Intuitive morality is independent from (and 
only partly affected by) explicit, culturally specific understandings of 
and teachings about right and wrong (Greene, 2005). Intuitive morality 
also underpins a sense of fairness that is quite distinct from economic 
rationality (McCabe & Smith, 2001). Rather than survey these models 
and findings, we will only mention those points directly relevant to the 
issue of criminal behavior and appropriate punishment.
Human minds in a variety of cultural environments develop the 
following specific intuitive processes. First, there is a domain of moral 
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principles and norms, distinct from other evaluative dimensions of 
action. Indeed, even preschool children have definite intuitions about 
the difference between moral rules and mere social conventions (Elliot 
Turiel, 1994). Second, the judgment that a behavior is permissible, 
commendable or wrong occurs as a fast, automatic consequence of 
representing the specific action and context. These intuitions may then be 
explicated, nuanced or (more rarely) reversed by explicit reasoning, but 
the latter is quite literally an afterthought — deliberate, slow and often 
produced in order to justify a pre-existing intuition. Third, intuitive moral 
appraisals are generally accompanied by congruent emotions. Emotional 
appraisal is part of the processes leading to moral evaluation, which is 
why experimental manipulations of the emotion can trigger significant 
changes in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). All this is particularly visible 
in young children’s moral development. In contrast to the classical, 
Kantian picture of children gradually building moral understandings 
by acquiring more complex modes of reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981), 
experimental evidence suggests that moral development consists in the 
calibration of prior intuitions (E. Turiel, 2002).
Experimental evidence also shows that people are intuitively 
convinced that wrong behaviors vary in seriousness — that much is 
assumed by young children even for completely novel behaviors (E. 
Turiel, 2002). Another common intuition is that the punishment should 
fit the crime, as it were — such that a schedule of graded punishments 
is required (Nichols & Knobe, 2008). Again, these thoughts are not 
entertained as the result of deliberate reasoning on moral matters, but 
as the intuitions that start the process of moral reasoning.
Another important aspect of moral intuitions is a motivation to 
punish norm violators, even in third parties who are not harmed by 
the transgression. This preference is not based on learning from trial 
and error, since the potential consequences of either punitive or non-
punitive strategies are manifest only in the long run. Such punitive 
attitudes are universal in human groups and virtually non-existent in 
other animals. There are various interpretations for this evolutionary 
novelty. Punitive sentiments may have helped recruitment to collective 
action (Yamagishi, 1992). They may also signal cooperative attitudes, 
as those who punish transgressors are signaling their attachment to 
local norms and their willingness to incur costs in their defense (Fessler, 
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2001), which would explain why people tend to be more punitive when 
observed by others (Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones, 2007). Finally, punitive 
attitudes may be an attempt to eliminate the fitness advantage enjoyed 
by free-riders (Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002) or recalibrate their 
motivations (Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2010). What is certain 
is that the motivation for third-party punishment is general in human 
groups, and strong enough to override the cost involved.
An Integrated Perspective
In the same way as for marriage, evolved psychological capacities and 
processes constrain legal norms. They provide a set of understandings 
that need not be explicitly transmitted as a condition for participation, 
and therefore make institutions ‘learnable’ to the extent that they are 
congruent to intuitive understandings (Cosmides & Tooby, 2006). Legal 
institutions do not require that one learn concepts of right and wrong, 
the need for appropriate sanctions, or that one acquire the motivation 
for third-party punishment. Also, the ways in which legal institutions 
publicize decision making seems to derive from moral intuitions. As we 
noted, people have definite intuitions about the role of reputation in 
cooperation. It may be no surprise that legal institutions turn reasoning 
and decision making, ordinarily private mental events, into publicly 
scrutable processes. Courts work in the open, laws are inscribed in 
stone or in books, and penalties are made visible, for instance, by using 
stigma as a salient form of punishment (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; E. A. 
Posner, 2007). All these aspects of the law seem self-evident to most 
practitioners, as indeed they should be if they are based on common 
pre-existing intuitions.
In return, institutions do modify social interactions in the legal 
domain. Obviously, the existence of public representations of norms and 
processes make punishment more predictable and the domain of lawful 
behavior more easily delineated, which translates as an advantage in 
transaction costs (R. A. Posner, 1981). But the effects may be even deeper, 
as most people tend to reify or essentialize the law as independent from 
actual people’s decisions and the workings of their minds. To the extent 
that the motivations for particular judgments seem both stable and 
impersonal, they reinforce this tacit form of legal idealism, a notion that 
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laws are not made but discovered, which itself may make them more 
compelling.
5. Illustration (III). Commons and Exchange Intuitions
The cognitive framework may also make sense of some common features 
of particular economic institutions. Consider, for instance, Elinor 
Ostrom’s description of the principles that allow efficient management 
of common-pool resources such as fisheries, water distribution, 
etc., in which a resource must be pooled and might be depleted by 
opportunistic unregulated use (Ostrom, 1990). According to Ostrom, 
the following principles are necessary, though not sufficient, to preserve 
the semi-formal institutions that manage commons: (1) some rules must 
clearly define the set of agents authorized to use the commons and the 
conditions for entry; (2) the rules must be adapted to the specific nature 
of the resource; (3) the rules must be designed by the users; (4) rule 
observance must be monitored by the users or agents accountable to the 
users; and (5) rule violation must be sanctioned by graded punishment 
(Ostrom, 1990).
Why are commons institutions the way they are, and why these 
recurrent features? An institutional account does not directly address 
them, as it is focused on different issues, both theoretical (showing 
how efficient commons-management systems emerge despite collective 
action problems) and pragmatic (deriving recommendations for 
efficient commons management). All the rules mentioned above require 
a complex background of psychological processes and preferences. 
For one thing, commons management implies definite judgments 
about distributive justice, about which divisions of resources count 
as acceptable, given different agents’ contributions or needs (Fehr, 
Schmidt, Kolm, & Ythier, 2006). Psychologists have shown that such 
judgments are mostly based on early developed intuitions (Enright, 
1984). Young children in very diverse cultures use similar principles 
of distributive justice, combining a principle of equality (equal shares 
as the best distribution) with context-based intuitions about merit and 
need (Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). Obviously, these early judgments 
are then calibrated during development as a function of local forms of 
exchange. But the underlying principles subsist. They result in specific 
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fairness intuitions that cannot be explained in terms of standard rational 
choice models (Fehr et al., 2006).
The cognitive mechanisms required for commons management 
also include the capacity and motivation to identify violators of agreed 
norms. Experimental findings suggest that people are specifically 
sensitive to cheating (taking benefits without paying costs in a social 
contract) and quickly identify which behaviors constitute cheating. The 
underlying cognitive system is domain specific, in the sense that social 
contract violations are not processed in the same way as violations of 
social norms in general, or exceptions to other kinds of rules (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2005).
As Ostrom and others have demonstrated, efficient use of commons 
requires a whole lot of specific ‘tools’ (institutions in the neo-institutional 
framework) such as rules, norms and models to overcome collective 
action problems. However, these tools need not be provided by the 
institutions themselves. To a large extent, norms and rules ‘free-ride’ 
on competencies and motivations for fair exchange that are part of our 
evolved cognitive equipment.
6. What Are Evolved Domain-Specific Systems?
Evolved Systems as Specialized Learning  
and Decision Mechanisms
The perspective developed in relation to these three examples highlights 
how institutional designs are directly facilitated by the structure of 
human cognition. In this way, they complement the focus of previous 
accounts of the interplay between cognition and institutions. In the 
extant literature, the focus has been on the general cognitive limitations 
of human cognition and how the latter affect the workings of institutions. 
One strand of argument has been preoccupied with how the fallibility of 
institutional designs can be traced back to the fallibility of the cognitive 
capabilities of their designers (Pierson, 2004). Another strand of research 
has focused on how institutions can buffer the limits of human cognition 
(Knight & North, 1997). Hence, institutions — refined through trial 
and error — provide external constraints on behavior which simplify 
individual choice and guide it toward rational outcomes. A third strand 
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of research has focused less on the limits of fixed cognitive processes but 
rather argued for the plasticity of cognitive processes and how they are 
molded by the institutional environment of the individual (Dequech, 
2006). While these avenues toward integrating insights on human 
cognition and institutions are highly important, they are based on an 
incomplete description of the current state of knowledge in cognitive 
science.
In our view, the content (and not just the limits) of a variety 
of special and species-typical cognitive systems, as observed by 
evolutionary anthropologists and psychologists, is relevant to issues 
of institutional design and maintenance. As we noted above, human 
beings have an intuitive mating psychology that includes attractiveness 
judgments, relationship maintenance and reproductive strategies 
(Buss, 1989; Symons, 1979). They have specialized social exchange 
mechanisms for cheater- and cooperator-detection (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2005) and a highly specific moral psychology (Haidt, 2007). They 
also have a coalitional psychology which monitors the establishment 
and maintenance of groups with common interests, vigilance towards 
defection, rivalry towards other groups, etc. (Kurzban & Neuberg, 2005), 
as well as systems that monitor ethnic cohesion and attitudes towards 
others (Schaller, 2006) or gender relations (Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000; 
Wilson & Daly, 1992). In fact, sketching the range of evolved cognitive 
mechanisms underlying common human behaviors would be far beyond 
the scope of this article (for general surveys, see (Buss, 2005); (Dunbar, 
Barrett, & Lycett, 2005)).
Several features of these cognitive systems are of particular relevance 
here:
Cognitive systems are domain specific. Cognitive predispositions are 
not just general constraints, for example, on the amount of material that 
can be acquired, on the capacity of attention and memory. Cognitive 
predispositions also consist in domain-specific expectations about the 
kinds of objects and agents to be found in the world. Only some items 
of information trigger operation of a specific system, in much the same 
way as only molecules of a particular shape and composition trigger 
the activity of specific enzymes (Barrett, 2005). Many such narrow 
input–output relationships are species-typical fixations rather than 
plastic features that can be molded by environmental processes (Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1992).
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Each domain-specific system includes its own decision-making procedures. 
In most standard models of economists and political scientists, one 
assumes that people’s behavior is guided by a domain-general, utility-
maximizing cognitive system. In those cases in which human behavior 
does not conform to normative models, this is said to result from general 
limitations of the decision-making system, for instance because of biases 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) or impulsiveness (Ainslie, 2005; 
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2005). These putative flaws in decision 
making are thought to be domain general — they would occur in the 
same way in, say, keeping friends and keeping lovers, avoiding enemies 
and avoiding pathogens. However, psychological evidence suggests a 
different picture, in which each domain-specific system (e.g., concerned 
with retaining mates, or with recruiting coalitional allies) comes with its 
own, domain-appropriate decision rules. For instance, if you are dealing 
with a contractor for house repairs, it may make sense to average the 
benefits and costs from previous interactions with that specific agent, 
in order to compute their overall value to you. If dealing with a lover, 
it would seem intuitively odd to balance cases of infidelity with cases 
of availability. Even when we use rules of thumb or ‘fast and frugal 
heuristics’, these are tailored to the kinds of problems we evolved to 
encounter (Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999).
Competencies and preferences are integrated. This is a consequence of the 
previous point. Each domain-specific cognitive system includes its own 
decision-making procedures which combine specific preferences and 
specific competencies. There is no reason to consider that preferences 
are external to decision-making systems. For instance, consider human 
coalitional psychology, our capacity to form an alliance with genetically 
unrelated agents, usually against other groups. It includes as part of a 
single package both a set of preferences (e.g., a strong aversion for other 
agents’ defection, a desire to make the coalition stronger, a willingness 
to pay a high price of entry, etc.) and a set of competences (e.g., the 
monitoring skills to detect other agents’ commitment, the signaling 
skills to express one’s solidarity, etc.).
Cognitive systems are learning mechanisms. Each domain-specific 
system is specialized in picking up particular kinds of information in the 
organism’s environment. Contrary to widespread assumptions outside 
evolutionary biology, ‘acquired information’ and ‘genetically specified 
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information’ are not a zero-sum system. On the contrary, organisms that 
can acquire vast amounts of information from their environments (e.g., 
primates) need vastly more specified initial systems than organisms 
(e.g., invertebrates) that acquire less. Between species, more learning 
invariably means more ‘instinct’, so to speak. Humans have a complex 
coalitional psychology and a complex mating psychology, which means 
that in both domains they acquire enormous amounts of information 
from their social and natural environments precisely because 
sophisticated learning systems in these domains are specified by their 
genotypes.
Implications for Interaction with Environments
These features have a number of implications for the operations of 
human cognition which are highly important to institutional researchers. 
Here, we focus on two implications. We begin by outlining them in 
relative broad terms, review some of the evidence for these implications 
in the cognitive science literature and then specifically apply them to 
institutional analysis.
Cognitive systems operate more reliably in matching environments. 
Cognitive systems are designed to operate within a specific domain 
and, therefore, the inbuilt assumptions, categories, competences and 
learning procedures reflect the evolutionarily recurrent structure of that 
exact domain. When cognitive systems are applied to problems on the 
fringes of their proper domain, they will operate less automatically and 
less reliably.
This has been directly shown in cognitive research. For example, we 
have evolved to hunt prey and protect ourselves against predators and, 
therefore, most probably have specialized cognitive systems designed 
to track the movements of animals, their orientation, and their most 
likely trajectory (Barrett, 2005a). In modern societies, predatory animals 
constitute less a threat than, for example, cars but this does not mean that 
we can effortlessly apply the systems designed for tracking the former 
to the latter. And, in fact, Joshua New et al. showed that subjects are far 
slower to recognize changes in car orientation than the orientation of 
animals—even when these animals are visually unfamiliar, unimportant, 
and barely discernible (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007).
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Similarly, we detect violations of rules faster and more reliably 
when detecting violations corresponds to detecting cheaters on social 
exchanges (Ermer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). As argued above, rule 
violation in the context of social exchange is the exact domain of a 
set of highly specialized cognitive systems while, most likely, generic 
rule violations are not. This insight is also directly applicable to actual 
design situations. Human–computer interfaces require much less effort 
on behalf of the user if these interfaces correspond to the structure of 
cognitive systems designed for handling real-world objects (Nørager, 
2009).
The structure of cognitive systems creates a baseline motivation to shape 
environments into a format that matches them. Because environments that fit 
our cognitive systems can be processed effortlessly (given the possibility 
for reliably applying evolved categories, competences, etc.), people will 
find matching environments more ‘natural’ and their exigencies more 
compelling. Also, creating and upholding non-matching environments 
require a level of effort that individuals could be unwilling to pay 
without special incentives.
Again, a number of studies in cognitive science have directly 
demonstrated this. Most of these studies have focused on an extreme 
version of the above principle, in the sense that these studies have shown 
that we simply process and react toward non-matching environments as 
if they were matching. In the domain of popular culture, one obvious 
example is pornography that is psychologically represented as if mating 
opportunities were present, thereby triggering sexual arousal, etc. (Saad 
& Gill, 2014). Similarly, research shows that people have difficulties 
in distinguishing between their real friends and people they see on 
television in the sense that their satisfaction with their friendships is 
influenced by both (Kanazawa, 2002). These cognitive effects also occur 
in the direct interaction with others. For example, modern individuals 
process the anonymous one-shot interactions of mass society (an 
evolutionary novel phenomenon) as if they were of the iterated kind to 
which we have most probably adapted (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006; 
Price et al., 2002).
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Predictions concerning Institutional Design
One may object that this is fine but insufficient. The 
evolutionary — cognitive model may solve some issues of design, telling 
us what rules are ‘natural’, easy to acquire and intuitively compelling for 
human beings. But, the objection goes, it does not address the major 
question of institutional development, i.e., why are these cognitive tools 
and motivations activated in some but not all contexts? Why, as a result, 
are some commons successful and others less so? Since the cognitive 
tools are always present, why are they not always used?
Institutions are a part of the external environment of individual 
actors and, hence, are processed with the same cognitive effects as 
other parts of the environment. The application of the above insights 
to institutional analysis is, therefore, straightforward. Doing so 
should enable researchers to build specific predictions about (a) 
which institutions or aspects of institutions people are more likely to 
find ‘natural’, (b) to what extent people can have an intuitive grasp 
of the actual workings of their institutions, and (c) how institutional 
participation can recruit motivations that are there anyway, regardless 
of the institutional environment.
In essence, we suggest that the structure of evolved cognitive systems 
and dispositions create a cognitive ‘rubber cage’ (Gellner, 1985). 
That is, human understandings are usually constructed and therefore 
constrained by the structure of long-evolved cognitive systems, and 
remain inside the cage, as it were. It is not impossible to think beyond our 
intuitive assumptions or to build institutions that violate them. However, 
each such extension requires some effort, and the further one moves 
away from intuitive expectations, preferences and understandings, the 
more effort is required (Boyer, 1998; Sperber, 1996). The further away 
one moves from our evolved understandings, (a) the more effort will be 
required to get them adopted by large numbers of people, (b) the less 
people will intuitively grasp how the institution works, and (c) the less 
motivated they may be to participate.
Because divergence from the intuitive set of design features requires 
effort, such divergence will be less common than convergence (at least, 
absent other strong environmental pressures for divergence). Of course, 
this is likely to be a matter of degree. For instance, it is not too difficult 
 352. Institutions and Human Nature
for some human groups to extend the scope of marriage-like institutions 
to, say, encompass homosexual unions. A more radical departure from 
common intuitions would be to envisage fixed-term marriage contracts 
or simultaneous polyandric unions. Although such arrangements are not 
unthinkable or impossible, they are less likely than standard marriage-
like systems in human societies, given the intuitive assumptions that 
normal human minds spontaneously develop about the connections 
between sex, reproduction and subsistence. Within this approach, it is 
also possible to specify a number of other specific predictions:
People will prefer intuitive to non-intuitive institutions. Intuitive 
institutions, quite simply, seem more natural and appropriate to people. 
For people to prefer a non-intuitive solution to a problem that mimics 
something which our cognitive architecture was designed to solve, 
effort is required on their behalf and they need good reasons to put in 
this extra effort.
Some research has specifically shown this in the domain of 
punishment institutions. As argued above, punishment has most 
probably played a key role for evolution of human social life. Recent 
studies in neuroscience demonstrate that brain regions related to the 
production of pleasure are activated when subjects engage in the 
punishment of free-riders (de Quervain et al., 2004). Also, economic 
experiments have demonstrated that people prefer to tackle collective 
action problems in institutional contexts that allow for punishment 
(Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006). We can observe such effects 
outside the laboratory as well. Throughout the twentieth century, 
criminal justice institutions have shifted from punishing to helping 
the offender (Garland, 1990). Politically, this shift was legitimized 
by references to criminologists and other experts’ observations that 
punishment did not work to reduce crime in large societies. In this 
way, criminal justice institutions were pulled away from their intuitive 
function — to impose costs on anti-social individuals (Petersen et al., 
2010)—and instead designed to simply decrease recidivism in a non-
moralizing manner. Across countries, however, these attempts have now 
been significantly reversed and an explicit part of this has been public 
reactions led by, for example, victim movements. When they reverted 
to more punitive practices, policy makers often made clear that the 
reversal aimed at placating public sentiment rather than decreasing 
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crime (Balvig, 2005). In our terms, the return to punitive rhetoric and 
practices made the institution closer to our evolved intuitions.
This example also illustrates another point: that intuitiveness is 
especially important for institutions that are directed toward the public. 
Worries about rehabilitation-oriented systems did not come from within 
the penal system itself, whose personnel were quite willing to invest 
the needed effort to think outside their intuitions. Rather, the pressure 
came from the general public who have much else on their minds than 
investing cognitive effort in overwriting their punishment intuitions 
(Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, & Hough, 2002).
More intuitive institutions are more efficient in influencing behavior. 
This follows from our argument that intuitive institutions are easier to 
process. It is important to notice that this is not just because it is easier 
to learn some kind of institutional rules than others but rather because 
intuitive institutional rules simply require less learning on behalf of 
the subjects. For instance, criminal justice practices that rely on evolved 
concepts of right and wrong influence public behavior, we suggest, 
not because citizens have uploaded legal knowledge in their minds 
but precisely because evolved expectations spare them that effort. 
While laymen, for example, do not know the specific punishments for 
shoplifting versus grievous assault, their behavior can be guided by an 
intuitive understanding that the latter is more serious than the first 
(Robinson et al., 2007).
An example from the health sector serves to illustrate this. To avoid 
poisoning of children, a government-funded health program in the USA 
encouraged parents to mark poisonous materials with a ‘Mr. Yuk’ sticker, 
an emoticon with the facial expression of disgust, to signal that the 
material should not be ingested. The effectiveness of this program was 
negligible (Demorest, Posner, Osterhoudt, & Henretig, 2004). One factor 
is that accidental poisoning does not fall within the evolved domain of 
disgust but rather within the domain of fear — i.e., hazard management. 
Adults as well as children react to accidental poisoning with fear rather 
than disgust (Pooley & Fiddick, 2010). Marking poisonous material with 
disgust-conveying emoticons does not engage the cognitive machinery 
for producing the very behavior that the institution aims at activating.
Our claim here, it must be stressed, is not that ‘natural’ institutions 
are necessarily more efficient in terms of generating optimal outcomes. 
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Efficiency is here strictly understood with reference to their power to 
influence behavior and not whether the resulting behavior is optimal 
or rational. In fact, given that our evolved cognitive systems evolved in 
ancestral environments, institutions that seem ‘natural’ to the human 
mind might often be ill-suited to solve the problems of modern-day 
mass society (Carvalho & Koyama, 2010).
More intuitive institutions seem more legitimate. In the domain of social 
and moral interaction, institutions that promote our welfare in an intuitive 
way (i.e., by promoting behavior that would have been ancestrally 
beneficial and sanctioning behavior that would have been ancestrally 
costly to us) would be, all else being equal, perceived as more legitimate. 
As classical sociologists have emphasized, legitimacy is at the root of 
effective governance (Tyler, 2001). If rules are perceived as legitimate, 
individuals will spontaneously incorporate them into their decisions. 
Importantly, efficiency in influencing behavior is not necessarily the 
same as efficiency in solving the problem that the institution is designed 
for. Our cognitive systems are designed to function within evolutionarily 
recurrent situations and can be ill suited for solving the problems of 
large societies. Similarly, there is no guarantee that institutions matching 
these intuitions are good at solving modern problems.
Evidence concerning the management of common-pool resources can 
be interpreted along these lines. In relation to common-pool resources, 
the problem is congestion and, hence, people need to be restrained 
in their use of the resources. Detailed studies have shown that the 
institutions that facilitate restraint most effectively are institutions that 
facilitate face-to-face interaction among the participants (Ostrom, 1990). 
This allows for a social situation that mimics that kind of situation in 
which we have evolved to deal with such problems of collective actions. 
In fact, laboratory experiments show that resources are protected 
by institutions that emerge as a result of between-participant social 
interaction, better than by externally enforced institutions, even if 
the latter yield the optimal use of the resource (Cardenas, Stranlund, 
& Willis, 2002). The reason is that people do not feel intrinsically 
committed to the optimal-but-enforced institutions and, therefore, cheat 
on them whenever possible.
Clearly, then, the efficiency of institutions in regulating behavior is 
not a matter of their inherent rationality. Rather, it is the extent to which 
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they allow for appropriate cognitive machinery to become activated. 
In the case of collective action, a number of studies document that the 
human mind contains sophisticated machinery for committing ourselves 
to pro-social decisions but that these are extremely sensitive to the 
extent to which others are similarly committed (given selection pressures 
for making cooperation reciprocal) (Frank, 1988). Coordination of 
commitment is possible when institutions for common-pool resources 
are endogenously agreed upon rather than exogenously enforced.
Another illustration of the importance of ‘naturalness’ for the 
regulatory potential of institutions is provided by a series of studies of 
when people accept specific distributions of costs and benefits (Hibbing 
& Alford, 2004; Smith, Larimer, Littvay, & Hibbing, 2007). People’s 
reactions are modulated, not just by whether or not they benefit from 
the allocation, but also by the way the institutions orchestrating the 
allocation matches evolved moral sentiments. Using the Ultimatum 
Game, Hibbing and Alford, for example, experimentally varied the 
institutions governing who would be assigned the role of proposer and, 
hence, be allowed to divide a pot of money between themselves and 
the other participant — the receiver — who could accept the division or 
decline (in which case neither participant received any money). Receivers 
readily accepted (and felt satisfied with) highly unequal divisions 
(against their interest), if the institutions governing the allocation of 
roles focused on merit or chance but not if these institutions focused on 
preferences, that is, granted a participant the power to propose because 
he/she wanted this role most (Hibbing & Alford, 2004). We have evolved 
cognitive devices to resist exploitation (Buss & Duntley, 2008), which is 
why we spontaneously suspect the motives of eager dictators — and, of 
particular relevance here, feel more dissatisfied with institutions that 
allow them to move into power.
Non-intuitive institutions will drift towards greater intuitiveness. Non-
intuitive institutions require subjects to continuously invest effort to 
ensure that their rules are correctly recalled. For example, studies in 
social psychology demonstrate that individuals use effortful cognitive 
operations to encode and recall expectation-inconsistent information 
when forming impressions of others (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, 
& Calvini, 1999). By implication, we expect that popular images and 
understandings of the rules of non-intuitive institutions will drift 
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towards greater intuitiveness; that is, over time (if countervailing actions 
are not taken) subjects will be more likely to recall intuition-confirming 
parts of institutions and mold initially intuition-disconfirming rules into 
a format that matches intuitions.
One example of this comes from religious institutions and, in 
particular, Max Weber’s classical account of the rise of capitalism 
(Weber, 2002). Before the reformation, Christians could secure salvation 
by submitting themselves to the authority of the Catholic Church. After 
the reformation, this possibility was closed and, instead, the dominant 
theological paradigm described how certain people were predestined to 
become saved. With predestination, the normal response to a problem 
as psychologically significant as the prospect of eternal damnation, i.e., 
action, was effectively removed. As a result, at the popular level, the 
theological institution of predestination quickly drifted into the more 
intuitive informal institution of looking for signs for salvation in the 
form of success in the current life. Through success and, hence, hard 
work, one could then ‘reveal’ oneself as chosen for salvation.
Divergence between non-intuitive official doctrine and public practice 
and belief is also widespread in the realm of politics (Kuran, 1995). In 
the literature on political tolerance, for example, it is often noted that 
people strongly endorse official doctrines about widespread civil rights 
for everyone, and at the same time display strong intolerance towards 
specific groups (McClosky & Brill, 2003). In the domain of criminal 
justice, there is widespread support for the principle of proportionality, 
i.e., that punishments should ‘fit’ the crime (Darley & Pittman, 2003), 
enshrined in modern criminal justice institutions but at the same 
time people, when considering specific criminals, allow for a number 
of exceptions to these principles. While such public beliefs do not 
necessarily reshape official institutions, they nonetheless influence how 
the institutions in fact work. As these last examples show, a cognitive 
science account of institutions does not preclude the possibility that 
institutions are also shaped by environmental factors that can make them 
divert from natural focal points. Rather, the point is that such divergence 
will constantly be put under pressure by processes of institutional drift 
towards greater fit with our evolved cognitive systems.
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7. Is a General Theory of Institutions Possible  
(or Desirable)?
The framework proposed here implies a substantial departure from 
common assumptions in theories of institutional design. Neo-institutional 
models, for instance, describe domain-general processes that should in 
principle apply in similar ways to marriage, exchange or criminal law, 
or most other domains of institutional norms (Ostrom, 2005). Also, 
the aim of such models is to provide general economic or political 
factors that constrain institutional development. By contrast, we have 
argued that one should explain institutions in terms of domain-specific 
psychological systems. Human psychology comes with assumptions, 
capacities and preferences concerning, for example, reproduction and 
parenting, distinct and separate from those concerning the punishment 
of wrongdoing or the establishment of reliable exchange relations. 
These are exogenous factors in the sense that they stem from the evolved 
cognitive make-up of the species, independently of social institutions.
If this is a valid proposal, then a general theory of institutions as 
such is not really what social scientists should aim for. That is because a 
general model, based solely on endogenous factors, should be extremely 
abstract to be equally applicable to the many disparate domains of 
institutional development. At such a level of abstraction, the model may 
not predict or exclude anything in particular, and therefore may not be of 
great value. An account of institutional design and development is more 
likely to come from integrated, probably situation-specific, models that 
bring together economic constraints and human-specific competencies 
in particular domains of social interaction.
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3. Why Ritualized Behavior?
Introductory Note
Why do people perform rituals? Over the world and however far we 
can go in the past, human groups seem to engage in what we would 
recognize as, well, ‘rituals’ of some kind or other, even though we may 
be very unclear about what that term is supposed to convey. Pierre 
Liénard nudged me to join forces and re-open that question, which 
used to be central in classical anthropology, together with the additional 
query, what is the connection (if any) between the collective ceremonies 
described by anthropologists or historians, and the compulsive behaviors 
of obsessive patients?
So, why perform rituals? The question of why this (vaguely defined) 
way of behaving is universal was more often avoided than addressed in 
anthropology, as quite a few anthropologists have pointed out (Bloch, 
1974; Rappaport, 1999). We were told that collective rituals expressed 
a world-view, or reflected social values or made manifest a social order 
etc. All such statements raise more questions than they solve. Why 
would you need a ritual to do any of these things?
As for the striking similarities between collective ceremonies and the 
individual, often pathological rituals observed in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD)—the article provides a detailed account of these 
similarities—the question had been largely abandoned after Sigmund 
Freud’s desultory observation (1948) that religious ritual could be 
described as collective obsessiveness and obsessiveness as a kind of 
individual religion… which did not help much.
Our work diverged from previous models and theories of rituals in 
three distinct ways.
First, Liénard and I agreed that we should try to describe ritualization 
rather than rituals. That is not a pedantic distinction. Rituals are the 
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outcome—the collective or private ceremonies found in most human 
cultures, the routines of individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
as well as the repetitive behaviors of many children. Ritualization is 
the combination of underlying processes that creates all this, making 
it natural or even compelling individuals to engage in these behaviors. 
A great deal of confusion in anthropology stems from a focus on 
the result, on ‘rituals’, rather than on the processes that cause them. 
Anthropologists have for instance wasted much time trying to define 
the term ritual, to demarcate what is and what is not a ritual, and so 
forth. This is a bit like spending one’s time trying to define what counts 
as a ‘fire’ and what does not, rather than describing the physics and 
chemistry of combustion—for a more recent critique of that unfortunate 
tendency, see Boyer & Liénard (2020).
Second, Liénard suggested that we should build our account on 
the basis of the ‘security motivation’ model proposed by Szetchman 
& Woody (2004) to account for the neuro-physiology of obsessive-
compulsive disorders. Together with previous evolutionary models by 
Abed & de Pauw (1998), as well as Fiske & Haslam (1997), this neuro-
physiological model provided a key to understanding how ordinary 
actions can become ritualized. Our model is very much a modified 
version of the Szechtman & Woody account, with a few important twists, 
as discussed in the paper. (I should point out that the neuro-physiology 
in the paper is of course partly out of date, although the main points 
remain valid).
Third, Freud was obviously wrong—most anthropologists would 
agree with that—but it matters to understand exactly why. Consider 
people performing a collective ritual, e.g., sacrificing a pig to the 
ancestors as a way to placate them and ward off witches and devils. 
The reason why people engage in such behaviors is that they receive 
messages from other people, their elders for instance, that one should 
engage in this course of action. The content of these messages is the 
reason why the ritual actions are reiterated. As we describe in the paper, 
people will follow a ritual recipe if it is (even marginally) more relevant 
than alternatives available in their social environment. In our account, 
people receive a description of the cultural ceremonies that is relevant 
because it activates, however faintly, cognitive systems that evolved to 
protect us against potential hazards like contagion and predators. That 
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is sufficient. This is a matter of cultural selection and reconstruction—in 
the same way as people select some stories among the many stories they 
hear, and store and reconstruct them, whilst abandoning other variants 
or other stories, a process of cultural ‘epidemiology’ described in detail 
by Dan Sperber (1996) and Sperber & Hirschfeld (2004).
The re-iteration and performance of such rituals does not, in any 
way, require that the participants suffered from any special anxieties, 
that rituals could allay mental states, or any other such functionalist 
assumptions. Liénard made this even clearer in our subsequent paper, 
focused on cultural rituals and their dynamics (Liénard & Boyer, 2006). 
Strikingly, that unfounded assumption (that people participate in 
collective rituals to assuage their anxieties) is so entrenched, that some 
of the commentators on the original article took it for granted that we 
must be defending that explanation, despite our (as we saw it) clear 
assurances to the contrary.
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Why Ritualized Behavior?  
Precaution Systems and Action Parsing  
in Developmental, Pathological and 
Cultural Rituals1
with Pierre Liénard2
Abstract: Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its 
stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational 
motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, 
and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious 
or non-religious; in many children’s complicated routines; in 
the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in 
normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in 
particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, 
neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation 
of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System 
geared to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to 
fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond 
to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential 
danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In 
OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., & Liénard, 
P. (2006). Why ritualized behavior? Precaution systems and action parsing in 
developmental, pathological and cultural rituals. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29, 
595–613. Republished by permission of Cambridge University Press.
2  We are grateful to Leda Cosmides and John Tooby for initial inspiration, and to Dan 
Fessler, Thomas Lawson, Robert McCauley, Pascale Michelon, Mayumi Okada, Tom 
Oltmanns, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, Howard Waldow, Dan Wegner, Harvey Whitehouse, 
and Jeff Zacks, for detailed comments on a draft version of this article. 
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to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about 
the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. 
Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units 
of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units 
normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized 
actions are submitted to cognitive control. This ‘swamps’ working 
memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions 
but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this 
Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in 
normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through 
childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system’s normal input 
makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A 
number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. 
1. Ritualized Behavior 
In a variety of circumstances, humans produce rituals, intuitively 
recognizable by their stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack 
of rational motivation. Behavior of this kind is found in cultural rituals, 
religious or non-religious; in the complicated routines of many children; 
in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders; in normal adults 
around certain stages of the life-cycle, especially during birthing. The 
common features of these behaviors cry out for explanation. 
We build on a variety of prior models to describe a core psychological 
process that we call action ritualization—which is only a part of individual 
or cultural rituals, but a crucial part. The occurrence of ritualization 
depends on the conjunction of two specialized cognitive systems. One 
is a motivational system geared to the detection of and reaction to 
particular potential threats to fitness. This ‘Hazard-Precaution System’ 
includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire 
of species-typical precautions. The other system might be called ‘Action 
Parsing.’ It is concerned with the division of the flow of behavior into 
meaningful units. In some circumstances, specific interaction between 
these systems creates ritualized actions. The circumstances are different 
for individual, pathological, and collective rituals, as we will see. But 
the core ritualization process explains some of their common properties. 
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There is no precise definition of ‘ritual’ in any of the three fields that 
deal with its typical manifestations. Cultural anthropologists generally 
accept a very vague definition of the term as scripted, stereotypic 
forms of collective action (Gluckman, 1975). Ethologists use criteria 
such as repetition and stereotypy (Payne, 1998). Clinical psychologists’ 
descriptions of OCD pathology, as in the DSM-IV, mention ‘ritualistic 
behaviors’ without more precision (American Psychiatric, 1995). 
Besides, models of the phenomenon are generally limited to one 
domain of ritual. There is a large clinical literature about children’s OCD 
but little study of normal childhood ritualization, simply because the 
latter is not pathological, even though it may be difficult to understand 
one without the other (Evans, Leckman, Carter, Reznick, et al., 1997). 
Models of OCD do not usually cover normal episodes of obsessiveness 
and ritualistic compulsion in the life-cycle although these are probably 
continuous with the pathology (Mataix-Cols, do Rosario-Campos, 
& Leckman, 2005). Very few anthropologists have considered the 
striking similarities between cultural ritualized behavior and individual 
pathology (Rappaport, 1999). A notable exception is Alan Fiske 
(Dulaney & Fiske, 1994; Fiske & Haslam, 1997), who re-opened an issue 
famously framed by Freud a long time ago (Freud, 1928). 
Following up on Fiske’s pioneering work, discussed in Section 
8.1 , as well as neuro-physiological (Szechtman & Woody, 2004) and 
evolutionary (Abed & de Pauw, 1998) models, we aim to provide a 
model of the different domains of occurrence of ritualized behavior. 
We certainly do not mean to underestimate the obvious differences, 
but we do think that the common features of ritualized actions require 
an explanation. We aim to provide an integrated model that includes 
not only a cognitive specification of the behavioral patterns and their 
elicitation conditions, but also the neural correlates of the behaviors and 
of their pathological distortion, the developmental patterns involved, 
and the evolutionary background. 
It might seem imprudent to make any general statements about a 
disparate set that includes pathological and normal manifestations, 
and individual as well as collective rituals. Note, however, that our aim 
here is not to account for all these behaviors. Our aim is to account for 
the psychological salience of a particular feature they share, namely 
the performance of what we call here ‘Ritualized Behavior,’ a precisely 
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defined way of organizing a limited range of actions. In the following 
sections we outline the diverse domains of ritualized behavior before 
putting forward an integrated neural-developmental-evolutionary 
model of ritualization. 
2. Diverse Domains of Ritualization 
2.1 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
The main features of the pathology of OCD are familiar: intrusive, 
bothersome thoughts about potential danger, as well as a strong 
compulsion to engage in stereotyped and repetitive activities with 
no rational justification. Standard criteria in the DSM-IV include (a) 
intrusive thoughts that (b) cause distress and (c) are often accompanied 
by ritualistic behaviors that (d) disturb normal activity and (e) are 
recognized as irrational by the patient (American Psychiatric, 1995). 
Typical obsessions include contamination and contagion (i.e., fear of 
catching other people’s germs, of ingesting contaminated substances, of 
passing on diseases to others), possible harm to others (e.g., handling 
kitchen utensils and wounding people), as well as social ostracism 
following shameful or aggressive acts (thoughts about assaulting 
others, shouting obscenity, exhibitionism, etc.). This is often combined 
with ‘thought-action fusion’—the assumption that having forebodings 
of possible misfortunes is tantamount to bringing them about—and an 
exaggerated feeling of responsibility for others (Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
Obsessions are typically accompanied by rituals. Some patients 
engage in endlessly repeated sequences of washing hands, cleaning 
tools or utensils (Hodgson & Rachman, 1972). Others repeatedly verify 
that they properly locked their door, rolled up the car window, or 
turned off the gas stove (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). Still others are 
engaged in constant counting activities or need to group objects in sets 
of particular numbers, with specific alignments (Radomsky, Rachman, 
& Hammond, 2001). Although a categorical division between ‘checkers,’ 
‘washers,’ and ‘hoarders’ has become popular in descriptions of OCD 
and as a descriptive clinical tool, there seems to be a large overlap in 
these categories (Khanna, Kaliaperumal, & Channabasavanna, 1990). A 
more accurate description would construe ‘contamination,’ ‘insecurity 
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and doubt,’ and ‘excessive precautions’ as dimensions of the syndrome 
(Mataix-Cols et al., 2005), with each patient presenting a cluster of 
symptoms distributed along these dimensions (Calamari et al., 2004). 
Most patients are aware that their obsessions are unreasonable and their 
rituals pointless (patients’ insight used to be a criterion in the DSM) 
but they also report that neither is easily controlled (Eisen, Phillips, & 
Rasmussen, 1999). 
2.2 Children’s Rituals 
Most young children engage in ritualistic behaviors in a limited range 
of situations and at a particular stage of development, starting at age 
2 and peaking in middle childhood. This developmental phase is 
characterized by perfectionism, preoccupation with just-right ordering 
of objects, attachment to a favorite object (imbued with a special value), 
concerns about dirt and cleanliness, preferred household routines, 
action repeated over and over or a specific number of times, rituals 
for eating, awareness of minute details of one’s home, hoarding, and 
bedtime rituals. (Obviously, most children in most situations also create 
disorder, at least relative to what adults expect; insistence on ‘just so’ 
performance is limited to highly specific contexts.) The themes and 
the age-range are similar among American and other cultural groups 
(A. H. Zohar & Felz, 2001). In many children, rituals are connected to 
anxiety states with specific targets. Among them is the fear of strangers, 
as well as the possibility of inflicting harm to self or others, possible 
contamination, attack by strangers or animals. The tendency to engage 
in rituals is correlated with anxiety or fearful traits (A. H. Zohar & Felz, 
2001). Both fears and rituals typically evolve with development, from 
‘just so’ insistence to elaborate rituals (Leonard, Goldberger, Rapoport, 
Cheslow, & Swedo, 1990). Younger children’s ritualistic behaviors are 
related to prepotent fears such as stranger and separation anxieties, 
whereas the ritualistic behaviors of older ones are related to more 
specific and contextual fears such as contamination and social hazard 
(Evans, Gray, & Leckman, 1999). Some children connect their rituals to 
supposed effects by magical beliefs in ritual efficacy (Evans, Milanak, 
Medeiros, & Ross, 2002), but this is by no means necessary or even 
general. 
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Although the facts of childhood ritualization are familiar and 
impressive, there is no definitive account of the functional basis of such 
behaviors in young children. This is mostly because OCD pathology is 
seen as discontinuous with the ‘normal’ routines of childhood, given 
both the obvious differences in frequency and emotional intensity and 
the fact that only very few young ritualists become clinically obsessive 
(Leonard et al., 1990). However, it seems difficult to understand the 
pathology in the absence of a proper causal model for this highly 
recurrent, culturally stable part of the normal developmental process 
(Evans et al., 1997). 
2.3 Life-Stage-Relevant Intrusive Thoughts 
Specific disturbing thoughts occur in many people at particular phases in 
the lifetime, notably pregnancy, motherhood, and fatherhood. Senseless, 
intrusive, unacceptable ideas, thoughts, urges, and images about infants 
are common among healthy parents of newborns, both fathers and 
mothers (Abramowitz, Schwartz, Moore, & Luenzmann, 2003). The 
content of intrusions is related to specific stages of the life-cycle. While 
new fathers and post-partum mothers report fears about harming the 
infant, pregnant women report heightened fears about contamination 
(Abramowitz et al., 2003). They also develop rituals of washing and 
cleaning related to these intrusions. A common underlying theme is 
uncertainty and doubt concerning possible harm to the infant. Three-
quarters of the new parents surveyed by Abramowitz et al. reported 
persistent thoughts about accidents, suffocation, and other possible 
ways of intentionally harming the infant (Abramowitz et al., 2003). The 
individuals feel responsible for these intrusive thoughts. Development 
of specific perinatal anxieties may be part of a ‘primary parental 
preoccupation’ complex that includes nesting behaviors, repeated 
checking, thoughts about the infant’s perfection, and fantasies about 
possible threats to its security (Leckman et al., 2004). Rodent models 
suggest oxytocin as a major modulator of such maternal behaviors 
(Leckman et al., 2004). 
The connection between these non-clinical context-relevant intrusions 
and OCD is not just a matter of similarity. The onset of OCD in women 
occurs during pregnancy more than at other life-stages (Maina, Albert, 
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Bogetto, Vaschetto, & Ravizza, 2000; Neziroglu, Anemone, & Yaryura-
Tobias, 1992). Note that the development of intrusions and early rituals 
into OCD is quite distinct from the evolution of post-partum depression 
(Williams & Koran, 1997). The former triggers very specific, highly 
consistent obsessive thoughts as opposed to unfocused or frequently 
shifting depressive ruminations. OCD onset also results in an urge to 
act (perform specific rituals) very different from the withdrawal from 
action observed in post-partum depression (Hagen, 2002). Among OCD 
patients, pregnancy and postpartum result in more severe symptoms 
(Labad et al., 2005). Activation of the fronto-striatal networks as a result 
of infant cries is different in new mothers and controls (Lorberbaum et 
al., 2002), suggesting functional calibration of the circuitry involved in 
OCD (see Section 3.1 ). 
2.4 Cultural Rituals 
A great variety of social occasions are identified as ‘rituals’ in the 
anthropological literature. They range from private ceremonies with few 
participants, or indeed just one person, to large gatherings, and from 
single acts to long sequences spread over months or years. The general 
themes range from worship to protection to aggression. The occasions 
for ritualized behaviors also vary, based either on contingencies such 
as illness or misfortune, life-stages like birth, initiation, and death, or 
recurrent occasions such as seasonal changes. Finally, the connections 
between rituals and religious concepts are crucial in some cases (e.g., 
ancestor worship, Islamic prayer), or only peripheral (e.g., anti-
witchcraft divination), or just absent (as in ‘secular’ rituals). 
How do we recognize such actions? As Roy Rappaport argued, it 
seems that we (anthropologists but also lay folk) use a conjunction of 
specific criteria that a model of ritual should explain (Rappaport, 1979). 
Here is a slightly modified list of features he emphasized: 
1. First, actions are divorced from their usual goals. In cultural rituals, 
one typically washes instruments or body parts that are already clean, 
one enters rooms to exit them straightaway, one talks to interlocutors 
that are manifestly absent. Also, many rituals include actions for which 
there could not possibly be any clear empirical goal, such as passing a 
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chicken from hand to hand in a circle, going round a temple seven times, 
and so forth. 
2. Second, cultural rituals are often presented as compulsory, given 
a particular situation. People are told that a particular ceremony must 
be performed. More often than not, there is no explanation of why that 
ritual should be performed given the circumstances. True, a ritual often 
has a specific overall purpose (e.g., healing a particular person, keeping 
witches at bay); but the set of sequences that compose the ritual are not 
connected to this goal in the same way as sub-actions connect to sub- 
goals in ordinary behavior (Boyer, 1994). 
3. Third, in many cultural rituals people create an orderly environment 
that is quite different from the one of everyday interaction. People line 
up instead of walking, they dance instead of moving, they wear similar 
clothes or make-up, they build alignments of rocks or logs, they create 
elaborate color and shape combinations, and so on. Related to this is the 
recurrent concern with delimiting a particular space (a sacred circle, a 
taboo territory) often visually distinct from the other, unmarked space. 
It is important to distinguish ‘rituals’ from ritualization. There may 
be lots of different reasons why particular kinds of ceremonies are found 
in human cultures, why they persist, and why they are relatively stable. 
We discuss these issues elsewhere (Liénard & Boyer, forthcoming). 
For instance, one may propose plausible evolutionary scenarios for 
the existence of birth celebrations and of death rituals in most cultural 
environments. But these scenarios do not explain why these social 
occasions all include ritualized behavior in the precise sense intended 
here. 
2.5 General Features of Rituals 
Behavior in these different domains displays obvious similarities: 
1. Compulsion. Given certain circumstances, people feel that it would 
be dangerous or unsafe or improper not to perform ritualized actions. 
There is an emotional drive to perform the action, often associated with 
some anxiety at the thought of not performing it (especially in patients 
and children) and some relief after performance. Naturally, this varies 
between domains. Anxiety precedes ritual actions or behavior in many 
personal and pathological rituals but not always in cultural rituals. 
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Common to all domains, though, is the important fact that compulsion 
does not require any explanation. People feel that they must perform 
the ritual, otherwise. . . [something might happen], but they require no 
specific representation of what would happen otherwise. 
2. Rigidity, adherence to script. People feel that they should perform 
a ritual in the precise way it was performed before. They strive to achieve 
a performance that matches their representation of past performances 
and attach negative emotion to any deviation from that remembered 
pattern. This is familiar in childhood rituals and OCD but also in the 
‘traditionalistic’ flavor of most cultural rituals (Bloch, 1974). Deviation 
from the established pattern is intuitively construed as dangerous, 
although in most cases the participants have or require no explanation 
of why that is the case. 
3. Goal-demotion. Rituals generally include action-sequences selected 
from ordinary goal-directed behavior. But the context in which they are 
performed, or the manner of performance, results in ‘goal-demotion,’ 
in performance divorced from observable goals. For instance, people tie 
shoelaces that were tied already; they touch a specific piece of furniture 
without trying to move it or use it as support; they wash hands many 
more times than hygiene would require; and so on. 
4. Internal repetition and redundancy. Repeated enactments of the 
same action or gesture, as well as reiterations of the same utterances, 
are typical of many rituals. A given sequence is executed three or five 
or ten times. What matters is the exact number. This makes many ritual 
sequences clearly distinct from everyday action, in which there is either 
no repetition of identical sequences (e.g., in assembling a musical 
instrument, one performs a series of unique actions), or each repeated 
act has a specific outcome (e.g., in weaving), or repetition is cumulative 
(the egg-whites rise only after a long period of whipping). 
5. A restricted range of themes. Many rituals seem to focus around 
such themes as: pollution and purification, danger and protection, the 
possible danger of intrusion from other people, the use of particular 
colors or specific numbers, the construction of an ordered environment 
(Dulaney & Fiske, 1994). A ritual space or instruments are described 
as ‘pure’ or ‘safe’ (or, on the contrary, as the locus of concentrated 
‘pollution’) or the point of the ritual is to ‘purify’ people or objects, to 
‘cleanse’ mind or body, and so on. In collective rituals, this concern with 
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pollution and cleansing is so prevalent that it has been considered a 
foundation of religious ritual (Douglas, 1982). 
Is there a common explanation for these different features of 
ritualized behavior? Here we will start from pathology and summarize 
what can be safely concluded from the clinical and neuropsychological 
evidence. This supports a particular model of action ritualization which 
we will also extend to developmental rituals in children and adults, 
before proceeding to the distinct case of cultural rituals. 
3. Interpretations of Compulsive Ritualization 
3.1 Neuropsychological Modeling 
OCD has been interpreted as a specific dysfunction of the basal ganglia 
(Rapoport, 1990, 1991). To understand how this would result in the 
specific symptoms, the impairment should be described in terms of the 
specific functions of a cortical-striato-pallidal-thalamic circuit (CSPT). 
This network includes projections from many cortical areas (including 
medial and orbital frontal cortex) into the striatum (caudate and 
putamen) and back to the cortex via the substantia nigra and thalamus 
(Rauch et al., 2001; Saxena, Brody, Schwartz, & Baxter, 1998). This has 
been confirmed by neuro-imaging studies, as OCD is associated with 
increased activity of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) as well as in the 
striatum, thalamus, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Saxena et al., 
2004; Saxena et al., 1998). Also, the anatomy of the caudate, putamen, 
and globus pallidus seems to differ between patients and controls 
(see, e.g., (Giedd, Rapoport, Garvey, Perlmutter, & Swedo, 2000). One 
generally distinguishes between a ‘direct’ and an ‘indirect’ pathway in 
the CSPT networks (see Fig. 1 ). The direct pathway links (1) frontal 
cortices to (2) the striatum, to the globus pallidus (pars interna) and 
substantia nigra (pars reticulata) to (4) thalamus and (5) cortex. The 
indirect pathway connects (1) cortex to (2) striatum to (3a) globus 
pallidus (pars externa) and subthalamic nucleus to (3b) globus pallidus 
(pars interna) and substantia nigra (pars reticulata) to (4) thalamus to 
(5) cortex.
The basal ganglia are involved in the formation of habits, motor 
habits in particular (Rauch et al., 1997). The pattern of projections from 
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Fig. 1.  A summary of some cortico-striatal pathways relevant to OCD. Continuous 
line for the ‘direct’ pathway and dotted line for ‘indirect’ pathways (both 
highly simplified). SMA: Supplementary Motor Area, DLPFC: dorso-lateral 
prefrontal cortex, OFC: orbito-frontal cortex, Caud: caudate nucleus, Put: 
Putamen, Cing.: Cingulate Cortex, NA: Nucleus Accumbens, GP: globus 
pallidus (external and internal), SN(pr): substantia nigra pars reticulata, 
SubTh Nuc: Subthalamic nuclei. (Figure by P Boyer, 2006).
the cortex to the striatum suggests that the latter may store summaries 
or ‘chunks’ of motor behavior. This is confirmed by involvement of the 
striatum in the learning and production of habitual responses (Graybiel, 
1998). Striatal networks may act as coordinators of cortical input and 
orchestrators of motor habits. 
What specific dysfunction would result in OCD symptoms? In animal 
models, modifying dopamine uptake in the striatum results in stereotypic 
and repetitive behavior (Canales & Graybiel, 2000; Szechtman, Sulis, & 
Eilam, 1998). So an imbalance between various parts of the basal ganglia 
system or a modification in the dynamics of cortico-striatal pathways 
are probably involved in the condition. Saxena and colleagues identify 
the ‘indirect’ pathway as the locus of impairment. In their model, the 
association of globus pallidus (external) and subthalamic nucleus 
can be construed as a ‘basal ganglia control system’ that modulates 
the projections to the thalamus and cortices (Saxena et al., 1998). The 
indirect pathway consists of inhibitory (GABAergic) projections from 
the striatum to the thalamus. To the extent that this pathway becomes 
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less tonic, it would fail to inhibit habitual motor responses and result in 
unmotivated, stereotypic routines (Saxena et al., 1998).
Also important is the regulatory role played by the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Early neuroimaging 
studies showed differential activation of these regions in OCD patients 
in situations of symptom provocation (Adler et al.; Rauch et al., 1994). 
OFC activation makes sense given its role in the selection, control, and 
inhibition of behavior as demonstrated both by neuroimaging and by 
lesions of this area (Happaney, Zelazo, & Stuss, 2004; Ogai, Iyo, Mori, & 
Takei, 2005; Schnider, Treyer, & Buck, 2005). Anterior cingulate activity 
is also revealing. Ablation of the area has been used in refractory OCD 
cases (Kim et al., 2003). ACC hyperactivity is not limited to situations 
of symptom provocation (Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003). 
In an event-related study of error-processing, Fitzgerald and colleagues 
found increased ACC activity with error-detection in both patients and 
controls, with significantly higher increases in patients. The amount 
of ACC activity also correlated with the severity of the patients’ 
compulsive symptoms (Fitzgerald et al., 2005). The anterior cingulate 
can be described as an error-detection network that activates top-down 
responses to situations of conflicting information, for example, between 
expectation and perception in errors, or between discrepant stimuli 
(Van Veen & Carter, 2002). 
All this converges to suggest that OCD may stem from a dysfunction 
of a neural system involved in the production and inhibition of a 
particular set of habitual or routinized behaviors. The etiology of the 
dysfunction includes probable genetic factors (Campbell et al., 1999; 
J. Zohar, Kennedy, Hollander, & Koran, 2004) as well as infectious 
conditions (Giedd et al., 2000; Henry, Perlmutter, & Swedo, 1999), 
although evidence for either cause is tentative. The compulsive nature 
of the actions seems to result from a failure to inhibit strongly motivated 
routines initiated in the striatum, either because striatal networks over-
respond to cortical inputs, or because their inhibitory effect on thalamic 
networks is diminished, or both, leading to ritualization. This picture is 
consistent with the clinical and pharmacological evidence (Kaplan & 
Hollander, 2003; J. Zohar et al., 2004). 
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3.2 Cognitive models: General or specific? 
Cognitive models provide a bridge from neuropsychological findings 
to the phenomenology of OCD symptoms. A classical cognitive model 
describes the condition as a disorder of threat-appraisal and cognitive 
control (Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985). Patients produce a 
misguided appraisal of intrusive thoughts, exaggerate the threats present 
in the environment as well as the extent of their own responsibility for 
what befalls others, and finally fail to appreciate the measure of safety 
introduced by normal precautions. In this model, OCD differs from 
other anxiety conditions (general anxiety disorder, panic) only in that 
the eliciting stimuli are very specific—a series of intrusive thoughts with 
recurrent themes (Clark, 1999). 
Obsessions and compulsions might then result from a general failure 
to appreciate levels of danger, to evaluate one’s responsibility in external 
events, and to form an appropriate picture of one’s situation. For instance, 
ritualized repetition may stem from the patient’s failure to realize that 
he or she has actually accomplished the action (Pitman, 1987). There is 
indeed evidence (though not conclusive) for general memory problems. 
OCD patients have the right intuitions in both memory for actions 
and source monitoring (i.e., whether they performed as opposed to 
imagined performing an action) but they report less confidence in their 
own intuition (Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003). 
However, there is also definite evidence for domain-specific aspects 
of OCD. For instance, OCD patients are similar to controls in their recall 
of neutral objects but are markedly better at recalling dangerous items 
(Tolin et al., 2001). OCD ‘checkers’ are impaired in their recall of own 
actions but less so in recall of other information (Ecker & Engelkamp, 
1995). In terms of attention, modified Stroop tasks show that OCD 
‘washers are more attentive to contamination words than are controls, 
and OCD patients in general show more interference than controls do 
from danger-related words (Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer, & et al.). 
3.3 Security-Motivation 
Most cognitive models of OCD are phrased in domain-general terms. 
An exception is Abed and de Pauw’s evolutionary hypothesis about 
OCD as a disruption of a specific ‘psychological immune system’ 
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(Abed & de Pauw, 1998). The hypothesis starts from the observation 
that the prevalence of OCD would suggest the tail of a phenotypic 
distribution rather than harmful mutations. According to Abed and de 
Pauw, obsessional phenomena are an exaggerated version of thought 
processes selected because they lead to risk-avoidance behavior (in 
particular through fear or disgust). Central to the hypothesis is the fact 
that intrusive thoughts, in patients and normal individuals, consist of 
detailed scenarios of possible danger, an ‘Involuntary Risk Scenario 
Generating System’ (Abed & de Pauw, 1998). 
A similar evolutionary background motivates Szechtman and 
Woody’s interpretation of the condition in terms of a ‘security-
motivation’ system (Szechtman & Woody, 2004). The model is an 
attempt to integrate the diverse components of the relevant behaviors 
(emotion, perception of specific information, typical actions, inhibition 
or disinhibition of automatic routines) in a motivational system 
functionally specialized in potential danger. 
In contrast to general cognitive impairment models, both Abed and 
de Pauw’s and Szechtman and Woody’s models provide a parsimonious 
account for the specificity of OCD intrusions.
The security system is present in all normal human beings and 
monitors external signals of particular kinds of potential danger. 
The neural circuitry involved in both normal and pathological safety 
motivation can be broken down into three major functional components 
with excitatory and inhibitory links. An appraisal system handles 
information that matches input conditions for environmental cues of 
potential danger. A security motivation system handles the evaluation 
of these cues. A set of various evolved security-related programs is 
engaged, depending on the outcome of this motivation assessment, 
with specific motor and visceral output (see Fig. 2 ). 
As a result of engaging security-related motor-programs (this may 
consist in visual inspection of one’s environment, cleaning, ordering, 
etc.), the security motivation system produces a specific experience 
of things being ‘just right’ which feeds back into the danger appraisal 
system. 
Szechtman and Woody’s identification of the neural correlates of these 
systems extends beyond the cortico-striatal pathways. The appraisal of 
potential danger involves perceptual and memory information and feeds 
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Fig. 2.  An interpretation of Szechtman and Woody’s (2004) model. Rectangles 
correspond to distinct systems activated, rounded boxes to behavioral 
results and call-outs to aspects of the processing. Danger clues are evaluated 
and action-plans selected, resulting in a ‘just right feeling’ that sends 
negative feedback to danger appraisal. This loop is absent or impaired in 
patients, leading to doubts about performance, which themselves result in 
repetition and rigid action-plans. (Figure by P Boyer, 2006).
into both orbital cortex and the cortical-striatal pathways. From there, 
Szechtman and Woody identify two distinct informational loops. One of 
them, the affect loop, includes most of the ‘indirect pathway’ structures, 
producing a specific anxiety. In parallel, a ‘security-related programs’ 
loop, connects striatum to the globus pallidus (internal) and ventral 
thalamus to elicit the performance of stored motor routines. Finally, the 
normal inhibition of these two loops is provided by brainstem structures 
after performance of the elicited motor routines. The model states that 
OCD is the result of a dysfunction in a satiety signal, plausibly generated 
in brainstem structures, that connects the performance of security 
related behaviors as inhibitory feedback to a subsystem that generates 
and sustains security motivation. 
68 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
3.4 Outstanding Questions 
In our view, while current models of compulsion have great descriptive 
and explanatory value, they still provide an incomplete account of various 
aspects of the obsessive and compulsive spectrum, especially if we include 
normal as well as pathological manifestations of ritual dispositions. 
A more complete model should account for the following aspects of 
ritualized behavior: 
1. Why these specific themes? The thoughts patients and others 
report are clearly not random conceptual associations. They center on a 
few threats that are particularly disturbing. Even this is much too broad 
a description. People have intrusive thoughts about causing accidents 
involving their kin, but not complete strangers; they fear contamination 
more than bone fracture or inflammation; they fear that they may have 
left the back door open or the oven on, not that their car will be stolen or 
the fridge will break down. 
2. Why these specific actions? Compulsions seem to focus on a narrow 
set of possible actions. This is clear for contamination compulsions 
which result in repeated washing and cleaning. The same applies to 
checking behaviors, limited to visual cues. Not all actions seem likely to 
become compulsive. 
3. Why combine the actions in that way? Many compulsive rituals 
organize action in a very specific way. For instance, there are many 
negative rules in compulsions (avoid treading on the lines on the 
pavement). Also, there are specific rules about the number of iterations 
(touch this chair three times) or about the order of actions (tie the right 
shoe before the left one). 
4. Why does ritual provide relief? Most clinicians agree on a temporary 
lowering of anxiety levels after the performance of rituals. The question 
points to one possible explanation for the compulsive character of the 
behavior. Could it be that patients intuitively reproduce behaviors that 
reduce anxiety? But then, what is it about such organization of action 
that could reduce anxiety? 
5. Why does ritual eventually strengthen obsessions? This too is a 
feature often noted by clinicians (see, e.g., Salkovskis, 1985). Although 
rituals provide some relief, this is only temporary and the intrusive 
thoughts quickly come back. Indeed, it would seem that the more rituals 
one performs, the more focused and bothersome are the intrusive thoughts. 
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4. Ritualized Action: The Core Process 
What follows is a list of the different points of the model which will be 
explained in the following sections . In our view, ritualization in young 
children, in normal adults at particular life-stages, and in patients 
comprises a series of processes in which specific information is acquired 
or retrieved and specific behavioral plans are engaged: 
1. Security-motivation systems are engaged. This may be because of 
potential danger cues in the environment (described below), information 
imparted by other people, self-generated thoughts, or intrusions. In any 
case, these thoughts focus on cues for potential hazards chosen in a 
small set that we call the Potential Hazard Repertoire. 
2. Safety motivation triggers an arousal state in which non-action is 
intuitively considered dangerous (something must be done) although 
there need be no clear representation of why that is the case. 
2a. This state triggers a non-deliberate, non-controlled search 
for action-sequences that appear intuitively appropriate. Some cues 
make some actions seem apposite although the subject generally 
has no explanation for the intuition (or may only have ex post facto 
rationalizations). These actions are selected from what we call an 
Evolutionary Precaution Repertoire.
2b. The arousal triggers a special attentional state that focuses on 
low-level properties of own actions. The action-flow is parsed in smaller 
units than is usually the case. 
2c. The arousal state may bias the appraisal system in such a way that 
‘just right’ or ‘closure’ experience is delayed. This triggers doubts about 
actual or proper performance and reiteration of action-plans. 
3. Performance of the actions with attention to low-level parsing [see 
2b above ] may impose a heavy load on working memory-systems, with 
two consequences: 
3a. The intrusive themes are temporarily pushed away from conscious 
access, resulting in a short-lived reduction in anxiety level.
3b. The intrusive themes are monitored by automatic, not controlled 
processes, which should result in higher salience (and renewed 
intrusion) after performance. 
These different steps are summarized in Figure 3 . In what follows we 
explain the processes engaged in more detail and provide arguments 
for their presence in most domains of ritualization. An important point 
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to emphasize is that we do not identify any particular component of 
the overall process as being exclusively pathological. In our view, most 
reactions to inferred threats engage all these processes. Whether or 
not a given action triggers doubt about proper performance, leading 
to rigid repetition, that is, ritualization of these reactions, may be a 
matter of degree. 
Fig. 3.  Summary of our Potential Hazard and Precaution model. Boxes denote 
specific processes with corresponding neural systems. Rounded box 
describes performance. Dark call-outs describe some of their typical 
properties. Clues for danger must suggest hazards from the Potential 
Hazard Repertoire. Appraisal of the clues if modulated by anxiety, leading 
to activation of plans from Evolutionary Precaution Repertoire and action-
monitoring systems. At the normal end of the spectrum, performance 
triggers satiety feelings with a negative feedback to danger appraisal 
systems. At the pathological end of the spectrum, doubts about proper 
performance lead to repetition and a positive feedback to danger appraisal. 
(Figure by P Boyer, 2006).
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5. Why These Particular Obsessions and Compulsions? 
5.1 Logic of Our Evolutionary Approach 
Intrusions and compulsions are bothersome and time-consuming. Not 
only do they confer no particular adaptive advantage, they seem to be 
clearly maladaptive in diverting attention and memory resources from 
valuable goals. However, note that OCD and other disorders of the fronto-
striatal circuitry (Tourette’s syndrome, ADHD, and schizophrenia) all 
have some genetic basis, as may be suspected from their prevalence 
(Bradshaw & Sheppard, 2000) and is tentatively confirmed by gene-
loci studies (Arnold, Zai, & Richter, 2004; Grados, Walkup, & Walford, 
2003). 
To the extent that a specific kind of motivation is involved in the 
pathology of ritualization (perhaps also in its normal occurrence), it 
makes sense to wonder why and how humans are endowed with this 
special focus on particular kinds of hazards. In particular, are such 
systems the outcome of the evolutionary history of the species? In this 
case ultimate explanations would help us make sense of the pathology 
(Nesse, 1998), a strategy used in physiology (Nesse & Williams, 1996), 
psychiatry (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Stevens & 
Price, 2000) and neuropsychology (Duchaine, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2001), and, as mentioned earlier, already outlined in some studies of 
OCD (Abed & de Pauw, 1998). 
Providing an evolutionary model requires the following steps: (1) 
identify the relevant fitness-related problem; (2) identify the knowledge 
base and computational rules that would be minimally required to solve 
that problem in ancestral environments; and (Willour et al., 2004) provide 
experimental evidence for the actual operation of a mental system that 
meets this computational specification. Once this is accomplished, such 
a model may allow us to delineate possible pathogenic scenarios that are 
causally deeper than the vague clusters identified in DSM-IV (Murphy 
& Stich, 2000). 
There are some indications that this approach may be appropriate 
for anxiety disorders and OCD in particular. First, negative emotions 
like anxiety or persistent low mood should not be considered as 
dysfunctional. They may consist in evolved warning systems whose 
negative rewards steer organisms away from fitness-reducing situations 
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(Nesse, 1998). Second, the specific thoughts and actions that compose 
the symptoms may be linked to evolutionary concerns (Leckman, 2003; 
Mataix-Cols et al., 2005). Third, some of the conditions associated with 
fronto-striatal impairment may actually result in adaptive phenotypes 
(Bradshaw & Sheppard, 2000). 
5.2 Two Types of Fitness-Threats 
We know enough of early primate and early human living conditions to 
identify broad categories of highly salient danger in our evolutionary 
past: reproductive risk (e.g., for females, mating with un-nurturing or 
low-fitness males; for males, cuckoldry or choosing unhealthy females); 
predation (failing to detect or deter predators); contamination from 
pathogens (bacteria, viruses, toxins); resource scarcity (e.g., failing 
to anticipate seasonal changes); social harm (e.g., ostracism, but also 
reduced cooperation). 
From an evolutionary standpoint, we should expect (1) that such 
recurrent hazards, not more recent ones, would be the target of specific 
emotions, and (2) that different kinds of hazard require different decision 
rules. On the first point, it is clear that specific emotions target hazards 
of great evolutionary ancestry rather than more recent ones, even 
though the latter may be much more dangerous. Our danger-avoidance 
systems do not seem to rely on an unprejudiced tabulation of which 
features of the environment effectively predict harm or misfortune. 
If this were the case, we would observe in modern conditions many 
cases of anxieties, fear, or even phobic aversions to electricity, cars, and 
cigarettes, which cause vastly more deaths than do spiders and rats. But 
we observe the opposite. Second, it seems that different kinds of fitness-
threats do activate different inferential rules. Specific principles inform 
the gender-specific perception of particular mates as more or less of a 
waste of reproductive potential (Buss, 1989). Predator-prey interaction 
is governed by early-developed intuitions that do not apply to other 
interactions (Barrett, 1999). Recurrent features of disgust reactions 
suggest a pathogen-minimizing system that adapts to local conditions 
(Fessler, Arguello, Mekdara, & Macias, 2003; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
1993) or to particular individual circumstances such as pregnancy 
(Fessler & Navarrete, 2003; Profet, 1993). Problems of resource scarcity 
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are handled by specific foraging strategies (Krebs & Inman, 1994) which 
can override explicit reasoning (Rode, Cosmides, Hell, & Tooby, 1999). 
Finally, a host of ‘social intelligence’ principles support the monitoring 
of social interaction, from the establishment of friendships and coalitions 
(Harcourt & de Waal, 1992; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1996), to dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and punishment (Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). 
At this point we must introduce an important distinction between two 
types of fitness-threatening situations. First, there are cases of manifest 
threats, cases in which the organism receives signals about the presence 
of the source of danger: for example, a predator or enemy attack, or 
seeing one’s infant in danger. Situations of this type are handled by 
specialized and context-specific fear-mechanisms in humans as in other 
primates (LeDoux, 2003; Maren & Quirk, 2004) and result in aggression, 
freezing, or flight routines (Blair, 2001; Payne, 1998). Second, there are 
inferred threats, when the potential danger is probable given certain 
clues in the environment. For instance, the strange taste of a particular 
dish may be evidence of rotting; tracks may betray the recent passage of 
a dangerous predator; a particular person’s attitude may indicate that 
they will not cooperate. Such circumstances typically engage what Abed 
and de Pauw called an ‘Involuntary Risk Scenario Generation.’ Naturally, 
the distinction is a rough one (many situations involve threats for which 
there are direct and indirect clues). It is also, obviously, species-specific 
since some situations are a threat to some organisms but not others. 
5.3 Potential Danger as a Specific Domain 
It may seem odd to hypothesize a domain-specific system whose 
activation is triggered by such disparate potential inputs as a footprint, a 
disgusting odor, or the fact that one’s infant is out of sight for a moment. 
How specific is the system if it can encompass such physically different 
stimuli? But this objection assumes that domain-specific inference 
systems are tied to a physically specified range of stimuli, which is true 
for some perceptual systems (e.g., 3D vision) but certainly not for most 
higher-level functional systems. A human mind can parse linguistic 
input in just the same way on the basis of auditory, visual, or tactile 
information. Neuro-cognitive systems specialized in assessing the value 
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of potential mates use information from conversations, from comparison 
of visual information to some ideal template, from observed interactions 
between the potential mate and other people, and so forth. Indeed, it 
would be surprising (and maladaptive) if a particular kind of physical 
input always triggered a unique inference-system. A man is a man is a 
man, but a father, a brother, an attacker, and a potential mate should 
activate different mental systems. 
So the autonomy or specificity of a domain-specific system can 
be inferred, not from focus on a physically specific range of cues, but 
from specific processing principles, a specific kind of output, a specific 
learning logic, and—in some cases—a specific pattern of impairment. 
These are criteria that seem present in the case of the Hazard-Precaution 
system. 
There is indeed some behavioral evidence that humans have specific 
inference rules for information relative to precautions. Fiddick and 
colleagues have demonstrated that when considering precautionary 
rules (e.g., ‘if you take oranges on board you will not get scurvy’), 
subjects pass logical tests for verification of rule-violation that they 
fail in other contexts (Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000). This is a 
replication, in another domain, of the performance on rule-verification 
in the Wason selection task observed when the rules allude to social 
contracts, however unfamiliar, as opposed to other deontic domains, 
however familiar (Cosmides, 1989; Fiddick et al., 2000). Although these 
findings concern explicit judgment more than intuition, they suggest 
that potential hazard management might require cognitive processing 
that is quite different from other inferential tasks. 
5.4 The Limited Range of Obsessions and Compulsions 
To explain the recurrent features of both intrusions and compulsions, 
our model stipulates two kinds of databases, called Potential Hazard 
Repertoire and Precaution Repertoire respectively. Intrusions and 
compulsions have to do with a specific, narrow range of hazards, which, 
in our view, are best explained as recurrent threats to fitness in ancestral 
environments. 
One reason for defending this hypothesis is that the actions 
combined in ritual sequences are generally (i) species-specific and (ii) 
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precaution-related. Ritualists do not generally design entirely novel 
behavioral sequences from scratch. Rather, they combine familiar 
elements of actions (e.g., washing, cleansing, checking) into novel 
sequences. This is also manifest in animal models of the condition. 
The ritualistic behaviors triggered in rats treated with quinpirole 
(a dopamine agonist) are species-specific, consisting in checking 
with return to a home-base, similar to those of controls, but stylized, 
redundant, and time-consuming (Szechtman et al., 1998). Second, these 
actions are generally relevant ones as a protection against various kinds 
of fitness-threatening situations (Rapoport & Fiske, 1998). A review 
of the different dimensions of OCD obsessions but also adult normal 
intrusions and children’s anxieties should illustrate the point. 
5.4.1. Contamination. Thoughts about contamination and contagion 
are too specific to be interpreted as the outcome of a general lowering 
of the anxiety threshold. They tend to center on invisible agents such as 
toxins, viruses, and microbes—of obvious evolutionary import. Besides, 
people’s anxious thoughts about contamination focus on modes of 
contact (touching with the hand, kissing, licking, having sex, sharing 
food, breathing next to a particular source) that are actually used by 
pathogen vectors. In patients, the compulsions associated with these 
thoughts are not arbitrary either. They center on measures such as 
washing and cleansing, protecting oneself from intrusive material by 
staying at a distance, avoiding contact, suspending breathing. In ancestral 
environments, before the discovery of asepsis, these procedures would 
indeed constitute the only measures to reduce or control contamination. 
There is behavioral and cross-cultural evidence that a concern 
with possible contamination triggers specialized inferential circuitry 
in humans. For instance, Fessler and colleagues have documented the 
disproportionate representation of meat among the foods that are ‘good 
to taboo’ in many cultures. They connect this to the specific challenges 
of meat consumption caused by protozoa and other pathogens (Fessler 
& Navarrete, 2003). In the same way, meat seems to be the chief target of 
early-pregnancy aversions, a period of dangerous immuno-depression 
(Fessler, 2002). More generally, many sources of disgust are also sources 
of contamination: decaying corpses but also rotting substances, feces, 
spit, and so on. 
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5.4.2. Symmetry and order in one’s environment. Many children 
and adults are concerned with creating an orderly environment. 
Children align toys in a particular order, ritual participants need to 
create elaborately ordered displays, and the same is true of many OCD 
‘checkers.’ These behaviors are often construed, especially in the domain 
of children’s rituals, as the expression of a need for reassurance; as the 
urge to create a recognizable and therefore reassuring environment. 
However, this ‘therefore’ is question-begging. What is reassuring 
about a predictable environment? True, predictability implies a 
reduction in computational load, but that cannot be the reason, as 
children and ritualists in general devote great amounts of time and 
cognitive resources creating their orderly world. So there might be other 
aspects of order and symmetry that motivate cognitive investment. 
In our view, ordered environments combine two properties that may 
explain this motivation. 
First, alignments and symmetry are such that they make other agents’ 
intrusions clearly visible. Anecdotal (but massive) evidence suggests 
that children but also various sub-clinical obsessive personality-types 
get quite upset when ‘intruders’ such as parents or cleaners disrupt 
their sequences and alignments. We speculate that the point of the 
ordering may be precisely to detect such disruptions. Or rather, that the 
behavior may be a stored action-plan that would have this function in 
other environments. This is indeed the one explanation of some animals’ 
‘tidying up’ routines as an anti-predator strategy (Curio, 1993). So the 
creation of a non-trivial order that is not immediately detectable by 
intruders may be a powerful motivation in such compulsions. Note that 
childhood rituals center on the home environment and in particular on 
children’s own personal space (usually their bedroom). 
Second, the specific use of symmetry and conceptual order 
(alternating colors, corresponding shapes) is diagnostic of uniquely 
human dispositions to alter the environment. Bowerbirds may be among 
the few exceptions—and seem to resort to similar ways of making a 
display salient: pure colors, symmetry, and so on. Indeed, people readily 
detect such specific alterations—which has been used for millennia as a 
way of advertising human presence. Cairns are improbable pilings of 
rocks that no species other than human beings would build. Broken 
twigs, straight paths, and color markings serve as landmarks for the same 
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reason. What makes this possible is the combination of sophisticated 
symmetry and pattern-detection capacities in humans (Bornstein & 
Krinsky, 1985; Bornstein & Stiles-Davis, 1984; Fisher, Ferdinandsen, 
& Bornstein, 1981) and sophisticated tool-making capacities (Wynn, 
1993). This is particularly relevant to children’s construction of ordered 
environments, which may consist of a period of systematic training in 
the construction of such signals of human presence. 
These are bound to remain speculative as there is, to our knowledge, 
no systematic research on the cognitive and emotional processes 
involved in ordered displays, particularly in children’s strong motivation 
to produce such environments. 
5.4.3. Social offence. Some of the intrusive thoughts of obsessive 
people center on possible acts that would offend or harm other 
people, resulting in social exclusion. These fears also represent, in our 
view, a domain of evolutionary hazard. Given human dependence on 
conspecifics for all aspects of survival, it is not surprising to find that 
possible social strife is seen as extremely dangerous. Life in complex 
societies makes this dependence diffuse and impersonal. By contrast, 
in ancestral environments people depended on known members of 
the group. Conflict in such groups threatens each member’s access 
to resources, cooperation, and information (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). 
In this domain too, it seems that the precautionary measures taken 
by obsessives are in fact rather appropriate. For instance, one of the 
features of OCD patients (especially checkers) is a tendency to monitor 
actions, in particular the minutiae of one’s own behavior, well beyond 
the ‘normal’ limits. Another common feature is that people choose to 
avoid social contact lest they insult or assault others, which again is 
intuitively appropriate as a precautionary device. 
5.4.4. Harm to offspring. Intrusive thoughts reported by adults 
often focus on possible harm to one’s own offspring, accompanied by 
fears of handling tools and utensils in a dangerous way, smothering or 
dropping the infant, as well as forgetting about the baby and losing it 
(particularly in stores and other public places). Again, the danger is one 
of obvious evolutionary significance, as tools and weapons are part of 
our ancestral past. Also, shifting attention away from one’s infant is risky 
but unavoidable in humans who need to attend to such tasks as foraging 
or processing food. Again, the compulsive precautions (hyper vigilance, 
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neglect towards other people and social interactions, etc.) would seem 
appropriate given these hazards. 
5.5 The Precaution System Associates Domain-Specific 
Repertoires 
Specific reactions to inferred threats suggest a functional system that we 
called the Precaution System, whose specific input consists in inferences 
to non-manifest threat and whose output is selective activation of 
particular precautions. At both ends of its operation, the postulated 
system is highly specific. The Precaution System does not respond to all 
or most actually significant signals of potential danger, but to a limited 
repertoire of cues. As we said above, humans seem to infer fitness 
threats, with a specific anxiogenic response, from wounds or rotting 
carcasses, but not from tobacco smoke or electricity. 
The range of action-plans activated is also restricted to a few possible 
precautions (washing, avoiding contact, etc.) that may or may not be 
most appropriate given changing circumstances. Note that this model 
does not account for some sub-varieties of OCD symptomatology. 
Hoarding, for instance, does not seem to result in ritualized behavior 
in the precise sense described here. This may be because the underlying 
processes are different from other OCD dimensions, as is suggested 
by neuroimaging studies (Calamari et al., 2004; Saxena et al., 2004). In 
our model, the specificity of cues and responses maps a set of highly 
recurrent threats in human evolutionary history. 
6. Why the Complicated Action? 
6.1 Ordinary Action-Parsing 
The ritualization process imposes particular constraints on the 
performance and sequencing of action. This is why the features of ritual 
should be considered in the context of action representation in general. 
Human beings attend to each other’s behavior and react to it, which 
means that they must ‘parse’ other people’s and their own behavior 
in meaningful units (Newtson, 1973). The experimental study of such 
parsing mechanisms provides a background against which we can 
understand specific features of ritual. 
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People identify actions as belonging to particular categories (e.g., 
putting on one’s socks) but also as part of larger sequences (putting on 
one’s socks as part of getting dressed). This ‘partonomic’ structure is 
general to action sequences in normal contexts. Small units are parts of 
larger units and the boundaries between large units tend to coincide with 
a boundary at a lower level. Zacks and colleagues distinguish between 
three levels of representation: that of simple gestures (sequences of a few 
seconds), that of behavioral episodes (an order of longer magnitude, 
actions like ‘getting dressed’), and that of a script (series that can span 
a much longer time, e.g., ‘eating out,’ ‘giving a talk’) (Zacks & Tversky, 
2001; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). 
In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, people 
spontaneously describe and recall behavior in terms of middle-level 
behavioral units (Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks, Tversky, et al., 2001), 
that could be called a ‘basic level’ for event-taxonomies (Rifkin, 1985). 
Indeed, people can generate far more categories of events at that middle-
level than either super- or subordinates (Morris & Murphy, 1990). Mid-
level breakpoints also correspond to specific neural activity (Speer, 
Swallow, & Zacks, 2003; Zacks, Braver, et al., 2001). It is certainly not 
a coincidence that this is also the level of description at which people 
typically ascribe goals to behavior. While gestures do not readily reveal 
intention, and scenes include many different intentions, behavioral 
episodes typically constitute the realization of a particular goal. Action-
parsing develops early in infants and seems to focus on the intentional 
unit level from that early stage (Baldwin & Baird, 1999; Baldwin, Baird, 
Saylor, & Clark, 2001). 
6.2 Goal-Demotion in Ritualized Action 
These studies converge to suggest that spontaneous parsing focuses on 
middle-level action-units connected to specific goals. It is very difficult 
for normal humans not to parse action at that level. Indeed, an excessive 
focus on a low-level, gestural description of behavior, with the attendant 
imprecision about goals, is characteristic of frontal lobe or schizophrenic 
patients (Janata & Grafton, 2003; Zalla, Pradat-Diehl, & Sirigu, 2003). 
Now this focus on low-level gesture analysis of the action-flow 
is precisely what happens in cultural and individual rituals. People’s 
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attention is typically drawn to the details of performance, the particular 
direction of a gesture, the specific number of times an action should 
be performed, and so on. Conversely, the description of ritual action in 
terms of goals is either not available or in any case irrelevant. 
This is what we call ‘goal-demotion.’ Although there may be a 
goal for the overall ritual script, there are no obvious sub-goals for its 
components. In typical patients’ rituals or in developmental rituals, there 
may be an explicit goal. For instance, producing a particular alignment 
of twigs in a particular order is supposed to ward off intruders; or a 
sequence of familiar actions, for example, tying one’s shoes in a very 
specific way, will prevent accidents. But the contribution of each part 
of the script is not connected to particular sub-goals. For some ritual 
actions it is impossible for the actor to imagine what contribution they 
would make as they reverse the results achieved through previous 
actions (e.g., piling up objects and carefully putting them back in a line 
before piling them up again). More generally, the actions are considered 
an indispensable part of the script although the subject has no 
representation of why he or she should be included in it. This contrasts 
with the standard parsing of action-flow, where the units identified at 
all levels of partonomic division correspond to specific goals. Indeed, in 
a typical example of routinized efficient practice, that of blacksmithing 
techniques, the correspondence between action-units and goals serves 
to mobilize different units of knowledge as they become relevant to 
the sub-task at hand (Keller & Keller, 1996). This is emphatically not 
the case in ritualized behavior, the performance of which seems to be 
a ‘tunnel’ in which each action only points to the following one in the 
prescribed sequence (Bloch, 1974). 
6.3 Swamping of Working Memory 
There is very little study of the attentional effects of the focus on low-
level features of action, combined with high control and hypersensitivity 
to possible mistakes, during performance of personal rituals. Our model 
suggests a specific, temporary effect on working memory which would 
explain some effects of rituals. Working memory is a specific memory 
system that holds information for a short time and allows updates 
and transformations of that information (Baddeley, 2000). In typical 
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working memory tasks subjects are asked to repeat a sequence of letters 
in the right order, repeat in inverse order, repeat the sequence formed 
by letters while ignoring digits provided in between, or specify which 
was the third letter before last in a series that ends unexpectedly. In all 
such tasks, the subject must consider a certain set of information units 
or chunks at the same time in order to perform the required operations 
(Baddeley, 2000). 
In our view, one of the effects of prescribed, rigidly compulsory 
action-sequences is a momentary overloading or ‘swamping’ of working 
memory, especially if the action sequences are represented at the fine-
grain parsing level. This is very much what happens to some patients 
whose spontaneous action-parsing remains at this same low level of 
description. As Zalla puts it in her description of frontal lobe patients, 
‘the weakening of the causal connections between the component 
actions leads to the decomposition and the fragmentation of the action 
representation. […] The increased amount of fragmented information 
rapidly overloads subjects’ working memory capacity’ (Zalla, Verlut, 
Franck, Puzenat, & Sirigu, 2004). A similar point can be made about 
fragmentation of action in OCD compulsions (Ursu et al., 2003). 
Many ritual prescriptions resemble the tasks designed by cognitive 
psychologists in the study of working memory. They require focused 
attention on a set of different stimuli and their arrangement. For 
instance, a requirement to turn round a ritual pole three times clockwise 
without ever looking down imposes executive control of two tasks at 
the same time. Also, the frequent combination of a positive prescription 
(‘do x. . .’) and a negative one (‘. . .while avoiding doing y’) would seem 
to engage working memory and executive control in a way that is not 
usually present in everyday action flow. 
6.4 Core Ritualization is the Opposite of Routinization 
In the model proposed here, ritualized acts are very different from 
other routines. However often an individual may perform a ritualized 
action, it does not seem to become automatic. On the contrary, it 
remains constrained by high-level cognitive control. Ritualized actions 
as described here require high cognitive control because the rules often 
apply to familiar actions (e.g., walking, talking, preparing food) and 
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turn them into more difficult tasks (e.g., walking without treading on 
the line). This clashes with a commonsense notion that rituals only 
include actions that one performs ‘routinely’ or ‘without thinking.’ 
Indeed, it is essential to our model that the component of rituals that we 
called Ritualized Behavior cannot be automatic. 
7. Implications of the Model: Individual Ritual 
7.1 Intrusions as Context-Sensitive Adaptive Algorithms 
A surprising conclusion from the very few systematic studies of intrusions 
and mild compulsions in the normal population is that thoughts about 
potential dangers (contamination, social harm) and some compulsive 
reactions are not confined to the clinical population. Most normal people 
seem to experience the same kind of intrusive thoughts as patients do, 
and to some degree generate the same ritualized action-plans to avoid 
such dangers (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Rachman & de Silva, 1978). The 
crucial difference, then, is not in the contents of the thoughts but in their 
appraisal (Salkovskis, 1985). 
The evidence available is insufficient to address the fundamental 
questions of the distribution, themes, intensity, and effects of intrusions 
in the normal population. Our model implies that intrusions are 
generally not dysfunctional. They are the outcome of systems geared to 
protecting the organism against potential dangers by over-interpreting 
specific inputs, which would suggest this prediction: 
[P1] The position of an individual along fitness-related life-cycle 
dimensions (young vs. old, male vs. female, nulliparous vs. multiparous, 
high vs. low status) should predict the frequency, intensity and contents 
of intrusive thoughts. 
So far, we only know that contagion and risk intrusions become 
highly salient during the perinatal period (Abramowitz et al., 2003; 
Leckman et al., 2004). This may also be true of other stages in the life-
cycle, such as puberty, menarche, and the death of relatives. There is 
simply no general, population-sample study of thought-intrusions and 
their correlates. Sampling bias is particularly likely in this domain. 
Perinatal intrusions get noticed only because pregnancy is a period of 
higher medical monitoring. 
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7.2 Spontaneous Optimization and Relief 
Why the strange rules and prescriptions in compulsive action? Also, 
why should such performances induce temporary relief? Many patients 
explicitly associate their rituals with specific obsessions, stating 
that performing the ritual is one way of inhibiting or repressing the 
unwanted thoughts (Salkovskis, 1985). Clinicians’ observations and 
patients’ reports converge in suggesting that the relief from unbearable 
anxiety, though temporary, is palpable. But there is nothing in current 
cognitive models to explain the fact. 
In our view these two questions are related, and the common answer 
lies in the effects of ritualization on cognitive control and working memory. 
We suggested earlier that the performance of rituals, accompanied by 
numerous, specific, attention-demanding prescriptions, has the effect of 
‘swamping’ working memory. We propose that such rituals constitute 
spontaneous and moderately efficient forms of thought-suppression. 
The difficulties of thought suppression in everyday life (trying not 
to recall unpleasant experiences or not to mull over possible future 
misfortunes) are familiar to everyone. Dan Wegner and colleagues have 
studied the phenomenon in controlled environments and demonstrated 
the complex control processes at work in such attempts (Wegner & 
Erskine, 2003; Wegner & Schneider, 2003). One interesting feature of 
these experimental studies is that only a few techniques are available 
to effectively ‘push away’ unwanted thoughts. They include focusing 
on emotional information of greater intensity than the target thoughts, 
or focusing attention on intrinsically difficult tasks like mathematical 
problems. These are difficult precisely because they recruit working 
memory to a greater extent than most everyday tasks and cannot be 
accomplished automatically. 
Obviously, compulsive rituals are in many ways different from the 
phenomena observed in such studies. First, Wegner’s subjects generally 
have no intrinsic motivation to avoid the suppressed thoughts, other 
than compliance with the experimenter’s instructions. By contrast, OCD 
patients are strongly motivated. Second, the intrusions in patients are 
far stronger (more difficult to push away from consciousness) than a 
simple neutral theme suggested by an experimenter. Third, patients 
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have a history of thought-intrusion and thought-avoidance, whereas 
experimental subjects are genuine beginners in the domain. 
Notwithstanding these differences, we think the studies on thought-
suppression are important to suggest a possible mechanism for the 
elaboration and rigidity of ritual prescriptions. In our view, patients 
with complicated compulsions have spontaneously attained an optimal 
point in the kind of activity that is so demanding in cognitive control 
that intrusive thoughts can be, at least for a while, pushed away from 
consciousness. 
This ‘trick’ exploits certain features of the action-parsing systems 
reviewed (see Section 6.1 ). Given that action-parsing processes are 
engaged when any behavior is witnessed or produced, there are 
not many tricks that could force attention to focus on the low-level 
description of action. Among these features is repetition, which results 
in goal-demotion. Another such gimmick, obviously, is to borrow a 
sequence from ordinary scripts and perform it in a context that makes 
goal-ascription impossible: for example, wash objects without using 
water, pretend to trace an imaginary line, and so on. What results from 
these ‘tricks’ is what we called ‘goal-demotion’ above. Actions are 
represented without attaching a goal to each behavioral unit, as would 
be the case in non-ritual contexts. 
This has several implications for the organization of compulsive 
rituals: 
[P2] Compulsive actions should be such that they mobilize working 
memory and require high degree of cognitive control. 
We have suggested that this is precisely what complicated 
prescriptions achieve, in particular when they result in control of usually 
automatic actions, such as choosing which shoe to tie first, or whether to 
push the doorbell button with this or that finger. 
[P3] Compulsive rituals may be the outcome of a trial-and-error 
process. 
This means that patients more or less deliberately (usually not) try 
various behaviors with various prescriptive rules until they reach an 
optimum, that is, the maximal occupation of working memory that is 
compatible with the intrinsic limits of memory itself. This would carry 
another consequence: 
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[P4] The symptoms should become unstable if the actions become 
routinized. 
Working memory is effectively swamped when usually automatic 
actions are submitted to cognitive control. But even demanding tasks 
(e.g., tying one’s shoes in a particular order that changes with the time of 
the day) might become partly automatic with time. One would predict 
that this would result in diminished efficacy and the spontaneous search 
for different prescriptions, or for more complex sequences. Naturally, 
this dynamic model does not imply that patients are at any point aware 
of the effect of prescriptive rules on memory. They may simply come to 
associate slightly more controlled action to slightly diminished intrusion, 
which would be enough gradually to lead to the baroque complications 
of individual rituals. We do not have much comparative clinical evidence 
concerning the particular contents of obsessive-compulsive rituals, that 
is, the number of actions, their precise description, their prescribed 
order, and so on, as opposed to general descriptions such as ‘washing’ 
or ‘checking.’ Nor do we have much in terms of longitudinal studies of 
ritual elaboration or progression; which is why these remain speculative 
predictions from the model. 
7.3 Ironic Outcomes 
Studying normal subjects instructed not to think about a particular 
item, Wegner showed that thought suppression typically results in a 
‘rebound’—in higher salience of the unwanted thoughts (Wegner & 
Schneider, 2003). This, in Wegner’s model, is caused by the combination 
of two distinct processes engaged in thought suppression. While an 
explicit process directs and monitors the suppression, implicit processes 
are engaged that detect material associated with the target item (Wegner 
& Erskine, 2003). Here again, we do not wish to read too much in the 
parallel between an experimental paradigm and a long-lasting behavior 
pattern. However, an ironic outcome would seem to follow from the 
working-memory swamping scenario: 
[P5] The precise intrusions that rituals can tone down should 
become more frequent or more difficult to resist as rituals are frequently 
practiced. 
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Although it has not been studied in precise quantitative terms, this 
ironic rebound does seem characteristic of compulsive rituals (Rachman 
& de Silva, 1978). The patients who perform more rituals are typically 
more anxious, and also more bothered by their intrusive thoughts. In 
other words, the long-term effects of ritual performance are the opposite 
of its short-term results. Indeed, this may be why an effective cognitive 
and behavioral therapy for OCD, in particular exposure and reaction 
prevention (ERP), requires that the patient evoke the dangerous 
thoughts but restrain the compulsive response (Rachman, Hodgson, & 
Marks, 1971). 
7.4 Developmental Calibration 
Our model implies specific claims about the Hazard-Precaution system 
in children, suggesting that early childhood is a period of calibration 
of the system. Many cognitive systems require calibration, that is, a 
change in parameters as a function of specific information picked up 
in the child’s environment (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002). A salient 
example is the development of food-preferences in young children, with 
a period of unlimited tolerance followed by ‘parameter-setting’ when 
young children reject anything that does not taste familiar (Birch, 1990). 
Another domain would be predator-prey relations, in which common 
assumptions are gradually refined in view of local circumstances 
(Barrett, 1999). 
We can make a similar point about the Potential Hazard Repertoire. 
As we said, the system should handle indirect clues and produce 
inferences about the potential presence of dangerous substances, 
predators, and conspecifics. But it immediately appears that the 
number of possible clues is multiplied by the fact that (a) any one of 
these dangerous situations could be detected using a large number of 
possible clues and (b) the situations themselves must have changed a 
great deal, and changed frequently, during human evolution. Indeed, 
modern humans have adapted to variable conditions of subsistence in 
primary forests, grasslands, and dry savannas. They also had to adapt 
to seasonal changes. Most important, cultural evolution led to rapid 
cultural change, or ‘life in the fast lane’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). 
Ecological and cultural change means that old predators are gone but 
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new ones are present; that noxious substances are not found in the same 
plants or animals; and that social interaction is handled in significantly 
different ways. 
In this way the security system is a learning system, that appears in 
infants as a disposition to pick up particular kinds of locally relevant 
information from the natural and social environment, and changes 
its parameters as a function of that information. This would explain 
not just why children perform ritualistic behaviors, but also why the 
phenomenon appears and subsides at particular stages of development 
and why its typical manifestations evolve from prepotent fears for 
which there is clear preparedness, to more complex inferred threats like 
social harm. The system is designed to address a specific question: How 
to create a secure environment and to provide a series of contextually 
relevant solutions like washing, cleaning, checking, or modifying 
one’s interaction with other agents? This implies particular directions 
for development in the kinds of thoughts and compulsions found in 
childhood. If the system is in calibration during that period, we should 
observe the following: 
[P6] Anxiogenic thoughts should become gradually more specific 
with development.
[P7] Compulsive reaction should become more specific with 
development. 
In terms of anxiety, a fear of vaguely defined predatory animals 
should become a fear of particular animals, a fear of strangers should 
become a fear of particular strangers, and so forth, as the system picks 
up information from the environment. This applies to compulsions, 
too. At an early stage, all recipes should be equiprobable. At a later 
stage, children should acquire locally relevant associations between a 
particular potential danger and a particular recipe. This also predicts 
differences in the rituals of older children from different groups. To the 
extent that different cultural groups live in different conditions, different 
kinds of dangers would be relevant and different clues significant: 
[P8] Fears and compulsions should become more culturally specific 
as children get older. 
We already have some fragmentary evidence that developmental 
trends in children’s fears support these predictions. Fantasies and 
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intrusive thoughts change with development, as mentioned earlier 
(Evans et al.; Leonard et al.). 
7.5 Cultural Similarities and Differences  
in Pathological Ritual 
Our model assumes that there is a Precaution system focused on certain 
kinds of potential danger. We also suggested that this system undergoes 
calibration during childhood, given that clues about potential danger 
change with changing environments. This would imply specific 
predictions about cross-cultural variations in the condition: 
[P9] Anxieties and fears that result in compulsion belong to the 
narrow range of ancestral potential dangers: contamination, intrusion, 
social offence, and resource-depletion.
[P10] We should observe important cultural differences in the 
relative prevalence of symptom clusters (or ‘subtypes’). 
There is very scant comparative anthropological evidence for 
anxieties or fears, although it seems to suggest something of this kind. 
In industrialized countries, the notion of electricity and cars as massive 
killers is virtually absent from the repertoire of phobic and obsessive 
patients. Also, the few studies of OCD patients in non-Western 
environments report the familiar obsessive themes of social offence, 
contagion, and potential danger (Arrindell, de Vlaming, Eisenhardt, 
van Berkum, & Kwee, 2002; Barker-Collo, 2003; Bertschy & Ahyi, 1991; 
Sasson et al., 1997) and the prevalence of OCD as a general category is 
the same in different places (Weissman et al., 1994). 
Cultural differences too are suggestive, although there are to date 
very few (reliable) comparative studies of the condition and most of 
them only bear on clinical populations (so we have no evidence of what 
intrusive thoughts are common or exceptional in the population at large). 
For instance, a study from Bali documents a culture-specific tweaking of 
the general OCD themes. The patient needs to identify all passers-by 
in terms of genealogy and status, and reports obsessions about spirits 
and witches (Lemelson, 2003). Both are culturally specific variants of 
the social harm and social exposure obsessions, as hierarchy and status 
are fundamental to social interaction in Balinese society and social strife 
is expressed through witchcraft accusations (Barth, 1993). In Muslim 
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countries, by contrast, many patients report concerns about pollution 
and contamination strongly influenced by religious prescriptions on 
hygiene and purity of thought (Al-Issa, 2000; Mahgoub & Abdel-Hafeiz, 
1991; Okasha, Saad, Khalil, el Dawla, & Yehia, 1994). A sample of Bahrain 
patients showed that the fear of blasphemy was prevalent (about 40% 
of cases), which may be a local expression of the fear of social harm and 
potential exclusion (Shooka, Al-Haddad, & Raees, 1998). 
This would suggest that an important calibrating factor is the range 
of cultural messages emphasizing potential danger. In particular, 
further epidemiological studies of the various dimensions of OCD 
(contagion, social offence, checking) may be correlated to the intensity 
of precautionary messages available in the environment of development. 
While Islam includes many descriptions of possibly impure actions or 
thoughts, Western children are bombarded with insistent warnings 
about invisible germs. Whether this results in significantly different 
normal and pathological intrusions is simply not documented yet. 
8. Implications of the Model:  
Cultural Ritual as Derivative 
So far, we have not mentioned one of the most salient and socially 
important manifestations of ritualized behaviors, namely, collective, 
culturally sanctioned rituals. We consider that the model presented 
so far can help us understand why rituals are widespread the world 
over and why they are compelling—an argument summarized here and 
presented elsewhere in more ethnographic detail (Liénard & Boyer, 
2006). 
8.1 A Capacity for Ritual? 
We start from the work of Fiske and colleagues. Comparing hundreds 
of ritual sequences with clinical descriptions of OCD cases, they showed 
that the same themes recur over and over again in both domains 
(Dulaney & Fiske, 1994; Fiske & Haslam, 1997). OCD-typical features 
that also enter into rituals include specific (lucky or unlucky) numbers, 
use of special colors, repetition of actions, measures to prevent harm, 
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ordering and symmetry, stylized verbal expressions, washing, concern 
with contagion, and so forth (Fiske & Haslam, 1997). 
Fiske and colleagues speculate that there may be a human capacity to 
perform cultural rituals, that is distorted or hyperactive in pathological 
individual ritual (Fiske & Haslam, 1997). In Fiske’s model, rituals are 
used to channel individual anxiogenic thoughts and make them bearable 
by providing a broader cultural context in which they can be shared and 
make better sense. Fiske and Haslam did not pursue the psychological 
and cultural implications of this hypothesis. It would provide a simple 
and elegant way of explaining the similarities in themes and actions 
between pathological and cultural ritual. Moreover, it would do so by 
connecting both to evolved, species-specific anxiogenic situations. 
However, we consider that cultural rituals may be better explained 
in a different way, as partly parasitic on the Hazard-detection and 
Precaution systems described above. Our main reason for preferring 
this account is that it is more parsimonious. There is no empirical 
evidence that humans do have a specific capacity for ritual. There are no 
evolutionary grounds to consider that such a specific capacity would be 
adaptive (see our discussion of rituals as possible adaptation in Section 
9.1.) So this is a costly hypothesis. By contrast, we have seen that there is 
solid evidence for systems specialized in responses to potential hazard. 
So if the disposition to perform cultural rituals is a by-product of these 
systems, we do not need to posit additional mechanisms. 
8.2 The Cultural Selection Background 
The first assumption in our treatment is that cultural rituals, like other 
forms of cultural behaviors, should be treated as the outcome of cultural 
selection (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Sperber, 1985). 
Representations that we call ‘cultural’ occur with roughly the same 
content in other minds among people of a particular group. Indefinitely 
many factors (local or universal, psychological as well as physical) can in 
principle contribute to the spread of a particular mental representation. 
One type of factor of great interest to us is the set of general human 
dispositions that make certain representations, once they are expressed 
or conveyed by some people, particularly attention-grabbing or 
 913. Why Ritualized Behavior?
memorable or compelling, leading to their cultural transmission 
(Sperber, 1994). 
We observe that people seem compelled to perform particular 
ceremonies at particular junctures, and also that they seem compelled 
to perform them in (what they judge to be) the prescribed way. This is 
what we need to explain. Now, one way to explain this would be to posit 
that there must be a particular urge to perform such ceremonies, or that 
they may fulfill particular needs of the human mind or of human groups. 
However, there may be another kind of explanation, based on the fact 
that people who receive information about particular performances 
already have sets of mental systems designed to respond to particular 
classes of stimuli. The question becomes: Which mental systems would 
be activated, such that performing this ceremony in these circumstances 
would seem compelling? 
8.3 Cultural Information, Mimicry, and Cognitive Capture 
Cognitive systems can be functionally described in terms of their 
particular input format, their operating principles, and their output. 
The input formats of cognitive systems are, in some cases, well known. 
For instance, the auditory stream provides information about pitch and 
location, which is then routed to different systems (Romanski et al., 
1999). The pitch information is divided into linguistic input and non-
linguistic input, transmitted to different parts of the auditory cortex 
(Liegeois-Chauvel, de Graaf, Laguitton, & Chauvel, 1999). At each step, 
the transfer from one system to the other depends on the signals’ format. 
This extends to higher cognitive systems. 
The range of stimuli or internally generated information that meets 
the input format of a system is its domain. Now it is important to 
distinguish between an evolutionary or proper domain of stimuli and an 
actual domain (Sperber, 1994, 1996). The proper domain includes those 
objects or situations that played a causal role in giving the particular 
system a selective advantage. The actual domain includes all objects or 
situations that trigger activation of the system. In most evolved cognitive 
systems, the actual domain is larger than the proper domain, giving rise 
to false alarms. The frog snaps at any small objects whizzing by in its 
visual field, not just to actual edible insects. 
92 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
Any system of this kind is vulnerable to capture and mimicry. The 
terms describe situations in which the system reacts to an input that 
matches its input format, and is part of its actual domain, yet is not among 
the classes of stimuli that the system was designed to process, its proper 
domain. We reserve the term ‘mimicry’ for the situations in which a 
particular behavior or physical trait in an organism gains adaptive value 
by entering the actual domain of another organism’s cognitive system. 
This is what happens in familiar cases, like that of Viceroy butterflies 
adopting the genuine poison-warning garb of Monarchs without having 
to manufacture the poison. 
A different situation is what we call ‘cognitive capture.’ Consider a 
familiar example. Most visual art in humans (from tattooing to painting 
to architecture) seems strongly biased towards vertically symmetrical 
displays, while other symmetries are less salient. Vertical symmetry 
detection capacity appears in infancy (Bornstein & Krinsky, 1985; Fisher 
et al., 1981), influences pattern recognition in childhood (Bornstein & 
Stiles-Davis, 1984; Mendelson & Lee, 1981), and has evolved for purposes 
other than the appreciation of aesthetic displays, most probably for 
detecting facing predators and healthy mates (Thornhill, 1998). Music 
too is a good example, as it ‘hijacks’ certain parts of the auditory 
cortex and provides auditory super-stimuli (Jerison). Narratives about 
imagined persons can be, as we say, ‘captivating’ because they capture 
our capacities for mind-reading and the explanation of behavior. 
This is not mimicry since in the cases mentioned here the organism’s 
Type I error does not benefit another organism. The important point about 
cognitive capture is that a great deal of human culture is acquired and 
transmitted because of this inevitable propensity of cognitive systems 
to ‘fire’ beyond their proper functional range. Most items of ‘culture’ in 
the sense of group-specific sets of norms and concepts depend for their 
transmission on cognitive capture of this kind (Sperber, 1994). 
8.4 Core Ritualization in Cultural Rituals 
To understand the cognitive effects of collective rituals, we must describe 
the kinds of information available to the participants. At first sight, it 
would seem that most people who participate in most rituals do not 
have much information at all. People do not generally hold a ‘theory’ of 
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their own rituals—this is what makes ethnography indispensable and 
difficult. 
However, this is not to say that people participate in a ritual on the 
basis of mere imitation, peering at their cultural elders and simply 
performing similar gestures. This would be implausible, given that 
very little human cultural transmission actually involves such mindless 
imitation (Sperber, 1996). In this particular case, some behavior 
activates some mental templates in the mind of observers, and triggers 
non-random inferences about what is accomplished by the behavior. 
This, we contend, may be sufficient to explain the cultural success of 
Ritualized Behavior. 
To make comparisons simpler, we follow in our description the 
outline of action ritualization processes described earlier. The individual 
reaction to a particular cultural ritual can be functionally described as 
consisting in the following elements: 
People receive specific information about the ritual: a. They are 
told that a ritual should be performed and are led to infer that non-
performance is a dangerous option. For instance, one is told that because 
of a particular event (someone’s illness, a death or a birth, the change of 
seasons, a war with another group, possible damnation), it is necessary 
to go through a particular ritual sequence. 
b. People also receive information and produce inferences about the 
kind of danger against which the ritual is supposed to protect the group, 
for example, ‘pollution’ by invisible substances, attacks by invisible 
predators like witches or spirits, threat of disease, possible famine, social 
strife, and so on. These themes substantially overlap with the Potential 
Hazard Repertoire. 
This triggers a (dampened) activation of Hazard-Precaution system. 
People are instructed to participate in the ritual in particular ways. 
That is, people are generally not allowed to just add to their ritual 
whatever action they think fit. They are enjoined, more or less explicitly, 
to follow a particular script. Information about the script has the 
following properties: 
a. Action descriptions include themes that mimic some of the typical 
outputs of the Hazard-Precaution system: actions such as cleansing, 
washing, checking. 
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b. Descriptions of prior conditions, particular taboos, substances to 
avoid, et cetera, reinforce activation of security motivation system. 
c. There is great emphasis on the details of each action, inducing low-
level parsing of the action flow during performance, especially because 
of negative prescriptions. 
d. Description induces goal-demotion, by insisting on repetition, 
redundancy, apparently pointless acts, and so forth. 
Performance enacted in these conditions temporarily swamps 
working memory because of the attentional demands of the tasks. 
Performance ironically strengthens the salience of particular themes 
associated with gestures or situations to avoid during ritual. 
These various elements and their putative causal relations are 
outlined in Figure 4. In the next sections we present some evidence for 
these various claims and for the psychological and cultural effects of the 
processes. 
8.5 Cognitive Capture in Cultural Rituals 
Our model suggests that ritualized actions are culturally successful to 
the extent that they activate information-processing and motivation 
systems made manifest in other domains of ritualization. In this sense, 
cultural rituals result in cognitive capture of the systems described so 
far, and this is why they can seem attention-demanding and compelling 
to participants. 
Many features of collective rituals activate the Hazard-Precaution 
system by including cues for potential dangers of the Evolutionary 
Potential Hazard Repertoire. First, occasions for ritual often allude 
to clues of possible danger that overlap with the Potential Hazard 
Repertoire: for example, threats to fitness such as famine or illness, 
invisible germs or miasma, dangerous invisible pollution present in 
newborn infants, dead bodies and menstruating women (Bloch & 
Parry, 1982; Metcalf & Huntington, 1991). Second, details of prescribed 
performance also include many security-related motifs. As we said 
previously, many collective rituals include such operations as washing 
and cleaning, checking and re-checking that a particular state of affairs 
really obtains, as well as creating a symmetrical or otherwise orderly 
environment (Dulaney & Fiske, 1994; Fiske & Haslam, 1997), so we will 
not comment on this any further. 
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Fig. 4.  A simplified model of action ritualization in cultural rituals. Boxes identity 
different functional systems in the same way as in Fig. 3 . Participants in 
rituals are provided with two kinds of information, (a) statements about 
potential danger and (b) scripted recipes for ritual action, that activate the 
security-motivation systems. Rules for ritual performance result in both 
goal-demotion and low-level action-parsing with the resulting swamping 
of working memory. These processes result in highly attention-demanding 
and compelling performance of rigidly scripted actions. This in turn makes 
the associations more salient, which should make subsequent messages 
about ritual more intuitively compelling. (Figure design by P Boyer, 2006).
In our model, precaution systems are activated to the extent that 
particular themes (e.g., ‘this village must be purified’) and prescribed 
actions (e.g., ‘wash hands three times in this particular river’) trigger 
activation of evolved Precaution systems. This, however, does not entail 
that the ritual as a whole should be explicitly and exclusively about 
these themes. Indeed, there are many ceremonies in which prescribed 
behavior is only weakly related to these themes, while other themes (e.g., 
procreation, social exchange, hierarchy) are at the forefront of people’s 
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attention. Our claim is only that the ritualization itself is derived from 
the operation of Precaution and action-parsing systems. 
8.6 Ceremonies, Ritualized Action, and Routinization 
This model, in our view, at least provides elements that go some way 
towards an explanation of why ceremonies that include ritualized 
actions are found in most human groups and are generally stable within 
traditions. The model also has some implications that make it diverge 
from received anthropological usage and common intuitions about 
ritual. 
Ritualized actions are not ‘rituals.’ Ritualized actions as described here 
are only a subset of what people actually do in what are called ‘rituals.’ 
For instance, a ceremony may include a typical example of what we 
described earlier, such as, a prescription to turn around a cow three 
times clockwise while avoiding to stare above the horizon and making 
sure to touch the cow with one’s thumb only. But the circumambulation 
of the cow may be an element of a larger ceremony that also includes 
singing, dancing, feasting, and all sorts of other behaviors that are not 
precisely scripted in the sense described here. In other words, ritualized 
behaviors are certainly not the whole of ‘rituals.’ 
Ritualization is not routinization. The model has the slightly counter-
intuitive implication, that ritualized action is described as quite different 
from routinized behavior, indeed as its opposite. In most ceremonies we 
expect to find an alternation between phases of ritualized action (high 
control, attentional focus, explicit emphasis on proper performance) 
and routinized action (possible automaticity, low attentional demands, 
lesser emphasis on proper performance). 
Cultural ritual is not individual ritual writ large. We said that cultural 
ritualized actions are ‘derivative’ and it is important to stress that they are 
a by-product of the Precaution systems and the action-parsing systems, 
not of individual ritualized behavior. Given the similarities between 
individual and cultural forms of ritual, it is of course tempting to take 
one as a scaled version of the other, as Freud suggested (Freud, 1928). 
But this is clearly misguided. First, to maintain the parallel, cultural 
rituals would need to be behaviors that social groups initiate because 
they perceive certain potential dangers. But groups as a whole do not 
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literally behave or perceive, only their members do. Also, cultural rituals 
differ from individual ones in the way the information about compelling 
action is acquired—from other agents and from personal intuition, 
respectively. Most importantly, what compels performance is entirely 
different in the two situations. While individual ritualists (especially 
patients) may feel great anxiety at the prospect of not going through the 
ritual sequence, participants in a cultural ritual are likely to participate 
(among other reasons) to the extent that the particular sequence meets a 
minimal threshold of relevance. The idea of ‘scaling’ would also predict 
all sorts of interesting phenomena that are simply not observed; for 
example, that people who become more religious would tend to become 
more obsessive, or that OCD patients would tend to be more religious 
than controls, that children during early childhood should be more 
interested in religious ritual than at other stages of development, and so 
on. Although there are connections between certain forms of religious 
practice and obsessionality (Fallon, Liebowitz, Hollander, Schneier, et 
al., 1990; Hermesh, Masser-Kavitzky, & Gross-Isseroff, 2003), they fail to 
support these general conjectures. 
9. Conclusions 
9.1 Ritualization and Cognitive Adaptations 
Our models of individual and cultural ritualization take as a starting 
point a specific connection between obsessive pathology and security 
motivation (Mataix-Cols et al., 2005; Szechtman & Woody, 2004) but 
also a more general set of assumptions about the adaptive character 
of specialized neuro-cognitive function (Cosmides & Tooby 1994; 
Duchaine et al., 2001). We have assumed that the Hazard-Precaution 
system was the outcome of selective pressure for gradually finer-grained 
inferential detection of and appropriate response to recurrent hazards in 
ancestral environments. This naturally leads to the question, whether 
action-ritualization might constitute a cognitive adaptation, in the same 
way as other domain-specific capacities do (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). 
The question should be more specific and bear on either individual or 
cultural rituals, since the cognitive processes involved are so different. 
Let us consider cultural rituals first. In the anthropological 
literature, there are various hypothetical models of the ways in which 
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participation in collective ceremonial may have conferred adaptive 
advantage to individuals (Burkert, 1996; Knight, Power, & Mithen, 1998; 
Rappaport, 1979; Sosis, 2000; Watanabe & Smuts, 1999). This stems from 
a long anthropological tradition of construing ritual as crucial to social 
organization and cohesion (Durkheim, 1947; Hocart, 1970; Smith, 1889). 
We discuss the various hypotheses in more detail elsewhere (Liénard 
& Boyer, 2006). Suffice it to say that these different models may well 
explain a disposition to participate in coordinated social action, but not 
why these common endeavors should include scripted, goal-demoted, 
redundant scripting of familiar actions. 
The question of individual ritualization is more complex. In our 
model, the activation of the Precaution system normally results in 
performance of appropriate actions from the Precaution Repertoire—
and this, in most circumstances, should produce enough of a closure or 
satiety experience (Szechtman & Woody, 2004) to preclude reiteration. 
However, the closure experience probably is the outcome of continuous 
changes in the relevant circuitry, leading to various degrees of 
repetitiveness and anxiety about proper performance. So, in our model, 
it is not the ritualized behavior but the Precaution system itself that 
constitutes a cognitive-motivational adaptation. It has the hallmarks of 
such adaptations, such as a specific class of inputs, a specific mode of 
operation, a particular series of fitness-enhancing consequences, a non-
trivial functional design—and, in this particular case, a specific neural 
implementation as well as specific impairment. 
9.2 Phylogeny: Rituals and Displays 
What is the connection between human and other animal ‘ritual’? We use 
scare quotes here, as the term is stretched to encompass highly disparate 
forms of behaviors (Gluckman, 1975). Nevertheless, one should 
comment on the obvious similarities between human rituals and various 
forms of animal communication, notably in the context of agonistic and 
sexual displays where stylized behavior, repetition, and redundancy are 
clearly present. Is this evidence for the deep phylogenetic ancestry of 
ritual? In our view, this question suffers from several ambiguities: 
First, although we may sometimes follow a ‘same effects, same 
causes’ rule of thumb, this is rather misguided if it leads us to confuse 
observable behaviors with the neuro-cognitive systems that support 
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them (Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2000). Indeed, even in the limited 
domain of human rituals, apparently similar behaviors (in patients 
and in cultural ritual participants) actually stem from very different 
cognitive processes. This should a fortiori be expected when comparing 
widely different species. 
Second, the question downplays the extent to which certain features 
of behavior are constrained. Consider OCD patients for instance. They 
are not motivated by a positive urge to ritualize. Rather, ritualized 
behavior happens to constitute an optimal response to the anxiety 
produced by cognitive impairment. Other forms of behavior would not 
seem appropriate given the anxious concerns; they would not produce 
temporary relief. So the redundancy, et cetera, in this case stems from the 
properties of action-parsing and precaution systems in humans. Now 
consider animal displays. They are strongly constrained too, in this case 
by the logic of signaling processes. For instance, signals must be clear 
and distinct enough to preclude ambiguities, which typically results in 
redundancy (Rowe, 1999). The evolution of attentive receivers requires 
that signals maintain a relatively high level of accuracy (Bradbury & 
Vehrencamp, 2000; Silk, Kaldor, & Boyd, 2000) and that the content of 
the signals be directly related to the fitness dimensions they advertise 
(Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). In other words, in both human rituals and 
animal displays, features like stylization, redundancy, and repetition are 
the outcome of external constraints, but these seem to be different in the 
two cases. 
This would support the tentative conclusion that the presence of 
‘ritual’ in both cases is a case of behavioral analogy rather than the 
index of similar capacity and processes. (Obviously, this is not to deny 
that humans like other animals do engage in stereotypical displays, in 
situations of courtship or aggression). This is tentative in the sense that 
we do not know much about the phylogenetic history of ritualization 
(in the precise sense used here) in the hominin line. The evidence so far 
simply does not support the notion of a direct evolutionary homology. 
9.3 Epilogue 
It is a cognitive and evolutionary puzzle that humans perform rituals, 
given the waste of time and resources involved. We aimed to solve 
the puzzle by piecing together the evidence from neuroimaging, 
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neuropsychology, clinical psychology, developmental studies, and 
evolutionary anthropology. Ritualization may be seen as an occasional 
by-product of specific precaution systems and action-parsing capacities 
in humans. 
This explanation however compels us to discard the common 
intuition that there is a natural kind of phenomena called ‘rituals.’ If 
valid, our model does not explain ‘rituals’ but a highly specific form of 
behavior that is found in many of them and occurs for different reasons 
in the behavior of most normal children and obsessive patients, on the 
one hand, and in the context of collective rituals, on the other. 
Discarding misleading categories of behavior (like ‘ritual’—but 
there are many others) may well be the inevitable consequence and 
benefit of proposing integrated explanations. Our model is an attempt 
to bring together neural systems, evolutionary background, behavioral 
manifestations, and developmental trajectory to the understanding of 
action-ritualization. We consider this indispensable. True, much work 
remains to be done to understand the phenomenon. For instance, the 
cognition of children’s ritual is still largely unexplored; the connections 
between ritual performance and anxiety relief in patients need a proper 
neurophysiological study; the persuasive power of cultural rituals is 
not properly explained. But we are confident that all these and other 
puzzles will be solved by the kind of ‘general behavioral science’ that 
transcends fields and discipline boundaries. 
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4. Social Groups  
and Adapted Minds
Introductory Note
Relations between different ethnicities are often fraught with conflict, 
from mild suspicion to avoidance, discrimination or violent inter-group 
conflict. In many places, inter-group conflict has consequences for 
people’s well-being, including their health. But why is that the case? 
In this article, Rengin Firat, Florian van Leeuwen and I tried to propose 
a general model of inter-group conflict that would explain these well-
documented and sometimes paradoxical public health outcomes.
In our view, one cannot properly address questions of inter-group 
relations without a clear understanding of the ways humans form 
alliances. In traditional social sciences, people often simply assumed 
that there are social groups, that people find it self-evident that they 
‘belong’ to a particular collection of individuals, and that people 
sometimes sacrifice their individual welfare for what they see as the 
good of the group. Social scientists, like the rest of us, used to find all 
these phenomena self-evident, simply because they are very familiar.
One advantage of taking an evolutionary standpoint is that the familiar 
cannot be taken for granted, because it happens to be particular to our 
species. Sustained alliances between genetically unrelated individuals 
are rare and limited in scope in most animal species (Dugatkin, 1998). 
But they are ubiquitous among humans, who can form and maintain 
alliances both stable and extensive, scaling up from a few individuals to 
several millions. 
How is this possible? A possible, common and often sterile approach 
is to catalogue those collections of individuals that people identify as 
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different ‘groups’ in their society, and to try to classify kinds of groups. 
One could sort them, for instance, in terms of size (a street gang vs. an 
army), permanence (crowds vs. nations), or solidarity (a village vs. a 
group of commuters) and try to produce a taxonomy of groups based 
on these observable features. Is that really wrong? In a sense, it is not, 
since documenting varieties of phenomena is the starting point in any 
scientific study. But that does not by itself provide us with explanations 
for the observed similarities and differences.
Alliances between unrelated individual agents are (at least as a goal) 
mutually beneficial interactions. They dissolve when members do not 
see participation as favorable to their welfare. That is why the most 
promising interpretation of group formation and dynamics came from 
rational choice models (Elster, 1989; Hechter, 1987). These described 
the way aggregate individual interests could explain group dynamics—
the conditions under which each individual may expect to gain from 
participation in alliances. The one advantage and limitation of these 
rational choice models is that they assume no complex psychology in 
the agents, except a set of prior preferences, some perception of the 
expected benefits from different courses of actions, and of course a 
motivation to increase their expected benefits. This description of agents, 
adopted from micro-economics, is often very powerful, especially in the 
aggregate. But, as many have pointed out, it comes with two limitations. 
First, it assumes that agents have an accurate perception of the benefits 
that may result from their behavior, which is a convenient idealization. 
Second, more important, rational choice models do not (try to) explain 
why agents have the preferences they have.
Now understanding the origin of preferences, and describing the 
nature and limits of human capacities, are precisely the main goals of 
evolutionary psychology, in combination with the models and findings 
of economics, neuroscience and anthropology. In this perspective, 
we can put forward precise, testable hypotheses about the kinds of 
preferences that would have been the object of positive selection in 
human evolution. 
What makes human alliances and groups possible is a set of evolved 
mechanisms that allow us to see the benefits of coalitions, to detect 
what alliances are present in our social environment, to monitor who 
is and who is not committed to the coalitions we join, to signal our 
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own commitment, and so forth. Over the last thirty years, evolutionary 
scientists have added considerable detail to our understanding of these 
capacities. For instance, they demonstrated how people are intuitively 
suspicious of the status of newcomers in a group (Cimino & Delton, 
2010), which neuro-physiological systems support coalitional affiliation 
and rivalry (De Dreu et al., 2011), how people in some countries readily 
encode ‘racial’ identities as coalitional rather than merely perceptual 
(Kurzban et al., 2001; Pietraszewski et al., 2014), how accent is seen as a 
cue of alliances (Pietraszewski & Schwartz, 2014), and much more. For 
general surveys of the field, see Boyer (2018, Chapter 1), Pietraszewski 
(2016), and Tooby & Cosmides (2010).
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Safety, Threat, and Stress in 
Intergroup Relations:  
A Coalitional Index Model
with Rengin Firat & Florian van Leeuwen1
Contacts between people from different groups engage a variety of 
human competencies and motivations, from high-level representations 
of social categories to visceral responses when confronted with 
strangers, from cognitive appraisal of conflict to a desire to exclude or 
even attack ‘others.’ There is a correspondingly diverse set of fields and 
subfields in psychology and the social sciences focusing on such specific 
topics as racial prejudice, ingroup bias, ethnic identity, xenophobia, 
and nationalism. In this article, we propose a model that cuts across 
boundaries between these different fields to describe and explain 
fundamental aspects of intergroup relations.
The psychological literature in this domain comprises a vast number 
of empirical generalizations without an overarching explanatory 
perspective. This results in many ambiguities and paradoxes. For 
instance, belonging to a subordinate or stigmatized group is often 
described as intrinsically stressful, with negative health effects, but 
living among one’s own stigmatized group sometimes has a positive 
impact on health (Shaw et al., 2012). Or, racism is commonly found to be 
associated with conservative or authoritarian values, but the supposedly 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., Firat, R., & van 
Leeuwen, F. (2015). Safety, threat and stress in inter-group relations. A coalitional 
index model, Perspectives in Psychological Science 10(4): 434–450. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1745691615583133. Reprinted with permission from Sage Publications.
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conservative army is the one setting in the United States where people 
are most satisfied with interrace relations (Bullock, 2013). Or, people 
are considered to resent immigrants because they threaten the host 
population’s cultural and symbolic supremacy, but when immigrants 
assimilate and adopt to the majority’s cultural symbols, this triggers even 
stronger resentment in many people (Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki, 
& Sidanius, 2010). Many empirical findings are treated as unrelated 
phenomena, mostly because they are studied in distinct subfields of the 
social sciences. Finally, a great deal of the social psychological literature 
in this domain makes no connection to equally salient processes of 
intergroup relations studied in anthropology, human evolution, history, 
and economics.
We propose that many aspects of intergroup relations should be 
construed as different manifestations of a coalitional psychology. We 
describe coalitional psychology as a set of evolved mechanisms designed 
to garner support from conspecifics, organize and maintain alliances, 
and increase an alliance’s chance of success against rival coalitions. 
In this perspective, the core psychological mechanisms are the same, 
independent of whether the alliance in question is formed as ethnic 
(based on perceived similarity and common origin), racial (based on 
ethnicity combined with phenotypic similarity), regional, or political, 
and so forth. The point of the proposed paradigm is not to discard or 
replace extant models or explanations but to illustrate how they can 
be integrated into a broader framework, which we hope will give rise 
to new predictions and hypotheses. Consistent with other research 
in evolutionary psychology (Kurzban & Neuberg, 2005; Navarrete, 
McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010; Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 
2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010), we argue that whether the coalitional 
cognitive system is activated, and what information it processes, may 
provide a parsimonious causal explanation for many representations, 
attitudes, and behaviors in intergroup relations.
Also, we contend that intergroup relations are strongly influenced by 
threat-detection mechanisms. Threat detection results in the adjustment 
of an internal variable, the coalitional safety index, an individual’s 
representation of the safety induced by membership in an alliance. 
The level of this variable is modulated by cues of coalitional threat and 
support, for example, cues of decreasing support from one’s own group 
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or of increasing menace from rival groups. These threat cues can lead to 
coalitional stress, with standard physiological stress responses.
1. Evolved Cognition Background
1.1 Human Coalitional Psychology
Stable alliances are rare in most animal species (Harcourt & de Waal, 
1992). By contrast, cooperation among non-kin toward a common goal 
in stable alliances is ubiquitous in human social interaction, suggesting 
a suite of specialized motivations and capacities that appeared during 
human evolution. Coalitional processes may be found at many different 
levels of organization, such as political parties, street gangs, office 
cliques, academic cabals, and bands of close friends, and can include 
thousands or millions of individuals when ethnic or national categories 
are construed as coalitions.
Coalitional psychology is a crucial element of the human capacity 
for collective action, in which a collection of agents cooperate toward 
a particular (set of) goal(s) that cannot be achieved by any single 
individual (or only at much greater cost); these agents behave in ways 
that increase each agent’s welfare by making it more likely that the 
goal is achieved (Hardin, 1982; Myatt & Wallace, 2009). Humans for a 
long time have required, for their survival and reproduction, extensive 
support from kin but also from non-kin conspecifics, for example, in 
hunting (Dubreuil, 2010; Kelly, 1995), parenting (Hrdy, 1999, 2009), 
trade (Jaeggi & Van Schaik, 2011), and defense against other humans 
(Gat, 2006; Keeley, 1996). These evolutionary conditions explain why 
human groups are often stable and competitive. Humans need relatively 
stable alliances, because many endeavors require a prior assurance that 
support will be available when needed—warfare is a case in point. Also, 
human alliances may become rival even in contexts that may not require 
competition, because social support itself is a rival good. If an alliance 
builds up offering its members mutual support, it deprives others of that 
resource, so that one would expect coalitions to emerge as a response to 
the existence of other coalitions.
Collective action, as described by biologists and economists 
(Dugatkin, 1998; Medina, 2007; Mesterton-Gibbons & Sherratt, 2007), 
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requires that agents engage in highly specific information processing 
concerning their own and others’ behaviors. For instance, (a) payoffs 
to other members of the group are considered as gains for self (and, 
obviously, negative payoffs as losses to self); (b) payoffs for rival alliances 
are assumed to be zero-sum—the rival group’s success is our loss, and 
vice versa; and (c) other members’ commitment to the common goal 
is crucial to one’s own welfare. As a consequence, (a) each member 
monitors other members’ levels of commitment, (b) there is a strong 
motivation to demonstrate one’s commitment to the other members, 
and (c) there is an inclination to make defection less likely, notably by 
making it costly.
Participants in coalitional interactions rarely, if ever, represent these 
principles explicitly. All they are aware of are intuitive preferences, for 
instance, a desire to punish a renegade, a motivation to engage in risky 
behaviors for the good of the cause, an interest in whether and how far a 
specific person can be trusted or the fact that one’s enemies’ enemies can 
be strategic allies. Such motives and cognitions may seem self-evident 
to both actors and observers, and the necessary complex computations 
are not available to conscious inspection (Kurzban & Neuberg, 2005).
To say that there is a coalitional psychology, distinct from other 
mental system, does not entail that there is a demarcation between 
coalitions and non-coalitions in social life. First, coalitional psychology 
can be activated in relation to very different types of groupings—some 
may be based on a common category or origin (e.g., gender, ethnicity, 
nation) and others not (e.g., office cliques). Second, activation of 
coalitional psychology is in many cases contextual—an agent may treat 
a certain category as coalitional (e.g., the young against the old, Blacks 
versus Whites) in some situations but not in others. Third, one may treat 
a collection of agents as coalitional, while one’s partners do not. The 
coalitional construal is in the eye of the beholder and need not align 
with others’ construals.
When one’s representations of a social category activate coalitional 
psychology, one (implicitly or explicitly) assumes that people belonging 
to that category have a greater stake in each other’s welfare than they 
have in that of outsiders; one also assumes that they are committed to 
the common goal, that is, prepared to suffer some costs to advance the 
overall position of the alliance. This background of assumptions may 
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shape people’s representations of group interactions in terms of common 
goals, potential cooperation, and indirect or direct reciprocity—the 
features that most explicitly influence group-oriented behavior (Balliet, 
Wu, & De Dreu, 2014).
1.2 Coalitional Psychology in Context:  
Threat-Detection Systems
Important aspects of human coalitional psychology should be 
understood in the context of threat detection. Natural selection results 
in systems that attend to recurrent danger cues in environments of 
evolution and guide appropriate responses (Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011; 
Boyer & Lienard, 2006). Survival and reproductive success require 
not just avoiding present danger (e.g., a predator present) but also 
detecting potential fitness threats (e.g., footprints indicating predator 
presence). Evidence from ethology, neurophysiology, and experimental 
psychology shows that present and potential hazards elicit different 
reactions and orchestrate distinct neural circuitry (Blanchard, Griebel, 
Pobbe, & Blanchard, 2011; Woody & Szechtman, 2011). Research on 
threat detection has described two features of animal threat-detection 
systems that are likely relevant for humans’ coalitional psychology.
 First, safety and threat are not two sides of the same coin (Szechtman 
& Woody, 2004). Threats can be inferred from the actual presence of 
particular cues in the environment (e.g., the smell of a predator), but 
the absence of predators is not usually indicated by any perceptible 
property of the environment. The absence of evidence is not evidence 
for absence. Indeed, most complex animals do not immediately infer 
safety from the removal of threat cues (Dielenberg & McGregor, 1999). 
Rather, animals’ return to a baseline level of perceived security seems to 
be internally generated, mostly through performance of precautionary 
routines (Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
Second, the costs and benefits of inferring safety and threat are 
often asymmetrical (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Funder, 2006; 
Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Individuals usually face a trade-off between 
false alarms (e.g., inferring the presence of a predator, when none is 
present) and misses (e.g., failing to infer the presence of a predator, 
when one is present), where false alarms are much less costly than 
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misses. Therefore, error management models predict that many features 
of social psychology are characterized by displaying false alarms—that 
is, by erring on the side of caution. More generally, such models explain 
why cues that indicate a potential reduction of safety tend to have a 
stronger impact on attention and motivation than cues that indicate 
increased safety (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001).
2. The Model
2.1 The Coalitional Safety Index is  
an Internal Regulatory Variable
We propose that various cues concerning potential social threats and 
social support are summed up as an internal regulatory variable, a 
coalitional safety index, the level of which is adjusted in each individual 
from situation to situation. Formally, this variable is similar to other 
regulatory variables proposed in the biological psychology and 
physiology (Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008), 
such as indexes for hunger or thirst (Loewenstein, 1996), overall 
security (McGregor, Adamec, Canteras, Blanchard, & Blanchard, 
2005; Szechtman & Woody, 2004), and kinship (Lieberman, Tooby, & 
Cosmides, 2007). Such an index (a) integrates information from many 
other cognitive systems and sums them in a single value, which (b) has 
effects throughout the organism, such as allocating cognitive resources, 
modifying goal priorities, and triggering emotional and physiological 
reactions, and (c) predictably affects behavior (Tooby et al., 2008). 
Given human dependence on social support, we expect human cognitive 
systems to provide efficient monitoring of the availability of coalitional 
help. Indeed, the evidence shows that people automatically attend to 
alliance-relevant information in their social environment. For instance, 
they look for cues of reliability in potential partners by monitoring their 
behavior (Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001) or their faces (van’t Wout & 
Sanfey, 2008); they seek information about others, for example, through 
gossip (Dunbar, 1996; Hess & Hagen, 2006; Wert & Salovey, 2004); they 
automatically monitor alliances among others, even among outsiders 
(Pietraszewski, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014)and they carefully evaluate 
 1234. Social Groups and Adapted Minds 
the status of ongoing friendship ties (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1996)
2.2 Coalitional Threat
Coalitional psychological systems, as well as delivering a representation 
of the social environment as composed of competing alliances, also 
produce inferences of danger (i.e., information likely to activate 
appropriate emotional systems and engage specific danger-related 
physiological response). Other alliances can be seen as threats both to 
the person (e.g., losing one’s job, being attacked) and to his or her group 
(losing influence, power, cultural pre-eminence, and so on; (Rosenstein, 
2008).
People should be able to detect both within and between-alliance 
threat cues. Cues suggesting that coalitional support is diminishing or 
absent should result in reduced levels of coalitional safety in people 
within an alliance (Pratto & John, 1991). Such cues include information 
pointing out that one’s coalition partners do not consider one an actual 
member of the alliance, that they do not consider one sufficiently 
committed and trustworthy, or that they are less committed to the 
coalition than oneself. In situations that allow for potential physical 
conflict, we would expect people to be sensitive to other coalitions’ 
number, cohesiveness, and aggressiveness, as each of these factors is 
relevant to the level of safety provided by one’s own group (see, e.g., 
Schaller & Abeysinghe, 2006).
Coalitional threat cues would trigger a strong motivation to engage 
in a variety of behaviors to avoid the threat and return to a higher level of 
coalitional safety, for example, by sending clearer commitment signals, 
by cultivating homogeneity in the group, by avoiding members of other 
alliances, and by competing with or fighting against members of rival 
coalitions.
Threat-detection systems do not just raise a general alarm level in the 
face of generic danger. They typically respond in highly specific ways, 
in social as well as other domains. Other groups may be associated with 
economic or territorial competition but also with potential physical 
violence or with pathogen transmission (Schaller, 2006). Neuberg and 
colleagues have shown that these diverse kinds of threat representations 
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trigger distinct, appropriate emotional responses and precautionary 
behaviors (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). 
However, on a physiological level, qualitatively different threats may 
evoke fairly uniform stress responses.
2.3 Coalitional Stress
Mammals have evolved two neurophysiological responses to direct 
challenges (Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007). One response is immediate 
(i.e., within seconds) and involves the fight-or-flight response; the 
other is a slower, more durable response (i.e., within minutes or hours) 
that organizes longer-term changes of behavior. The fast reactions are 
orchestrated by the sympathetic-adrenal medullary system, associated 
with activation of the sympathetic nervous system, and expressed 
through release of epinephrine. The slower response involves activation 
of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal system, is associated with 
parasympathetic activation, and results in the release of glucocorticoids 
(cortisol in humans). Repeated activation of these responses results in 
chronic stress, with important consequences for health and well-being 
(Sapolsky, 2007).
A crucial part of our model is that the detection of coalitional threat 
cues in one’s social environment triggers a stress response. Repeated 
exposure to such cues may lead to chronic stress, which in turn yields 
negative health consequences. Therefore, to the extent that many 
individuals in a specific social category are exposed to similar coalitional 
threats, we should expect these effects to translate into differences in 
health outcomes at the level of social groups.
2.4 Specific Computations
 In the model proposed here, many aspects of intergroup psychology 
are construed as domain specific, geared to the management of 
coalitions. This stands in contrast to some classical models of social 
affiliation in terms of broad, domain-general processes, such as 
stereotyping, preference for familiarity, motives for distinct identity, 
or desires for self-esteem (see ‘Integrating Classical Frameworks’ later 
in this article). We propose that specialized cognitive systems orient 
attention to specific information relevant for computing coalitional 
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safety and threat. In the course of everyday life, people are constantly 
sampling their social environment and automatically making inferences 
about properties of that environment. For instance, perception of the 
numbers of immigrants in one’s country is heavily influenced by the 
number of visibly ‘foreign’ individuals encountered (Center, 2006). For 
the purpose of making inferences about coalitional safety and threat, 
we expect coalitional psychology to focus on such information as the 
number of individuals in one’s coalitions, the number of individuals 
in other perceived coalitions, changes in those numbers, the perceived 
aggressiveness of these coalitions, their cohesiveness, and their 
respective members’ commitment, strength, and so on. The model 
predicts that these inferences regarding coalitional safety and threat 
result not in unspecified positive or negative affective states but in 
domain-specific affective states that motivate a limited set of courses of 
action, appropriate for coalitional purposes.
We summarize the model in Figure 1. Below we survey a number of 
well-known aspects of intergroup relations and describe how they can 
be understood in terms of cues that increase or decrease the coalitional 
safety index.
3. Intergroup Encounters as Threat Cues
 We start with the individual impact of intergroup encounters. In the 
short survey that follows, we emphasize how a coalitional appraisal 
system integrates various cues and as a result adjusts the coalitional 
safety index.
3.1 Association between ‘Outgroups’ and Danger
The literature on the association between outgroups and danger is 
vast but essentially convergent, suggesting that this relationship is 
implicit and largely automatic, resulting in an ‘avoidance’ rather than 
‘approach’ motivation (Paladino & Castelli, 2008). For example, when 
primed with faces of Black men, American subjects expect weapons 
rather than tools (Payne, 2001; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). People 
categorized as potential enemies seem physically stronger than controls 
(Fessler & Holbrook, 2013), whereas being in the company of friends 
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Fig. 1.  Schematic representation of functional processes involved in the adjustment 
of the coalitional safety index (left) and examples of such processes (right). 
The model describes how attention to social information, for instance, about 
people’s behaviors indicating affiliation, leads to inferences of social threat 
and social support. These inferences modulate the coalitional safety index, 
which has two main consequences. First, it changes motivations concerning 
action plans, for instance, an effort to remain within one’s group, to avoid 
others, or to boost solidarity in one’s own group. Second, lowering the 
coalitional safety index triggers a stress response, which can have adverse 
long-term consequences. (Figure design by P Boyer. 2015).
makes potential enemies seem physically smaller (Fessler & Holbrook, 
2013). Fear is more easily attributed to out-group than ingroup faces 
(Navarrete et al., 2009), even when participants were assigned to minimal 
groups—artificial groups construed for the purpose of the experiment 
based on an arbitrary criterion (Navarrete et al., 2012). Encounters with 
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outgroups are experienced as uncertain and demanding (Blascovich, 
Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001), often create a specific form 
of ‘intergroup anxiety’ (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and are associated 
with an increase in behaviors like blinking and fidgeting (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 2008). Neuroimaging studies have also 
demonstrated specific fear-circuitry activation in response to stimuli 
depicting outgroups (Hart et al., 2000). Why are outgroups implicitly 
and often explicitly perceived as potential danger? This association is 
often explained in terms of shared stereotypes about social categories. In 
this view, encounters between Blacks and Whites in the United States, for 
example, are stressful because of a White stereotype of Blacks as violent 
and a Black expectation of White racism. However, it is not parsimonious 
to explain each case of difficult intergroup contact in terms of specific 
cultural stereotypes, as they occur even with minimal groups for which 
there are no stereotypes and more generally because the phenomenon 
is ubiquitous and thus demands a general explanation. Indeed, most 
people in most cultures known to history and anthropology have 
expected intergroup relations to be fraught with danger or at least some 
measure of hostility (Gat, 2006; Keeley, 1996). The notion of ‘others’ 
as threatening is an essential component of the ethnocentric prejudice 
generally observed in human societies (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).
3.2 Categories Tacitly Construed as Coalitions:  
Race in the United States
 In our model, what drives people’s intuitions about members of some 
social category as potential danger is not (just) information about 
characteristics of that category but the specific inference that members 
of that category are a coalition, that they are striving to achieve common 
goals against other alliances, including their own.
Consider interracial encounters in the United States. Usually, race is 
automatically encoded by American participants, regardless of protocols 
and task demands. However, ‘race’ is unlikely to be part of our evolved 
conceptual repertoire, because encounters with people of visibly 
different ancestry are a recent phenomenon in terms of evolutionary 
history (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). These encounters did not 
occur regularly before efficient modes of long-range transportation were 
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invented. Excluding a long-evolved adaptation to interracial encounters, 
one possible interpretation of automatic race encoding is that it is simply 
a byproduct of general perceptual biases. A more plausible alternative 
is that race, in the United States, is a proxy for coalitional affiliation. 
To demonstrate that, Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides (2001) used a 
memory-confusion paradigm in which they presented participants with 
different target faces, together with text suggesting that two coalitions 
were involved in a conflict. Each of the suggested alliances crossed racial 
categories. As predicted, this manipulation resulted in significantly less 
accurate memory for race than in conditions without such coalitional 
cues (Kurzban et al., 2001), showing that retrieving coalitional affiliation 
interfered with race but not with other distinctive features like gender. 
In other words, current coalitional concerns and external cues can 
easily interfere with encoding or retrieval of racial categories, because 
they activate the same cognitive systems (Pietraszewski, 2009). The 
automatic encoding of racial categories, then, is not a simple matter of 
perceptual cues but requires a conceptual elaboration of these cues as 
a proxy for coalitional rivalry, which is a specific consequence of the 
U.S. social history (Cosmides et al., 2003). This coalitional interpretation 
also makes sense of other empirical results concerning Black–White 
encounters. For instance, automatic race encoding is stronger when 
perceiving lower-class Blacks than when perceiving middle-class Blacks 
(Weeks & Lupfer, 2004), presumably because lower-class Blacks are seen 
as more hostile than middle-class Blacks by most research participants. 
Also, gathering participants into mixed-race minimal groups interferes 
with the familiar phenomenon of racial ingroup bias (Van Bavel & 
Cunningham, 2009).
3.3 Intergroup Encounters and the Stress Response
As outgroups are associated with hazard, encounters with them 
trigger physiological processes appropriate in the face of potential 
danger, a process that is crucial to understanding the cognitive effects 
of intergroup relations (Blascovich et al., 2001; Page-Gould, Mendoza-
Denton, & Tropp, 2008). Specific cardiovascular responses may result 
from unexpected and limited physical contact with an unfamiliar 
outgroup (Vrana & Rollock, 1998) or from imposed dyadic interaction 
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with outgroup members (Littleford, Wright, & Sayoc-Parial, 2005). 
Such cardiovascular reactions are modulated by cognitive appraisal of 
the situation. For instance, White participants’ physiological reactions 
during dyadic interaction are modulated by the self-description of Black 
interaction partners (confederates) as advantaged or disadvantaged 
(Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002). Also, uncertainty 
about another’s attitudes and intentions is a major contributor to the 
physiological response. In one study, responses of both Black and 
White participants to negative evaluations depended on the race of the 
evaluator and triggered threat reactions only when the evaluator was of 
the same race. Positive evaluations tended not to trigger threat reactions, 
except when they contradicted stereotypes. Whites may expect positive 
evaluations from both Whites and Blacks, and Blacks may expect 
positive evaluations from Blacks. But Black participants likely expected 
negative evaluations from Whites and responded to ‘suspicious’ positive 
evaluations by Whites with an increased threat response (Mendes, 
Major, McCoy, & Blascovich, 2008). Such responses are also observed 
as reactions to merely anticipated interracial encounters, as measured 
in both cardiovascular responses (Sawyer, Major, Casad, Townsend, & 
Mendes, 2012) and subjective ratings of health (Page‐Gould, Mendoza‐
Denton, & Mendes, 2014).
These effects of intergroup contact are best understood in terms of an 
intuitive appraisal of the resources available to each partner (Blascovich 
et al., 2001). Cognitive, emotional, and physiological responses to 
intergroup encounters engage both a primary appraisal (to evaluate 
potential danger) and a secondary appraisal of one’s own resources, 
leading to a coping versus stress polarity, which in turn results in either 
engagement or antagonizing behaviors (Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 
2009).
Stress is a response to situations appraised as incompatible with an 
organism’s goals (Lazarus, 1984). So understanding stress responses 
requires that we identify the appraisal system involved (Smith & Kirby, 
2011). We propose that the coalitional safety index constitutes precisely 
such an appraisal. Stress responses would make little functional sense 
if people were confronted only with instances of stereotypes. For 
instance, the fact that one’s partner in an experimental dyad comes 
from a group reputed to be incompetent should not impair one’s own 
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performance or result in a specific cardiovascular response. By contrast, 
if that encounter is implicitly framed as potential danger, the response 
is clearly functional.
4. Coalitional Stress and Health
We should expect repeated exposure to stressors, in the coalitional 
domain as elsewhere, to result in chronic stress with observable physical 
and mental health consequences.
4.1 Minority–Majority Health Disparities
The world over, immigrants and minorities suffer from worse health 
than host or majority populations (D. R. Williams, 2012). In many 
cases, obviously, immigration is confounded with oppression, poverty, 
or trauma from exile. However, the pattern also obtains in settled 
immigrant communities, such as Latinos in the United States (Osypuk, 
Bates, & Acevedo-Garcia, 2010) or South Asians in Britain (Carpenter 
& Brockington, 1980). Such negative impact of emigration on health 
sometimes leads to the ‘immigrant paradox’ whereby foreign-born 
members of these groups fare better than those born in the host country 
(Alegría et al., 2008). Health disparities between immigrant and host 
populations can be observed in virtually all modern industrial societies 
with large migrant groups (Bak-Klimek, Karatzias, Elliott, & Maclean, 
2014; Noymer & Lee, 2013)
A similar disparity is observed between low-status social categories 
and the rest of the population. For instance, racial-minority members 
in the United States get sick more often, die at younger ages, and have 
more hypertension and lower levels of subjective well-being than 
Whites (Geronimus, Bound, Waidmann, Hillemeier, & Burns, 1996; D. 
R. Williams, 2012). Though there are exceptions to this pattern (Morales, 
Lara, Kington, Valdez, & Escarce, 2002), it seems that in general, native 
ethnic and racial minorities fare worse on various health outcomes and 
rate their well-being lower than non-minorities.
Part of this disparity stems from economic conditions, such as access 
to nutrition, type of work, and access to healthcare (Lynch, 2000). 
However, the differences persist even after controlling for these factors, 
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suggesting that discrimination as such has a general deteriorating effect 
on health (Mays, Cochran, & Barnes, 2007; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 
2009). The poor health outcomes for minorities and stigmatized groups 
may result from a range of social processes, including categorization, 
hierarchical ranking of groups, and perceived levels of achievement or 
competence (Major, Mendes, & Dovidio, 2013).
 Stress is generally recognized as the crucial causal link between 
discrimination and health (Major et al., 2013; D. R. Williams & 
Mohammed, 2009). Perceived discrimination tends to elevate 
physiological stress responses such as blood pressure, cardiovascular 
reactivity, and heart rate (Brondolo, Rieppi, Kelly, & Gerin, 2003; Guyll, 
Matthews, & Bromberger, 2001; Utsey & Hook, 2007). Epidemiological 
studies support this stress-based explanation for Blacks in the United 
States (Clark, 2000; Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999) and for 
ethnic minorities more generally (McEwen, 2004; McEwen & Stellar, 
1993). Even merely anticipated discrimination can produce stress 
(Karlsen & Nazroo, 2004). That discrimination causes stress explains 
why the greatest health disparities between minority and majority 
groups is found in conditions typically brought about or worsened 
by chronic stress, such as obesity, heart disease, and hypertension 
(Geronimus et al., 1996).
A similar process may be responsible for deteriorated health among 
immigrants, as ‘acculturation stress’ accumulates in individuals 
confronted with new values or norms (C. L. Williams & Berry, 1991). The 
connection between acculturation and stress has been observed among 
Asian immigrants in the United States (Chung & Epstein, 2014), Latino 
students (Cano, Castillo, Castro, de Dios, & Roncancio, 2014), and older 
adults (Kwag, Jang, & Chiriboga, 2012). Indeed, newly arrived Latino 
immigrants in the United States enjoy a health advantage (in terms of 
adverse effects of chronic stress) over the rest of the Hispanic population, 
which decreases with each decade spent in the United States (Kaestner, 
Pearson, Keene, & Geronimus, 2009).
In a survey of health disparities, Major and colleagues reviewed a 
variety of factors (stereotype threat, excessive vigilance, memories of 
injustice, attributional ambiguity, and many more), all of which are 
documented as contributing to stress responses (Major et al., 2013). In 
summary, there is overwhelming evidence that, in many different ways, 
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the experience of minority or immigrant individuals includes a frequent 
occurrence of stress-inducing episodes, more so than for host or majority 
populations (Contrada et al., 2000, 2001).
4.2 Ethnic Density Effects
There is an interesting exception to general health disparities between 
majority and minority groups: the ethnic density effect. This effect 
refers to the situation when immigrants or members of minorities who 
live among other members of their group fare better than those who 
live among the majority population. This effect is counterintuitive, 
as immigrant or minority neighborhoods are generally poorer, less 
pleasant, and afford less access to health resources.
Ethnic or group density effects were first observed in the domain of 
mental health (Bosqui, Hoy, & Shannon, 2014; Halpern, 1993; Shaw et 
al., 2012). For instance, British Asian immigrants in more homogeneous 
environments have a lower incidence of psychoses (Boydell et al., 2001; 
Das-Munshi et al., 2012; Das-Munshi, Becares, Dewey, Stansfeld, & 
Prince, 2010) and other pathologies like self-harm (Neeleman, Wilson-
Jones, & Wessely, 2001). In the United States, the effects of acculturation 
on depression are modulated by group density among Latinos (Kwag 
et al., 2012).
Ethnic density also influences general health outcomes (Becares & 
Nazroo, 2013; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2008). For example, birth weight 
among U.S. Latinos is higher in mostly Latino neighborhoods (Osypuk 
et al., 2010); Black mortality from cardiovascular conditions is higher in 
more mixed neighborhoods in New York (Fang, Madhavan, Bosworth, 
& Alderman, 1998).
There is no consensus explanation for such density effects and 
surprisingly little systematic hypothesis testing about its causes (Shaw 
et al., 2012). Density may correlate with better social integration—that 
is, each individual has more and better social ties in homogeneous places 
(Pickett & Wilkinson, 2008). However, it is not clear that social capital 
mediates the density effect (Becares & Nazroo, 2013). An alternative is 
that ethnic density provides ‘buffering’ against the social psychological 
effects of discrimination (Becares & Nazroo, 2013). Living in an 
ethnically homogeneous place may decrease the psychological weight 
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of stigma (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2008). Assuming that this is the case, 
we still have no precise functional description of the processes whereby 
stigma or, conversely, protection from stigma would result in specific 
health outcomes.
4.3 Coalitional Interpretation
A proper explanation of the effects of intergroup relations on health 
should account for both the overall disparity between groups and the 
interaction with ethnic homogeneity. Explanations in terms of societal 
phenomena like stigmas or shared stereotypes may not provide a 
sufficiently specific description of the psychological and physiological 
processes involved.
We propose that the coalitional safety index is affected by a variety 
of threat cues, including the absence of individuals willing to extend 
support, decreases in number of such individuals, the presence of 
members of rival groups, their number, an increase in their number, 
their perceived level of hostility, and their perceived capacity to inflict 
harm. In other words, the perception of coalitional safety is influenced 
not just by activated beliefs about one’s own and other groups but also 
by inferring probable states of the world from such features as relative 
numbers, frequencies of encounters, and tenor of interaction.
The daily experiences of minorities or immigrants, on the one 
hand, and majority or host populations, on the other, diverge on these 
elementary metrics. First, even assuming an equal level of perceived 
danger in all intergroup encounters and all else being equal, minority 
individuals are bound to encounter majority individuals more 
frequently than vice versa. Second, in these encounters, minority 
members are more likely than majority individuals to appraise the 
situation as one of weaker coalitional position. For minority individuals, 
each encounter with majority members potentially constitutes a threat 
cue, in that it reminds the minority person that he or she is a member 
of a less numerous and probably weaker group. So even in terms of 
low-level properties of the social environment, the natural sampling 
described above should result in a higher frequency of stressors (i.e., 
a higher number of situations in which the coalitional safety index is 
down-regulated, if only momentarily).
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Such an information-processing account also explains the ethnic 
density effect. Living in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods changes 
the base rates of encounters with same- and rival-coalition members, thus 
reducing the number of stressors. One would expect that the cumulative, 
chronic stress effect is therefore smaller for minority individuals living 
in homogenous neighborhoods. Our interpretation predicts that this 
beneficial effect of homogeneous neighborhoods may be diminished if 
an individual does not perceive the frequent own-ethnicity encounters 
as interactions with coalitional allies. Indeed, people of very low status 
in their communities do not benefit from ethnic homogeneity (Ayers et 
al., 2009; Cano et al., 2014; Chae, Park, & Kang, 2014).
5. Integrating Classical Frameworks
Beyond providing explanations for consequences of intergroup 
contacts, the coalitional model may also help us integrate some 
standard perspectives on intergroup relations. Specifically, we consider 
here distance and con-tact approaches, social identity perspectives, and 
finally social dominance theory.
5.1 Intergroup Contact and its Paradoxes
We argue that some aspects of intergroup relations should be explained 
in terms of the psychological processes involved in individual encounters 
with outgroups. That is also the starting point of the various hypotheses 
put for-ward in the ‘contact’ tradition (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 
2003), which aims to reduce the prevalence of negative stereotypes and 
attitudes about outgroups by increasing the frequency and quality of 
encounters with outgroup members (Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. 
Tropp, 2006).
However, generalizing this association between more contact and 
more positive relations would be clearly difficult. Places of high outgroup 
fear and rejection, like the antebellum South in the United States or 
apartheid South Africa, were also places of intense, daily contact and 
deep familiarity between dominant and dominated individuals. That 
is why the contact literature emphasizes that increased intergroup 
contact diminishes prejudice only if the persons concerned are equal 
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in status, have common goals, are not in competition, and the contact is 
sanctioned by authority (Pettigrew, 1997; Thomas F Pettigrew & Linda 
R Tropp, 2006).
These conditions for beneficial contact show that the benefits depend 
on coalitional cooperation, which would raise the coalitional safety index 
in the individuals in contact. People from different social categories may 
find that categories matter little when they are equal partners in a joint 
collective action.
A case in point is the U.S. military, which started integrating all 
its units in 1948. Decades later, U.S. military personnel report levels 
of satisfaction with intergroup personal relations far above those 
of civilians (Bullock, 2013). Shortly after the start of the integration 
process, the units with higher numbers of minority (Black) soldiers 
reported greater satisfaction than others with interracial relations 
(Moskos, 1966). This increased satisfaction in heterogeneous units 
would seem to support the contact hypothesis. But note that the 
military is a very special social environment, as it constitutes in many 
ways a situation of coalitional affiliation. Military units are explicitly 
described as alliances against enemies. In small units like platoons, the 
specific coalitional dynamic of race is replaced with another one, in 
which individuals of all categories engage in a high-stakes collective 
action. Consistent with this interpretation, the beneficial outcomes of 
army integration change with contexts. Although prejudice is lowest 
in combat units in times of combat and in dangerous places, it tends 
to increase in times of peace and in civilian life, when the individuals 
of different ethnicities are no longer members of the same coalition 
(Bullock, 2013).
Conversely, the coalitional perspective makes sense of the fact that 
contact does not reduce prejudice or rejection in situations in which 
individuals from different categories cannot engage in mutually 
advantageous collective action, because of institutional or other barriers, 
as was the case for Blacks and Afrikaners in South Africa (Korf & Malan, 
2002). More generally, coalitional dynamics explain why, in contrast 
to the original formulations of contact theories, intense or frequent 
intergroup contact can be detrimental. As in the context of health 
outcomes, intergroup encounters are stressors before they are construed 
as situations of collective action.
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5.2 Limits of Social Identity Interpretations
Safety and threat dimensions of intergroup contact are addressed only 
indirectly in the framework of social identity theory, self-categorization 
theory, or what could be called more generally the social identity 
approach (Hornsey, 2008). Developed on the basis of minimal groups 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this approach has 
been applied to group polarization, group solidarity and cohesiveness, 
stereotyping, crowd violence and rioting, social influence, conformity, 
and power. A starting point of this framework is that people are 
motivated to engage in intergroup competition and other strategies 
in order to protect and/or promote a positive and secure self-concept 
(Brewer, 1979). Self-esteem or maintenance of a coherent sense of self 
are postulated as primary drives, which, combined with comparative 
assessment, lead people to hold representations of their own and other 
groups (stereotypes) with associated valence (attitudes) (Hornsey, 
2008).
One clear limit of social identity approach lies in justifying these 
general conjectures. That is, even though intergroup attitudes may be 
connected to self-concepts, it is not clear why maintaining a positive or 
‘secure’ self-concept would be a fundamental human motivation and 
through what evolutionary process this could have become a general 
human need. Moreover, the notion of people choosing among a variety 
of available identities in the service of maintaining a self-concept is 
clearly confined to some modern mass societies. It would be irrelevant 
in places where identity is assigned by genealogy, like most societies in 
human history.
Even as a descriptive framework, social identity theory has 
difficulties integrating some common aspects of intergroup relations. 
A good example is that of immigrant assimilation. From the standpoint 
of social identity theory, immigrants’ adoption to the host population’s 
cultural norms should be seen by members of the latter population as 
clearly positive, as it reinforces the assumption that these norms are 
superior. However, that is far from being the case. Studies carried out 
in the United States, Sweden, and France observed two divergent paths. 
Some individuals were hostile to cultural differentiation and therefore 
to immigrants holding on to cultural and ethnic markers. By contrast, 
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others were hostile to immigrants’ assimilation, which they saw as a 
menace. These attitudes correlate with different personality orientations. 
High authoritarianism predicts the rejection of cultural differentiation. 
High preference for hierarchical intergroup relations predicts rejection 
of assimilation (Guimond et al., 2010; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 
2008). These two variables account for the two contrary attitudes to 
assimilation, and neither of them is influenced by the need for a positive 
and coherent self-concept.
More generally, the connection (in a limited number of modern 
Western societies) between identity and self-esteem may be more 
economically interpreted as an effect of fundamental psychological 
processes. People are motivated to join groups, build them, and maintain 
them because of the safety and support provided by membership. They 
are motivated to describe their group as superior because (among 
other things) this signals to other members their commitment to the 
group. Safety and signaling motivations are established by independent 
evidence and have a long evolutionary history. They provide a more 
parsimonious explanation than self-esteem motives for intergroup 
dynamics.
5.3 Social Dominance Orientation and Coalitional Investment
Research on social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) has 
anticipated some of the hypotheses presented here. Social dominance 
theory also starts from the observation that most intergroup relations are 
competitive and emphasizes that humans readily construe hierarchical 
intergroup relations on arbitrary bases (i.e., not based on age or sex). 
Also convergent with the coalitional perspective, social dominance 
theory implies that stereotypes and attitudes are the effect rather than 
the cause of discriminatory behaviors. As Guimond et al. put it, ‘[social 
dominance] theory conceptualizes prejudice as a form of hierarchy-
enhancing legitimizing myth, an ideology that justifies intergroup 
inequality’ (Guimond et al., 2010). Such a conceptualization of 
prejudice is consistent with the notion that stereotypes are explanations 
rather than descriptions of the social environment (McGarty, Yzerbyt, 
& Spears, 2002; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). In our perspective, 
stereotypes are tools used to explicate and communicate to others the 
138 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
contents of one’s intuitive expectations about other individuals, for 
example, that they are in some alliance and constitute a potential danger.
Regarding the psychological variables involved, social dominance 
theory postulates the personality variable of social dominance orientation 
(SDO), measuring the extent to which people are motivated to preserve 
and reinforce the subordination of some social groups (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). The SDO 
measure predicts a number of attitudes and motivations associated with 
intergroup differentiation and contact (Guimond et al., 2010; Pratto et 
al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 1994; Thomsen et al., 2008).
We propose to interpret SDO as one of the stable personality factors 
contributing to the coalitional safety index. SDO may be a measure of 
(a) the extent to which individuals construe a particular category as 
a collective action they are part of, so that they perceive their welfare 
as dependent on the welfare of the group; and (b) the extent to which 
they are willing to invest in defending coalitional interests, which 
would in turn motivate them to preserve group boundaries. Returning 
to the example discussed above, this may provide an explanation 
for the association between high SDO and rejection of assimilation. 
Immigrants’ assimilation constitutes a threat because it dilutes the 
benefits of membership in a dominant group and because it makes 
member identification more difficult (uncertainty about affiliation 
increases transaction costs in collective action and creates opportunities 
for free riding). Blurring of the boundaries between national categories 
would be perceived as costly and therefore rejected most strongly by 
those who have construed national categories as coalitions and have 
invested heavily in this coalition.
6. Implications
We have argued that the coalitional safety index model provides an 
integrated and parsimonious understanding of safety, threat, and stress 
in intergroup relations. The model also suggests directions for further 
investigation.
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6.1 Coalitional Cues: Microprocesses of Social Sampling
In the social science literature, people are often described as experiencing 
social phenomena as large societal entities. For instance, immigrants are 
said to be directly affected by the host population’s xenophobia. Models 
of ‘racism as stressor’ simply assume that negative stereotypes and 
attitudes toward one’s own group will trigger stress responses (Lewis-
Coles & Constantine, 2006). The connections are clear but lack an 
explanation. The coalitional perspective provides such an explanation, 
as indices of racism, negative attitudes, and so forth are construed as 
reminders of one’s coalitional vulnerability. So, for example, it is not 
racism as such that is stressful but the easy inference from putative 
racism to one’s reduced safety.
Our model emphasizes the microprocesses involved in computing 
one’s coalitional safety index and suggests specific hypotheses about 
these processes. A system that computes coalitional safety should 
attend to various cues of the safety provided by one’s own coalition 
and the threat posed by rival coalitions. As mentioned above, such 
microprocesses may provide a causal understanding of observed 
connections between anticipated discrimination and stress, minority 
status and stress, and ethnic density and relative immunity from stress.
We would expect that people’s reactions to an immigrant group 
might be affected by general information about that group’s size but 
also by the frequency of actual encounters with immigrant individuals. 
The model also predicts that people should attend to the cohesiveness 
of coalitions, whether members of a coalition act in concert toward a 
common goal, which may result in lower coalitional safety when one 
infers one’s own coalition to be weaker (or in higher coalitional safety 
when one infers one’s own coalition to be stronger). Cohesiveness 
cannot really be observed; it must be inferred, for instance, from the 
similarity (in dress, speech, behavior) of the coalition members.
In short, the coalitional perspective suggests that further exploration 
of intergroup dynamics should pay special attention to the cognitive 
processes whereby people automatically sample their social environment 
and infer underlying properties on the basis of that sampling. This 
research program would benefit from cognitive psychology findings 
and models concerning intuitive statistics, ‘fast and frugal heuristics,’ 
and other aspects of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer, 2007).
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6.2 Gender Differences
Human dispositions and capacities are shaped by what worked 
toward reproductive success, on average, in evolutionary conditions. 
This provides a starting point for investigating and explaining gender 
differences in coalitional psychology.
In standard social psychological models, there is little reason to 
expect, and generally no explicit predictions of, differences between 
men and women regarding inter-group processes. By contrast, an 
evolutionary perspective predicts profound sex differences, as already 
emphasized in social dominance theory (Sidanius et al., 1994). Through 
most of human evolution, groups were patrilocal, as men stayed and 
women moved between groups (Pasternak, Ember, & Ember, 1997; 
Seielstad, Minch, & Cavalli-Sforza, 1998). Women had to establish 
support networks with non-kin (Taylor et al., 2000), while men needed 
to bolster alliances between kin groups to compete with other coalitions 
(Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000), most clearly in tribal warfare, 
an almost exclusively male (Gat, 2006; Keeley, 1996). As predicted, 
different patterns of socialization can be found cross-culturally from 
early childhood (Geary, 2003).
As a consequence, we may expect men to be more motivated than 
women to see interindividual relations in terms of rival coalitions 
and more motivated than women to engage in violent coalitional 
strife; both men and women should be biased toward representing 
coalitional enemies as typically male. Some psychological evidence 
supports these conjectures. For instance, after threat priming, men are 
more likely than women to activate concepts of groups and coalitions 
(Bugental & Beaulieu, 2009). Women cooperate within a group 
regardless of competition with rival groups, while rivalry makes men 
more cooperative inside the group (van Vugt, Cremer, & Janssen, 2007). 
Men are implicitly biased to see men more than women as enemies 
(Plant, Goplen, & Kunstman, 2011). In both genders, the association of 
anticipated harm with a male’s face is more difficult to extinguish than 
the association with a female face (Navarrete et al., 2009).
 Sex differences in coalitional psychology may also account for the 
effects described by Sidanius and colleagues in terms of a subordinate 
male target hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, which is supported 
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by many empirical studies, adult men of the dominated group are the 
focus of more intense discrimination than women (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is in terms of 
the potential reproductive value of subordinate women, which would 
palliate discriminatory attitudes toward women (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). Further developments of social dominance models point to a 
simpler and broader explanation, that men are the target because group 
rivalry recruits mental systems that evolved in the context of tribal 
warfare, in which males are more likely than females to be aggressors 
(McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012; Navarrete et al., 2010; Yuki & 
Yokota, 2009).
6.3 Coalitional Effects beyond Minorities
The literature reviewed above describes the poor health outcomes 
of subordinate groups (controlling for confounding socioeconomic 
variables) as an effect of prejudice, stereotype, or discrimination. The 
coalitional model by contrast emphasizes the number of encounters 
with individuals of a rival coalition, especially if these rival coalitions 
are perceived as stronger, more numerous, increasing in number, or 
more cohesive than one’s own. A prejudice model would not predict 
that members of majorities experience a negative health impact when an 
ethnic minority in their neighborhood increases in number or visibility. 
By contrast, the coalitional perspective predicts that increasingly 
frequent encounters with people of a rival coalition (the minority), 
especially when the minority is apparently cohesive (e.g., inferred from 
displays of common markers, a distinct unfamiliar language, and so on), 
would increase the number of stress responses in majority individuals.
Note that such negative effects on majority individuals have already 
been observed in another domain, that of trust. In studies by Putnam 
and others, generalized social trust (the extent to which one thinks one 
can trust others in one’s social environment) decreases with greater 
ethnic diversity (Putnam, 2000, 2007). Further studies have shown that 
this effect depends on the frequency of encounters at the level of small 
neighborhoods (Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2012). Our coalitional stress 
model would predict that this may have effects on health as well. There is 
some evidence in that direction—for example, Whites who live in more 
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homogeneous neighborhoods have better health in New York (Fang 
et al., 1998) and fewer psychiatric admissions in Chicago (Halpern, 
1993). But the data are really sparse, and only largescale surveys could 
overcome the obvious confounds created by the overall inequality 
between majority and minorities, as well as potentially harmful effects 
of majority individuals’ own prejudices.
7. Conclusion
The proposed model stipulates that an internal regulatory variable, 
the coalitional safety index, corresponds to an individual’s perceived 
coalitional security. The index reflects the extent to which he or she 
can depend on others in the competition against other alliances. It 
is down-regulated by specific threat cues of reduced support from 
one’s own coalition or increased menace from a rival coalition, which 
trigger motivations for appropriate precautionary behaviors. Repeated 
perceptions of such threat cues may cause chronic stress, with negative 
health consequences.
This perspective allows for the explanation of a great variety of 
phenomena described in the social psychology of intergroup relations, 
such as stereotyping, racism, ethnocentrism, stress, and health 
disparities, in terms of a suite of capacities and motivations shaped 
by natural selection. The evolved human coalitional psychology is 
described as a set of universal systems that take as their input specific 
information about the social environment and activate appropriate 
motivations to maximize coalitional safety. Interactions between such 
systems and highly variable social conditions result in culturally and 
historically specific representations of the social world, which motivate 
equally specific attitudes and behaviors.
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5. How People Think about  
the Economy
Introductory Note
People have views about the economy, about such things as 
unemployment, trade, taxation, etc. Where do these opinions come 
from? Explaining that would certainly count as an example of ‘useful’ 
anthropology or political science, considering that most political 
programs are based on some particular vision of the way a modern 
economy works, and how it could be made better.
Michael Petersen and I were interested in explaining how people 
acquire these representations of the economy and, as a result, favor this 
or that political program. 
Our aim was to explain economic ideologies, something that 
economists are not terribly interested in. Economists generally stop 
at pointing out that these ideologies are often based on erroneous 
assumptions, e.g., that labor is what creates value, that trade benefits 
one party at the expense of the other, that regulations have the 
intended effects, etc. But why would people reason on the basis of these 
misleading notions? We are often told that this happens because people 
are uneducated, or cognitively limited, or they just accept what is ‘in 
their culture’, or what fits their interests, or what politicians tell them. 
But none of these explanations are satisfactory, as we explain in the 
article.
We considered the hypothesis that economic ideologies are 
compelling and persistent in modern societies, because of their ‘fit’ 
with our evolved dispositions. How is our genetic evolution relevant 
to our views on international trade and income taxes? Obviously, such 
© 2021 Pascal Boyer, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0257.08
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issues were unknown in our environment of evolution, when we were 
(mostly) living in small bands of nomadic foragers. But that, in a way, 
is just the point. Our evolutionary heritage includes not just cognitive 
systems for understanding the natural world, but also capacities for 
managing life in groups—in particular, for cooperation and collective 
action, in which we pool efforts to obtain mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Over the last thirty years, evolutionary biologists, psychologists and 
economists have proposed and tested ever more refined models of the 
way cooperation occurs between humans, and of the psychological 
capacities and motivations that underpin the exceptional level of 
cooperation among humans—see summaries in André & Baumard 
(2011), Boyd & Richerson (2006), Cosmides & Tooby (2015).
This evolved cooperation psychology is part of our adaptations. 
It governs our reactions to information we receive, concerning the 
allocation of resources between partners, when we interact with 
others, share or trade with them. And—this was our starting point in 
this article—it may also explain our reactions to messages (from news 
organizations, political agents) concerning such mass-level phenomena 
as inflation, trade or unemployment.
This should illustrate how evolutionary models and findings are 
very much relevant to modern, mass-scale societies. A persistent 
misunderstanding, on the part of those unfamiliar with the field is that 
such models only apply to technologically simple societies, and that 
modern patterns of production, consumption, and communication 
create conditions so special that evolved preferences and capacities 
become less relevant. But that is just not the case. For instance, Michael 
Petersen pioneered an evolutionary perspective that promised to 
account for important features of mass-politics in modern societies 
(Petersen, 2012a; 2015). Consumption, too, is best understood in terms 
of evolved motivations (Saad, 2012), and even recent developments 
of electronic communication, including webpages, social media, etc., 
illustrate typically human capacities and motivations (Acerbi, 2019).
So, our evolved psychology influences the way we think of the 
immensely complex set of interactions that constitute an economy—and 
our representations of the economy in turn make particular political 
programs attractive. Our article only considered the first causal link, 
from evolved psychology to economic ideologies.
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Speculating further, one might wonder which political programs 
would best fit our evolved psychology. If we followed our Stone Age 
intuitions and preferences, what would we choose as our economic 
policy? Others have wondered about that, and addressed the question 
with a great deal of sophistication, in particular Paul Rubin and Peter 
Singer. Rubin emphasizes that trade, being a cooperative interaction that 
benefits both parties, is an outgrowth of our cooperation psychology—
and also notices that much cooperation in humans is based on partner-
choice, on the possibility of selecting good partners and rejecting others. 
These dispositions would favor the free exchange of goods or services, 
away from the diktats of a chief, a king or a state (2002). Singer places 
much more emphasis on our capacities for sharing and mutual help 
and on the evolutionary basis for fairness and moral intuitions. These 
would favor generous welfare policies, when modern conditions create 
disadvantages or inequalities (2000). Both are right, in the sense that 
our cooperation psychology does respond to these two distinct sets 
of motivations, for mutually beneficial voluntary trade and for social 
support as a palliative to misfortune (Boyer, 2018, pp. 163–202). Indeed, 
Michael Petersen’s experimental studies show that, regardless of their 
political affiliation, people can approve or disapprove of particular 
policy proposals, depending on which of these cognitive systems the 
material activates (Petersen, 2012b).
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Folk-Economic Beliefs:  
An Evolutionary Cogniti ve Model1 
with Michael Bang Petersen2
Abstract: The domain of ‘folk-economics’ consists in explicit beliefs 
about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, 
about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of 
nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international 
trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the 
connection between work and wages, the economic consequences 
of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These 
beliefs are crucial in forming people’s political beliefs and in 
shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often 
conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are 
often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or 
specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to 
predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs 
and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive 
factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we 
propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the 
economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, 
largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., & Petersen, M. 
B. (2017). Folk-Economic Beliefs: An Evolutionary Cognitive Model. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 41, 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001960. Republished 
with permission from Cambridge University Press.
2  Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Nicolas Baumard, Martin Bisgaard, Timothy 
Blaine, Thom Scott-Phillips, Don Ross, Paul Rubin, and four anonymous reviewers 
for thoughtful and detailed comments on a previous version. 
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to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which 
there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, 
fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional 
psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market 
conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in 
particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are 
dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These 
intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than 
others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, 
exert a crucial influence on political choices. 
1. The Domain of Folk-Economic Beliefs 
1.1 What Folk-Economic Beliefs Are 
The term folk-economic beliefs denotes a large domain of explicit, 
widespread beliefs, to do with economic and policy issues, held by 
individuals without systematic training in economic theory. These 
beliefs include mental representations of economic topics as diverse 
as tariffs, rents, prices, unemployment, and welfare or immigration 
policies, as well as mental models of interactions between different 
economic processes, for example, inflation and unemployment. 
Our perspective on the origins and forms of folk-economics is 
based on two major assumptions. First, we argue that folk-notions of 
the economy should not be described solely in terms of deviations 
from normative economic theory. That has, unfortunately, been the 
common approach to the subject. Folk-views are generally described 
as the outcome of ‘biases,’ ‘fallacies,’ or straightforward ignorance. But 
describing how human cognition fails to work according to some norm 
of rationality tells us little 
about how it actually works. Second, we propose to make sense of 
folk-economic beliefs by considering the environment in which many, if 
not most, human cognitive mechanisms evolved. 
The study of folk-economic beliefs should be distinguished from 
other domains of investigation. Microeconomics addresses actual choices 
of agents in conditions of scarcity, independently of whatever mental 
representations trigger these behaviors in actual individuals, and also 
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of the representations they may form of their behavior upon reflection. 
Another field, behavioral economics often uses experimental designs as 
a way to elucidate tacit motivations and capacities that direct economic 
choices in contexts where experimenters can manipulate incentives and 
information flow between agents (Plott, 1974). Finally, neuro-economics 
elucidates the brain systems involved in appraising utility and making 
economic decisions (Camerer et al., 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2008). 
The scope of a study of folk-economics is quite different from these 
three fields (see Figure 1 ). It focuses on people’s deliberate, explicit 
beliefs concerning economic facts and processes, for example, that 
foreign prosperity is good or bad for one’s own nation, that welfare 
programs are necessary or redundant, that minimal wages help or hurt 
the poor, and that rent controls make prices go down or up, and so forth. 
Fig. 1.  A summary of the systems and representations involved in forming folk-
economic beliefs. External information about economic matters triggers 
activation of specific mental systems, which results in both economic 
behavior and explicit folk-economic beliefs. The latter’s effects on behavior 
cannot be assumed. Different fields, represented as clouds, focus on 
different parts of these processes. The model presented here is about the 
causal arrow linking specific mental systems to the occurrence of folk-
economic beliefs in people’s minds. (Figure by P Boyer. 2017)
One should not assume that folk-economic beliefs (henceforth FEBs) 
have direct and coherent effects on actual economic behaviors. Many 
FEBs are about macroeconomic processes—for example, the level of 
unemployment, or the need for foreign trade, or the need for a nation to 
balance its budget—that are unrelated to people’s everyday transactions. 
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Also, even FEBs that do bear on micro-economic realities, for example, 
on ‘fair’ prices or wages, may remain insulated from the psychological 
processes that drive actual economic behavior, as we explain below, 
which is why people may recommend specific policy outcomes and 
behave in ways that contradict that choice (Smith, 2007). 
Figure 1 summarizes the different domains of thought and behavior 
and the research programs involved. 
1.2 Why Folk-Economic Beliefs (FEBs) Matter 
Understanding FEBs is of crucial importance, even if they do not 
govern people’s economic behavior, because they play a critical role 
in political choices. Perceptions of macro-economic developments 
influence how favorably people view the government and how they cast 
their votes (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). The translation of inflation, 
unemployment, and income dynamics into political choices is mediated 
by people’s beliefs about the economy, for example, whether rising 
unemployment is affected by government policy (Peffley, 1984; Rudolph, 
2003a, 2003b). Similarly, economic beliefs underpin people’s answers to 
such questions as: Is it a good idea to increase welfare benefits, impose 
tariffs on imports, cap rent increases, or institute minimum wages? Folk-
economic beliefs constitute a largely unexplored background against 
which most information about policy is acquired, processed, and 
communicated among nonprofessionals (Rubin, 2003).
1.3 A Different Approach to the Study of  
Folk-Economic Beliefs 
It is a matter of common knowledge that most people, including the 
educated public in modern democratic societies, do not think like 
economists (Smith, 2007, pp. 147–166). It is, for instance, a familiar 
finding that people are overinfluenced by consideration of sunk costs 
(Magalhães & Geoffrey White, 2016) or fail to consider opportunity 
costs (Hazlitt, 2010) in evaluating possible courses of action. More 
important for social and political debates, people often also express 
views on economic processes that seem misguided, if not downright 
fallacious, to most professional economists. There is a growing literature 
documenting this divergence (see, e.g., Blinder & Krueger, 2004; Caplan, 
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2006; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Hirshleifer, 2008; Rubin, 2003; Sowell, 2011; 
Wood, 2002; Worstall). However, there is still very little research on why 
such beliefs appear, and why they are so widespread. 
We argue that many folk-views on the economy are strongly influenced 
by the operation of non-conscious inference systems that were shaped 
by natural selection during our unique evolutionary history, to provide 
intuitive solutions to such recurrent adaptive problems as maintaining 
fairness in exchange, cultivating reiterated social interaction, building 
efficient and stable coalitions, or adjudicating issues of ownership, all 
within small-scale groups of foragers. 
The inference systems we describe further on are not specified as 
ad hoc explanations for folk-economic beliefs. All of these systems 
have been independently documented by evolutionary biologists, 
psychologists, and anthropologists who focus on such issues as the 
evolution of exchange and trade, its form in the small-scale societies 
in which humans evolved, and its consequences for psychological 
dispositions and preferences that can be observed in experimental 
studies on individuals in modern societies; for an overview, see Buss 
(2015). So, we are not proposing a new description or interpretation 
of the human evolved psychology of exchange, but rather, using prior 
findings to illuminate the emergence of folk-economic beliefs in modern 
contexts. 
1.4 Models of Folk-Economic Beliefs Are Not Normative 
The model described here is emphatically not a normative proposal. 
That is, we do not intend to suggest that there is a right way to consider 
economic processes, and to evaluate folk-economic beliefs in terms of 
their validity or coherence. This deserves mention, for two reasons. 
First, as discussed below, most descriptions of these beliefs, in the 
literature, were originally motivated by the realization that people do 
not think like economists, and that they often commit what trained 
economists would describe as fallacies. By contrast, we argue that this is 
not a promising way of approaching cultural beliefs in this domain, as 
the validity (or lack thereof) of these beliefs do not explain their spread. 
Second, because FEBs are politically consequential, readers may 
wonder whether studying them is by itself a political project. That 
would be the case if, for instance, widespread beliefs were contrasted 
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with a supposedly true picture of the economy, and if that picture was 
associated with a particular kind of political project. But we suspect 
(and to a certain degree, the evidence confirms) that individuals of all 
kinds of political persuasions are equally likely to entertain beliefs that 
are, in some sense, misguided or incoherent. 
Indeed, one could argue that the epistemic value of FEBs is largely 
orthogonal to their political import. That is, the economy is not a 
political end in itself but a political means to ends that are essentially 
contested. In principle, even completely misguided FEBs might give rise 
to outcomes that are, by some other standards, ‘good’ or ‘just,’ at least as 
far as some specific social group is concerned. 
Our more general point is that we believe that the question of 
whether FEBs are correct or incorrect is orthogonal to the importance 
of studying them. Few individuals receive formal training in economics 
and, hence, if they happen to hold correct beliefs, this is as much in need 
of an explanation as when they generate incorrect ones. 
2. Some Folk-Economic Beliefs  
and Possible Explanations 
Evidence for folk-economic beliefs is still scattered and unsystematic. 
Some FEBs are widespread and well-documented, either through 
surveys of attitudes such as the General Social Survey (2011), or 
by more-specific, smaller-scale investigations such as the Kaiser 
Foundation’s ‘Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy’ 
(Kaiser Foundation, 1996). Others are less systematically documented, 
being inferred from the platforms and common phraseology of political 
operators, as well as from common journalistic discourse (Wood, 2002; 
Worstall). 
2.1 Examples of Folk-Economic Beliefs 
In the following, we present a few examples of widespread beliefs about 
the economy, selected for their potential influence on political choice. 
Given that such beliefs are often expressed in vague or emotional terms 
(e.g., ‘markets are bad for society,’ ‘trade will make us poorer and 
others richer’), what we propose here are, by necessity, reconstructions 
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of possible beliefs as implied by people’s explicit statements or 
questionnaire responses. 
FEB 1. International trade is zero-sum, has negative effects. The notion 
is expressed in many forms in everyday conversations and in political 
discourse, and it was also a recurrent theme in early political economy 
(Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). This belief may take many forms. 
For instance, trade is said to create unemployment at home because 
foreigners instead of locals are making the things we need (Wood, 2002, 
pp. 53–55). Also, it is claimed that a nation should always try to export 
more goods than it imports (Worstall, pp. 29–32). This belief is often 
associated with the assumption that the wealth of nations is the outcome 
of a zero-sum game. As a consequence, the assumption that foreigners 
profit from trade entails that ‘we’ are losing out. Consistent with 
this assumption, many people believe (against possible comparative 
advantage) that trade cannot be beneficial if ‘we’ import goods that we 
could manufacture ourselves (Baron & Kemp, 2004, p. 567). After the 
2008 recession, many Americans interpreted increased unemployment 
as an effect of international trade and feared that continued trade would 
worsen their conditions (Mansfield et al., 2019). 
FEB 2. Immigrants ‘steal’ jobs. Beliefs about the negative economic 
impact of immigration lie at the center of many policy debates. It is a 
consistent finding among political scientists that immigration, especially 
of low-skilled immigrants, is viewed as threatening (Hainmueller & 
Hiscox, 2010), and a common formulation is that immigrants ‘take our 
jobs’ (Simon & Lynch, 1999). This view is associated with the assumption 
that there is a fixed quantity of jobs to share among people (Wood, 2002, 
p. 23; Worstall, 2014, p. 75). 
FEB 3. Immigrants abuse the welfare system. Another belief, almost 
diametrically opposite but equally widespread, is that immigrants are 
a fiscal burden on the welfare system, using up common resources 
(Sniderman et al., 2014). So, immigrants are intuitively viewed as free-
riding both on the jobs ‘we’ created and the welfare systems ‘we’ paid 
for (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Given these beliefs, co-occurrences of 
immigration and fiscal stress can be viewed as causally linked, with 
important consequences in terms of both policy opinions and of holding 
immigration-friendly politicians accountable on Election Day. 
FEB 4. Necessary social welfare programs are abused by scroungers. 
Welfare programs, for example, unemployment benefits, are the object of 
166 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
apparently opposing economic beliefs (Aarøe & Petersen, 2014; Alesina 
& Glaeser, 2004). Experimental studies show the coexistence of those 
contrary beliefs within individuals. On the one hand, welfare programs 
are viewed as desirable insurance schemes against unavoidable, 
essentially random misfortune. On the other hand, unemployment 
benefits are widely viewed as encouraging laziness and a culture of 
dependency (Aarøe & Petersen, 2014; Kameda et al., 2002).
FEB 5. Markets have a negative social impact. Rubin (2014) coined 
the term emporiophobia for the generally negative attitude towards 
markets observed in many modern societies and documented in many 
surveys. The belief is that markets as such produce negative outcomes 
for most participants. Surveys offer evidence that many people, against 
economists, see markets not as the encounter of buyers and sellers 
who mutually benefit from trade, but as a place of struggle between 
partners with unequal bargaining power. The anti-market attitude may 
also contribute to the rejection of market solutions for the allocation of 
‘sacred’ goods, like organs or children in need of adoption. Many people 
seem to consider more arbitrary allocations (lotteries, first come first 
served) as not just fairer than auctions, but also probably more efficient 
(Alan Page Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000)
FEB 6. The profit motive is detrimental to general welfare. The profit 
motive is seen as an attempt to extract more from transactions than 
would be warranted by ‘fair’ pricing. That is why there is a tendency 
to see private firms as less ‘caring’ than non-profits, and therefore more 
likely to create negative externalities (Bhattacharjee et al., 2017). One 
version of this belief is that there is a special class of ‘excessive’ profit that 
differs from the regular or fair allocation of profit to businesses (Wood, 
2002, pp. 10–12). Related to this assumption is the notion that regulation 
is required to limit the excesses of profit-driven businesses (Hirshleifer, 
2008). In general, then, the belief seems to be that if most economic 
actors act on the basis of maximizing their profits, non-economic social 
domains will be negatively affected, for example, by externalities such 
as pollution, or more generally through a decrease in solidarity, social 
trust, and so forth. Contra Adam Smith, the notion that private self-
regard creates general welfare seems to be unintuitive (Rubin, 2003). 
FEB 7. Labor is the source of value. This is the assumption that the 
amount of labor necessary to produce a good is an essential (or the only) 
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factor that determines its ‘value,’ a (generally undefined) quantity that is 
not necessarily expressed by market price. This assumption is not often 
expressed in such general terms, but the proposition is implicit in many 
widespread beliefs about labor and wages (Wood, 2002, pp. 175–178; 
Worstall, pp. 15–17). It is also present in opinions on the unfairness of 
low wages for hard or unpleasant jobs, especially those involving hard 
physical labor. 
FEB 8. Price-regulation has the intended effects. The belief is that 
regulation generally does what it is supposed to do, as government 
policy can direct the economy towards desired results (Hirshleifer, 
2008); (Wood, 2002, p. 77). For example, in the United States, many 
cities imposed rent-control in the 1960s—and such measures were a 
major item in politicians’ platforms (Dreier, 1999)—with the goal of 
creating an ample supply of cheap housing; see Schipper (2015) for 
similar processes in Israel. The FEB here is that such regulation efforts 
will work as intended, for example, that rents will stay low after the 
imposition of rent-control, or that minimum wages can affect wages 
without affecting the demand for labor (some people even think that the 
latter measure could boost employment rates (Haferkamp et al., 2009, p. 
533). More broadly, regulation is often seen as an efficient way to protect 
people against undesirable market dynamics. Chinese respondents, for 
instance, believe that China was spared the worst effects of the 2008 
downturn by its government regulations (Yuen & Greene, 2011). 
This is only a short list of widespread folk-beliefs about the economy. 
Because there is very little study of such cultural beliefs as of yet, we 
have scant evidence for the relative cultural spread of each of these FEBs, 
and of possible associations between them and various social or cultural 
variables. The beliefs in question may well vary between social classes, 
cultures, age-groups, and so on. One aim of this article is to demonstrate 
the importance and theoretical interest of this domain of cultural beliefs 
and motivate more detailed empirical research in the domain. 
2.2 Common Explanations: Ignorance, Self-Interest, Biases 
There are three main ways of explaining the divergence between 
laypeople’s and economists’ views: in terms of ignorance, in terms of 
self-interest, or as the outcome of specific biases that affect people’s 
perception of economic facts. 
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2.2.1. Lack of economic knowledge or training. The ignorance 
hypothesis simply assumes that non-normative views stem from a 
lack of relevant information, similar to the widespread ignorance in 
the political domain, long lamented by political scientists (Converse, 
1964). It is certainly true that most laypeople are unaware of many 
fundamental principles of economic analysis. For instance, if people 
knew some rudiments of price theory, they would not be surprised 
that useful water is much cheaper than useless diamonds. If they knew 
about comparative advantage, they might see international trade in a 
different way (Haferkamp et al., 2009). However, this interpretation has 
one major defect—it predicts that people’s common views will be non-
normative, but it does not predict that they will be non-normative in any 
particular way. Not knowing about a domain would predict random, 
vague, or nonexistent opinions, as in popular conceptions of quantum 
mechanics, rather than the specific set of beliefs observed (Caplan, 2008, 
pp. 9–11). 
2.2.2. Self-interested beliefs. If beliefs are not random, that may be 
because they are influenced by people’s perception of their interests. In 
this view, people adopt beliefs that would justify more resources being 
apportioned to them and less to their enemies or competitors (Dahl & 
Ransom, 1999). One difficulty with this interpretation is that it accounts 
for only some of the beliefs described above. It can explain, for example, 
how industrial workers in the United States might feel they will lose out 
if their jobs move to China, and therefore consider that protectionism is 
overall a good thing. But beliefs are sometimes less clearly connected to 
self-interest. For instance, many people feel that markets are bad, even 
though larger, more competitive markets provide them with cheaper 
goods, which is clearly in their interest. So, self-interest is at best an 
incomplete explanation, and in general is not a straightforward predictor 
of economic beliefs, or indeed of political choices (Caplan, 2008; Green & 
Shapiro, 1994). It should be noted that one type of interest that does seem 
to explain some variation in FEBs is partisan interests. During economic 
downturns, for example, people are much more likely to ascribe the 
government responsibility if they identify with the opposition party 
than with the government party (Martin Bisgaard, 2015; M Bisgaard & 
Slothuus, 2018). However, although partisanship provides a motivation 
to reach certain conclusions (e.g., ‘the government is responsible for 
this economic downturn’ or ‘the government is not responsible for this 
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downturn’), the question still remains as to how people generate the 
particular beliefs about the workings of the economy that allow them to 
reach their desired conclusion. 
2.2.3. Cognitive biases. Finally, another alternative to the knowledge 
gap is to consider that people’s views are the outcome of specific biases. 
The term denotes tacit patterns of reasoning that orient people towards a 
limited set of conclusions from the evidence. There is a vast psychological 
literature for reasoning biases (Gilovich et al., 2002). For example, the 
‘confirmation bias’ is the tendency to notice and remember instances 
of the hypotheses we hold and to ignore other cases as noise, with the 
result that prior assumptions seem ever more strongly confirmed. 
In the domain of beliefs about the economy, Bryan Caplan, for 
instance, identified an anti-foreign bias (what is good for foreigners is 
bad for us), an anti-market bias (inability to see how markets would 
turn private greed into a social good), a make-work bias (if people work 
more, there will be more wealth), and a pessimistic bias (economies 
are heading towards less prosperity) (Caplan, 2008). In a similar way, 
Haferkamp et al. argue that the divergence between economists’ and 
laypeople’s views does not reduce to self-interest or ignorance, but 
rather results from multiple biases, like the well-documented status-quo 
bias and omission bias (doing something detrimental is worse than not 
doing something beneficial) (Haferkamp et al., 2009, p. 530). Finally, 
people’s selection of economic beliefs often reflects own-side partisan 
bias (Martin Bisgaard, 2015). 
2.3 Proximate and Ultimate Factors 
Models based on identifying particular cognitive ‘biases’ have the merit 
of taking seriously the fact that the emergence of these beliefs may lie in 
the way information about the economy is processed in human minds, 
which is certainly the right starting point. However, we propose that 
the study of folk-economic beliefs should move beyond a description 
on terms of fallacies and biases. One major problem with bias-oriented 
accounts of cognitive phenomena is that a bias is often simply a 
re-description of the empirical phenomenon under investigation 
(Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). For example, when it is 
observed that people attend more to more recent and vivid information, 
this is explained by an ‘availability heuristic’ that simply stipulates that 
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people attend more to more recent information. In a sense, this is fine; 
after all, science requires the systematization of observations about the 
world. But explanations require causal models as well. 
Within the biological sciences, researchers distinguish between 
‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ explanations, where proximate explanations 
describe how a biological system works and ultimate ones explain why 
the system exists (Buss et al., 1998; T. C. Scott-Phillips et al., 2011). 
Bias-based models are largely equivalent to proximate explanations. To 
develop a scientific understanding of folk-economic beliefs, we need to 
attend also to the level of ultimate explanations, not just because doing 
so provides a more complete understanding, but also because we will 
then be able to develop more precise predictions about the psychology 
behind folk-economic beliefs. 
3. Our Model: Inference Systems, Beliefs,  
Cultural Transmission 
In the model we propose here, the emergence and spread of folk-
economic beliefs is influenced by specific intuitions about interpersonal 
exchange. These are not the outcome of explicit scholarly training. 
Nor are they the simple consequence of persuasion from political 
elites (politicians, journalists, pundits, etc.), or the straightforward 
absorption of particular cultural values. Rather, because of evolution 
in the context of small groups with intensive exchange, humans have 
developed an intuitive psychology of exchange, for which there is 
independent anthropological and psychological evidence (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2015a). This psychology consists of a collection of highly 
specialized inference systems, each of which is designed to solve one 
kind of exchange problem recurrent in our ancestral environments. 
3.1 Properties of Domain-Specific Inference Systems 
We can describe the mind as consisting of many distinct, specialized 
systems, each of which corresponds to recurrent adaptive challenges in 
human evolution, attends to limited domains of available information, 
is organized along specific inferential principles, orchestrates neural 
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structures in a specific functional manner, and is the outcome of a 
specific developmental pathway (Boyer & Barrett, 2015; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2015b; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).
A few examples may help illustrate the relevant functional properties 
of this broad class of cognitive systems. In the auditory stream, the 
sound events identified as instances of lexical items are handled by a 
parsing system that assigns various syntactic roles to the different words 
(Pickering & van Gompel). In the visual field, some configurations are 
identified as human faces by a face-recognition system that computes 
a holistic description of the face, which is then processed by other 
memory and affective systems (Kanwisher, 2000; Solomon-Harris et al., 
2013; Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). Information from multiple modalities 
is integrated to compute the extent to which a particular person is 
attractive as a potential mate (Fink & Penton-Voak, 2002; Grammer & 
Thornhill, 1994).
However different the domains, there are some important functional 
properties common to these systems: 
1. Specific input format. The face-identification systems respond 
to visual displays that include points or lines interpreted as eyes and 
mouth. Any such elements presented in the appropriate configuration 
trigger the system, which is why cartoons and other stylized renditions 
of human faces activate it, whereas displays with scrambled features, or 
features in the wrong alignment, do not. The parsing system responds 
only to words in the stream of speech. Other sounds are not processed. 
Sexual attractiveness computations only consider very narrow aspects 
of information about a person, for example, the pitch of the voice rather 
than prosody, skin-reflectance (an index of youth) rather than skin-
tone, facial symmetry rather than facial length, and so on. In general, 
then, domain-specific inference systems may ignore information that 
might be relevant to an organism but fails to meet the input conditions. 
2. Automatic activation. Specialized inference systems are neither 
initiated nor stopped by deliberate intentions. Once information with 
the appropriate input format is detected, the systems proceed to produce 
the relevant inferences, which are then passed on to other inference 
systems. 
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3. Specific inference rules. Each system operates on highly specific 
inferential rules. The computational principles that assign words to 
their syntactic roles are found only in that domain, and the same goes 
for the matching between faces and memories about persons, or the 
computation of sexual attractiveness. 
4. Unconscious computation. The operation and inference rules of 
each system are generally outside conscious access. Only some outputs 
of these computational systems can be accessed, such as, for example, 
the meaning of a sentence or the general attractiveness of an individual. 
5. Intuitive output. The output of specialized inference systems, when 
consciously accessible, consists of intuitions—that is, a description of a 
particular situation or a motivation to behave in a particular way—that 
do not include any indication of the computational steps that resulted in 
that particular description or motivation. 
3.2 Intuitive Systems Output Can Lead to Reflective Beliefs 
It is important here to keep in mind the difference between intuitive 
output on the one hand, and reflective representations on the other 
(Sperber, 1997). Reflective representations add information to intuitions, 
explicate them, extend or restrict their scope, offer a comment on the 
intuitions, or link them to specific sources, as in, for example, ‘the reason 
this sentence is strange is that there is no verb,’ or ‘this person has the 
same round face as Humpty Dumpty,’ or ‘it is sad that this attractive 
person has a bad personality,’ and so forth (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; 
Sperber, 1997, 2000).
Most of our ‘folk-theories’ of particular domains consist of explicit, 
conscious reflective beliefs about our intuitions. That is why we can 
better understand the diffusion of beliefs in social groups, if we follow 
closely the interaction between intuitions delivered by specialized 
inference systems, on the one hand, and their reflective interpretation, 
on the other. 
Here, again, examples may be of help. Human minds include an 
intuitive physics, a set of assumptions that helps us predict the trajectory 
of objects, expect solid objects to collide when their trajectories intersect, 
and so forth. These expectations appear early in infancy long before 
language acquisition (Baillargeon et al., 1995; Spelke et al.). But we 
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can also entertain explicit thoughts that (to some extent) explicate and 
comment on these intuitions, for example, a belief that heavy objects 
have more momentum than lighter ones. Some of these reflective 
beliefs are wrong, others are too vague even to be wrong, and some 
are in agreement with physical science (Kaiser et al., 1986). In the same 
way, we have a set of intuitive biological expectations, for example, that 
all living things come in exclusive, taxonomically ordered categories 
(Atran, 1995), and that they are propelled by internal energy sources 
(R. Gelman et al., 1995; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000). But we also have 
reflective and explicit beliefs, for example, that each species has unique 
essential properties that cannot change (S. A. Gelman & Wellman, 1991); 
that there must be some ‘catness’ about cats that makes them what they 
are. Here, the intuitive expectation (all cats share external features, their 
behavior is highly predictable, etc.) is explained by the reflective belief, 
which postulates a hidden, undefined essence inside organisms of the 
same species. 
Folk-economic beliefs are widespread, culturally transmitted, 
explicitly held reflective beliefs about economic processes. These are to 
be distinguished from the intuitive thoughts that emerge as a result of the 
operation of specialized intuitive systems. We reserve the term ‘folk’ for 
beliefs held by layfolk as a result of the interaction between information 
about the economy, and the operation of some inference systems. (This 
is in contrast to some parts of the psychological literature, where the 
term folk has been sometimes, confusingly, used to characterize both 
the products of intuitive inference systems and the cultural beliefs that 
emerge as a result of their operation.) 
3.3 Why We Should Not Expect Consistency  
or Coherence in FEBs 
Explicit reflective beliefs may be extremely vague in their implications. 
One may hold that there must be a special essence present in all cats that 
makes them different from dogs, without specifying what that essence 
consists of—in fact, that is the most common form of essentialism (S. A. 
Gelman, 2004). 
Also, reflective beliefs may be inconsistent or incoherent, mostly 
because they come in a meta-representational format. In contrast to 
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the output of intuitive systems, for example, the intuitive belief that 
‘there is a cat here on the mat,’ reflective beliefs consist in comments on 
intuitions, for example, ‘it is true in some sense that “the market is bad.”’ 
A meta-representational format allows one to be committed to a belief, 
without the contents of the belief being processed in detail (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009; Sperber, 1997). That is the case 
for mystical or religious statements, for example, ‘the true path is not a 
path’ or ‘three persons are one being,’ which people can hold to be true, 
in the form ‘the proper interpretation of ‘p’ is true,’ without processing 
their contents (Mercier & Sperber, 2009; Sperber, 1997). 
This applies to the domain of folk-economic beliefs as well. A belief 
that markets are socially negative can be held true, without triggering 
specific representations about, for example, how markets would 
decrease social welfare, in what domains of activity, to what extent, 
through what economic mechanisms, and so forth, as long as it is 
held in a meta-representational format, for example, ‘It is true in some 
sense that “markets are bad for society.”’ For the same reason, one can 
hold that meta-representational belief, and also hold other beliefs that 
may seem to contradict it, for example, ‘It is a good thing that we have 
many butchers here, so they have to keep prices low.’ Finally, if folk-
economic opinions consist of reflective, meta-representational beliefs, 
then different beliefs can be held in relative isolation from each other 
without ever being integrated in a general theory of the economy. So, we 
should not expect precision, consistency, or integration in the domain of 
reflective folk-economic beliefs. 
3.4 Proposed Mechanism: Intuitions,  
Beliefs, Cultural Transmission 
Folk-economic beliefs are cultural beliefs—which simply means that 
they are represented in roughly similar ways in the minds of different 
individuals in a group, as a result of communication between individuals. 
Folk-economic beliefs are communicated—between laypeople, but also 
between media and their customers, and between political entrepreneurs 
and the public. That is why it is important to consider the mechanisms 
that lead to their cultural spread, that is, the extent to which they are 
likely to be entertained, in roughly similar ways, by different minds. 
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An essential component of cognitive theories of cultural transmission 
is that prior psychological assumptions and expectations make certain 
representations easier to acquire, store, and communicate than others 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Sperber, 1991). Cognitive dispositions make 
people transform input in such a way that it is more similar to the types 
that match these dispositions, an ‘attraction’ process that results in the 
spread of highly particular mental representations (Claidière et al., 
2014). 
In Section 4 , we document the existence of various intuitive inference 
systems dedicated to representing social exchange. We then examine 
how these different systems make particular views of the economy, in 
general, particularly easy to acquire and represent, turning them into 
cultural beliefs. 
4. Relevant Cognitive Systems 
4.1 Relevant Systems Evolved before and outside Markets 
Evolutionary theory predicts that cognitive systems are geared towards 
solving specific, recurrent problems in environments in which humans 
evolved. Specifically, what evolutionary theorists call the environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness (or EEA) for a trait is a statistical construct, 
an aggregate of the conditions under which there was selection for 
or against that trait, weighted for frequency and time. In that sense, 
the EEA is not a particular time or place, but a collection of features. 
As an illustration, we can consider that optimization problems such 
as hunting, foraging, choosing the best mate, selecting nutritious 
foods, and garnering social support were present, and relevant to 
fitness, throughout human evolution. By contrast, urban life, mass-
communication, rapid long-distance travel, and mass-market economies 
only occurred for a small duration and only in some places at first. So it 
is more plausible that human minds were selected for systems geared to 
the first kind of adaptive problems, than to the second. 
One feature that is universally prominent in both modern and 
ancestral human societies is the exchange of goods (e.g., tools, food) 
and services (everything from back-up in conflicts to help with hunting, 
foraging, parenting, or shelter-building) (Brown, 1991). Developmental 
psychology studies show that children readily engage in exchange in 
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early years (Levitt et al., 1985). Exchange provides significant fitness 
benefits. It allowed our ancestors, as it allows us, to exploit cooperative 
positive-sum games, engage in collective action, and buffer against 
predicaments such as hunger and injury (Gurven, 2004; Sugiyama, 
2004). For us and for our ancestors, engaging in exchange requires the 
existence of distinct, specialized cognitive mechanisms (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992), including mechanisms for estimating costs and benefits 
of goods and services for the self and other; for comparing them in an 
abstract format (equivalent to utility in the vocabulary of economics); 
and for motivating exchange when the benefits of exchange exceed the 
costs for oneself. 
The human mind, in other words, contains a rudimentary exchange 
psychology, evolved by natural selection to help facilitate transactions. 
Although it evolved within ancestral small-scale hunter-gatherer 
groups, the cues inherent in modern markets economies (transactions, 
bargaining, prices, etc.) also bring it online. However, market economies 
are a novelty at the scale of biological evolution, so we should not expect 
specific adaptations to their features, as the differences between ancestral 
exchange and the market are vast (Rubin, 2003). 
A crucial difference is that economic activity in nonmarket societies, 
and by extension during most of human evolution, does not and did not 
take place in isolation from other aspects of social interaction. Indeed, 
the clear separation between economic exchange and other forms of 
social interaction is a by-product of market conditions (Polanyi, 2001). 
Throughout human evolution, most transactions affected not only the 
agents’ welfare, what they gained or lost on the spot, but also their 
reputation, their social standing, the nature of their relationship to 
exchange partners, the extent to which they could rely on others, the 
cohesiveness of the groups they belonged to, and so forth. That is 
why mechanisms for reasoning about exchange are designed to take 
in a whole range of social considerations that are not relevant in the 
impersonal modern market. 
In the following pages, we examine some of the systems that evolved 
to facilitate exchange, the evidence for their operating principles, and 
their potential effects on the perception of modern market phenomena. 
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4.2 Detecting Free-Riders in Collective Action 
In any exchange, it is crucial to monitor whether the implicit or explicit 
terms of the exchange are being followed. For example, if two individuals 
take turns helping each other forage, does one person provide less help 
than he receives? To solve this problem, human exchange psychology 
needs to contain specific mechanisms for detecting and responding to 
free-riders. There is considerable evidence that humans, in general, 
are attentive to potential cheating in social exchanges, so proximate 
psychological mechanisms are congruent with the ultimate fitness 
benefit of detecting and deterring free-riders. Indeed, a situation 
where some agent has taken a benefit without paying the cost for it is 
psychologically more salient than the opposite situation of an agent 
paying some cost but not getting the associated benefit (Cosmides, 
1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Sugiyama et 
al., 2002). Also, information that some agent received benefits from 
cooperation without contributing triggers punitive motivations, as 
a way of depriving them of the benefits of free-riding (Price et al., 
2002). The ultimate rationale for free-riding detection is to preserve 
cooperation, including in the future. This would suggest that we do 
not intuitively classify as free-riders those individuals who make 
honest mistakes or whom accidents bar from cooperating. Indeed, 
Delton et al. have shown that the intuitive freerider categorization is 
highly sensitive to intentions, rather than just tallying who contributed 
what to the collective action (Delton et al., 2012). 
4.3 Partner-Choice for Exchange 
To engage in exchange, one needs to choose among available social 
partners. Given the possibility of choice, human exchange and 
cooperation from ancestral times have taken place in the context of 
competition for cooperation (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994), as each agent 
could advertise a willingness to cooperate (and signal how advantageous 
cooperation would be), and could choose or reject partners depending 
on their past and potential future behavior (Barclay, 2016; Delton & 
Robertson, 2012; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). Cases of mutualism 
between species illustrate the efficiency of partner-choice for stabilizing 
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mutually beneficial cooperation, for example, between cleaner fish and 
their clients (Bshary & Grutter, 2005). Human communicative abilities 
allow this kind of mutualism to occur between conspecifics, with 
reputation as an essential factor in the selection of partners. Agents have 
access to information about other agents’ past interactions as an index 
of likely future behaviors. In such conditions, there is of course a cost 
in engaging with free-riders, but also a cost in not cooperating with an 
honest partner (in terms of potential cooperative positive-sum games) 
(Krasnow et al., 2012; Milinski et al., 2002). Competition for cooperation 
has specific consequences on fairness intuitions in the context of 
collective action. Given that two (or more) partners contribute equal 
effort to a joint endeavor, and receive benefits from it, an offer to split 
the benefits equally is likely to emerge as the most frequent strategy—
anyone faced with a meaner division of spoils will be motivated to seek 
a more advantageous offer from other partners. So, to the extent that 
people have partner options, the constraints of partner-choice explain 
the spontaneous intuition that benefits from collective action must 
be proportional to each agent’s contribution (André, 2010; André & 
Baumard, 2011; André & Day, 2007).
The existence of partner-choice based on shared information and 
reputation may explain why people select partners, in the context of 
laboratory economic games, on the basis of criteria that may seem 
economically irrational, but that happened to be ecologically predictive 
in our environments of evolution. For instance, people prefer partners 
who express moral judgments in deontic (i.e., ‘moral’ and emotional) 
rather than rational terms (Everett et al., 2016). They also prefer 
potential partners whose faces suggest productivity, prosocial attitudes, 
and relatively high social status (Eisenbruch et al., 2016). 
4.4 Exchange and Assurance by Communal Sharing 
One important form of social relations is founded on communal sharing, 
where resources are pooled (Alan P Fiske, 1992). This is found to some 
variable extent in all human groups, particularly in food provision, and 
seems crucial to social interaction in small-scale societies, especially in 
foraging economies similar to those in which humans evolved (Kelly, 
1995). That is why this form of apparently unconditional altruism has 
been the focus of so much research in evolutionary anthropology and 
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psychology (Kaplan et al., 2005). A major result of those observations 
and models is that communal allocations is not the outcome of an 
indiscriminate motivation to share with others, but rather follows 
implicit rules that make sense given the conditions of human evolution. 
For example, band-wide sharing in hunter-gatherer economies is 
generally confined to game, especially large game, whereas gathered 
and extracted foods are mostly shared with close kin. An explanation 
for this spontaneous preference in allocations lies in the differences 
in variance in the supply of these goods (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), 
as gathering typically produces low-variance resources, in contrast 
with hit-or-miss hunting expeditions. So communal sharing provides 
insurance against random bad luck such as the vicissitudes of hunting 
expeditions (Kaplan & Hill, 1985) or injury that prevents hunters from 
going on expeditions (Sugiyama, 2004). This is reinforced by the low 
marginal value of food units when they come in large packages, like big 
game. Communal sharing, although typically presented as including 
all group members, is often in fact modulated by past or expected 
reciprocation. Even where there is a norm of unconditional sharing, 
those who give more freely also receive more (Gurven, 2004; Gurven et 
al., 2000). Communal sharing is founded on specific assumptions and 
principles, distinct from those that govern, for example, direct exchange 
or authority-based social relations (Alan P Fiske, 1992). The norm of 
communal sharing is readily acquired by children, and intuitively 
deployed by adults in the appropriate contexts (Birch & Billman, 1986; 
Hamann et al., 2011; Rao & Stewart, 1999). In different places, different 
sets of resources and occasions are designated as proper goods to share. 
People notice (and are usually shocked by) the application of one type 
of inference system to the wrong domain according to the local norms, 
for example, offering to pay your friends for coming to dinner, or asking 
for a discount as a personal favor at a supermarket checkout. 
The structure of the psychology for exchange resources through 
communal sharing implies that if people find that a need is caused 
by random circumstances beyond their own control, they intuitively 
represent that need as potentially alleviated through communal sharing. 
By consequence, they would think it as unfair if others try to profit 
from this type of need (i.e., turning the exchange into a direct form of 
exchange rather than communal sharing). 
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4.5 Coalitional Affiliation 
Humans are special in that they build and maintain highly stable 
associations bounded by reciprocal and mutual duties and expectations. 
Such groups—called alliances or coalitions—may be found at many 
different levels of organization, such as political parties, street gangs, 
office cliques, academic cabals, and groups of close friends, and can 
include thousands or millions of individuals when ethnic or national 
categories are construed as coalitions (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). 
The psychology underlying coalitional strategies include the 
following assumptions: (a) relevant payoffs to other members of the 
coalition are considered as gains for self (and obviously, negative payoffs 
as losses to self); (b) payoffs for rival coalitions are assumed to be zero-
sum—the rival coalition’s success is our loss, and vice-versa; and (c) 
the other members’ commitment to the common goal is crucial to one’s 
own welfare (Pietraszewski, 2013, 2016). These assumptions reflect 
two crucial selection pressures operating on human groups: First, that 
alliances are competitive and exclusive, because social support is a rival 
good. Second, that resources, status, and many other goods are zero-
sum and, hence, the object for rivalry between alliances. As consequence, 
allied agents spontaneously share the intuition that achieving their goal 
requires avoiding or overcoming opposition from other, similar alliances 
and coalitions in a zero-sum fashion (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). 
A vast literature in social psychology and behavioral economics 
documents the proximate psychological mechanisms involved in 
coalitional situations. For instance, people do indeed consider benefits 
for the coalition as (presumed) benefits for themselves (Baron, 2001). 
Second, social psychology studies of in-group favoritism show how very 
subtle cues of group membership and coalitional rivalry can activate 
coalitional assumptions. In so-called minimal group paradigms, people 
favor fellow members of an arbitrarily constructed category (Tajfel, 
1970). This occurs when the categories in question are construed by 
participants as groups within which members can reciprocate favors 
(Karp et al., 1993; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2004). 
In human coalitions, members monitor each other’s level of 
commitment, are motivated to demonstrate their commitment to the 
other members, and are also motivated to make defection less likely, 
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notably by making it costly. Monitoring of other people’s behavior is 
frequent, all the more so if the collective action is risky and success 
is crucially dependent on numbers. Such surveillance is manifest in 
voluntary groups and associations, and the extent to which monitoring is 
possible is a predictor of group stability (M Hechter, 1987, pp. 146–156). 
4.6 Ownership Psychology 
For exchange to happen over human evolutionary history, our ancestors 
needed an elaborate psychology of ownership. Who is entitled to enjoy 
possession of a good, and to exchange it? Ownership is expressed in 
all human languages (Heine, 1997); in all human cultures, there is 
a principled distinction between mere possession and ownership; 
and ownership is associated everywhere with specific emotions 
and motivations (Brown, 1991). At the same time, explicit norms of 
ownership and property rights differ from one place or time to another 
in terms of both scope (who can own things and what things can be 
owned) and implications (what one may do with specific types of 
property) (Hann, 1998). Surprisingly, despite a long history of legal 
and economic reflection on property, there are only recent and relatively 
sparse experimental studies of our spontaneous intuitions about use, 
possession, and ownership (Boyer, 2015; DeScioli & Karpoff, 2015; O. 
Friedman, 2010). 
We must distinguish between intuitions and reflective representations 
about ownership. Adults and even very young children have definite 
intuitions about who owns what particular good, in a specific situation. 
For instance, they generally assume that ownership applies to rival 
resources (that is, such that one person’s enjoyment of the resource 
diminishes another person’s); that prior possession implies ownership; 
that extracting a resource from the environment makes one the owner; 
that transforming an existing resource confers ownership rights; 
and that ownership can be transferred, but only through codified 
interactions (O. Friedman et al., 2011). By contrast, people’s explicit 
beliefs about ownership are often vague and sometimes incoherent 
(Noles & Keil, 2011). Also, these explicit, reflective norms often do not 
even reflect actual legal practices. In fact, people who live in societies 
with legal systems generally (and often wrongly) assume that the law 
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must somehow accord with their intuitions—see County and Ellickson 
(1991) for an illustration in the domain of externalities and tort. 
In terms of proximate mechanisms, this suggests that the inference 
system takes as its input information about specific connections between 
a thing and an agent and outputs an ‘owner’ tag. In particular, this 
system is highly sensitive to such cues as first possession (O. Friedman & 
Neary, 2008), but also to information about an object’s history (e.g., past 
possession, transactions between past and present possessor) (Blake & 
Harris, 2009; O. Friedman et al., 2011), as well as the work invested in 
the object by its current possessor; even young children consider that 
creative work that transforms an object creates, at least presumptively, a 
claim to ownership (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). 
5. Effects of Intuitive Systems on Folk-Economic Beliefs 
In our model, folk-economic beliefs are a result of the activation of the 
intuitive systems for exchange described above (and many others). The 
processes are illustrated in Figure 2 below. Information about economic 
processes, from news media, political discourse, from occasional 
pronouncements by economists, from other individuals, or any other 
sources, sometimes happens to match the input conditions of some 
intuitive inference system. As a consequence, the system is activated 
and produces specific inferences in the form of intuitive representations. 
These intuitive representations, in some cases, become the object of 
explicit, deliberate reflections, which may attribute an intuition to a 
source, put together several intuitive inferences, or compare them, 
or provide an explanatory context for intuitions, giving rise to folk-
economic beliefs. 
In this context, it is also worth emphasizing again that a single belief 
need not be the product of a single, intuitive inference system. The 
more inference systems that are underlying a particular belief, the more 
cognitive scaffolding it receives (see Fig. 2 ). 
In the following sections (5.1. to 5.6), we discuss the possible 
connections between specific evolved inference systems and specific 
folk-economic beliefs—that is, how activation of the systems may 
make a particular belief received from external sources more natural 
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illustrations of many potential connections, providing the first small 
steps towards an empirical research program. 
5.1 Explaining FEB 1: International Trade  
as Coalitional Rivalry 
We begin with what we referred to above as FEB 1, the statement that 
international trade has negative consequences. This contains several 
pieces of information likely to activate specific inference systems. Let us 
consider a news headline like ‘China sells more to the U.S. than to Russia.’ 
Selling involves receiving resources and, importantly, resources in this 
case transfer from one nation to another. In psychological terms, nations 
are ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983) or, with the vocabulary 
presented above, nations are coalitions to the mind and, hence, mention 
of nations activates the coalitional psychological machinery (Gat, 2006; 
Michael Hechter, 1987). Nations are exclusive groups, citizens of a 
nation are assumed to have common interests, and nations are equipped 
with armies to fight each other. The activation of this machinery has the 
downstream consequence, we argue, that Americans will evaluate the 
transfer of resources to China—and, hence, the headline—negatively. 
As argued above, one key assumption of the coalitional system, once 
activated about two categories or groups, is that there is a zero-sum 
interaction between the mutually exclusive groups. As a consequence, 
there is a strong prior belief that any advantage to another group is 
detrimental to one’s own (Hiscox, 2006). Any information to the effect 
that other groups are prosperous, or getting better, is equivalent to a 
threat-cue, indicating that our group stands to lose out. 
It is relevant to note how this interpretation of FEB 1 (i.e., the 
disadvantage of trade) is different from the standard ‘fallacy’-oriented 
interpretation. According to our view, FEB 1 does not occur as a result 
of any cognitive or intellectual dysfunction. Instead, we argue that the 
zero-sum assumption is part of the design of coalitional reasoning. 
The resulting motivations are part of the architecture of this system. 
To maintain stable and efficient coalitions, humans in many different 
contexts must have assumed that other groups’ advantage was a 
potential loss. 
Viewing the ‘international trade is bad’ belief as supported by 
coalitional psychology does not just explain the belief but also suggests 
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novel testable predictions. In particular, we should expect the view 
that trade is bad to be particularly attractive when the trading crosses 
perceived coalitional boundaries. It is predicted to invariably occur 
in the context of, precisely, debates about trade between countries. 
American consumers may find it intuitive that the United States might 
suffer from Chinese prosperity, but, on this theory, they would find it 
less compelling that development in Vermont damages the economy of 
Texas. Similarly, the survival value of the belief might depend on the 
relationship between the countries. Trading between long-term allies 
(e.g., trading between Great Britain and the United States) should be 
viewed as less problematic than trading between rivals (e.g., trading 
between China and the United States), even if all else were equal. 
5.2 Explaining FEB 2 and FEB 3: Immigration and the 
Dual Activation of the Psychologies of Coalitions and 
Cheater-Detection 
In Section 2 , we outlined two FEBs about immigration. FEB 2 is the belief 
that immigrants ‘steal’ jobs and FEB 3 the somewhat contrary belief that 
‘immigrants abuse welfare systems.’ Although these two beliefs seem 
inconsistent (how can immigrants take both jobs and unemployment 
benefits?), they do share a key common assumption, a stipulation that 
immigrants use up valuable resources to which they are not entitled. 
This assumption, we argue, is what makes either of these ideas resonate 
with the evolved psychology of social exchange. 
Specifically, the representation of recipients as not entitled to resources 
receives support from the interaction of two crucial inference systems: 
(a) coalitional psychology, and (b) cheater-detection. Immigrants are 
by definition newcomers to the community. Psychological research 
has shown that newcomers to groups activate this connection between 
coalitional cognition and cheater-detection, in particular, in situations 
where group membership is construed as conferring particular benefits. 
In such situations, newcomers are typically regarded with great 
suspicion. 
Cimino and colleagues interpret this in terms of cheater-detection. 
When new members join a group, they are in a position to receive some 
of the benefits of membership (e.g., becoming a Marine makes one a 
respected member of a prestigious military corps), without having 
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(yet) paid any costs (e.g., risked one’s life in action). This combination 
of features may activate cheater-detection mechanisms, as persons in 
this situation effectively meet the input criterion of Benefit Received 
without Cost Paid, which would explain the considerable hostility 
towards newcomers in many voluntary groups that is sometimes 
expressed in the form of painful hazing and initiation rituals (Cimino, 
2011). Experiments show that there is indeed an implicit concept of 
NEWCOMER that motivates such aggressive attitude, even when 
people consider membership in imaginary groups (Cimino & Delton, 
2010; Delton & Cimino, 2010). 
The tight relationship between the concepts of nation and coalition 
may explain the attractiveness of the statement that immigrants must be 
free-riders, scrounging on the past efforts of the host community. But, at 
the same time, the involved psychological systems leave open whether 
it is on job creation or on the welfare system that immigrants free-ride. 
This interpretation suggests new research avenues. The argument is 
that the public’s intuitions about the economic effects of immigration 
does not just reflect diffuse prejudice (Stephan et al., 1999) but is the 
outcome of very precise psychological mechanisms that work in tandem 
with beliefs about jobs, the welfare state, and so on, as collectively 
produced resources. As a consequence, it will be difficult for immigrant 
populations to behave in ways that increase acceptance by the native 
population. Any involvement with what is construed as a ‘resource’ is 
likely to trigger intuitions of free-riding—see, for example, Guimond 
et al. (2010). Furthermore, our interpretation suggests that there is an 
intimate connection between the perceived motivations of immigrants 
and the presumed economic consequences of immigration. Only 
in instances where specific immigrant groups are seen as willing to 
sacrifice self-interest for collective goods—that is, the exact opposite of 
free-riding motivations—should the public view the economic effects as 
positive. 
Finally, this shows that there is no one-to-one mapping from specific 
systems for social exchange and specific FEBs. When FEBs—sometimes 
contradictory ones like FEB 2 and FEB 3—become culturally available, 
their acceptance depends on the degree to which they resonate with 
human exchange psychology. In this particular case, it is the dual 
appeal of the FEBs to both coalitional psychology and cheater-detection 
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psychology that ensures their cultural survival in the minds of the 
public. 
5.3 Explaining FEB 4: Social Welfare and Intuitions about 
Free Riding and Communal Sharing 
FEB 4 refers to beliefs about the effects of economic investments in 
welfare programs. In fact, as laid out in Section 2 , folk-economic beliefs 
about these effects consist of two separate and diametrically opposed 
beliefs. One belief is that unemployment benefit programs, for instance, 
lead to decreased economic activity because welfare programs benefit 
unproductive individuals. Another belief is that, in the long run, these 
benefits increase economic activity because they sustain productive 
individuals during periods of bad luck and, hence, facilitate the transition 
to new jobs. These opposite beliefs are not randomly distributed. In 
fact, their distribution demonstrates our key point about the relevance 
of FEBs: that they are associated with particular political positions. 
Support for welfare programs is strongly related to the belief that they 
sustain unfortunate individuals. Opposition to welfare programs is 
strongly related to the belief that they sustain unproductive—that is, 
lazy—individuals. 
In our perspective, beliefs surrounding welfare programs—and, 
in particular, the link between beliefs about welfare recipients’ 
productivity and support for welfare programs—are a key example 
of how psychological adaptations designed for social exchange shape 
economic policy views. What is surprising is not just the existence but 
also the strength of this link between perceived character of recipients 
and presumed economic benefits of welfare programs. In one of the 
most extensive studies of Americans’ views on welfare, Gilens (1999) 
concluded that the perception of welfare recipients as ‘undeserving’ 
is the strongest predictor of individual-level opposition to welfare 
programs. This, we argue, is a consequence of the way in which the 
cues surrounding welfare programs activates mechanisms designed for 
cheater-detection. 
Debates about welfare programs contain a number of cues that 
should elicit cheater-detection psychology. Welfare recipients are in 
need, and welfare programs provide benefits to the recipients and does 
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so at a cost for the collective. For a mind designed to scan the social 
environment for cheaters, this particular set of cues automatically raises 
the question: Have the recipients paid sufficient costs in order to be 
entitled to these benefits? (Petersen et al., 2012). Or, more specifically: 
Are the recipients valuable enough as cooperation partners to be 
included within the exchange system? This, then, motivates scanning 
for additional information about the cooperative motivations of welfare 
recipients, activating either cheater-avoidance motivations (if low) or 
communal sharing motivations (if high), and, in the end, providing 
an exceptionally fertile soil for infusing economic opinions with beliefs 
about whether or not welfare recipients are lazy. 
This psychological process is one of the more well studied aspects 
of folk-economics. The most direct test comes from a series of studies 
utilizing the memory confusion paradigm. They suggest that welfare 
recipients are mentally represented by activating the exact same 
psychological categories that people use to represent cheaters and 
reciprocators in everyday social interaction (Petersen, 2012). The 
results show that memory processes confuse lazy welfare recipients 
with everyday cheaters and unfortunate recipients with everyday 
reciprocators (but not lazy recipients and everyday reciprocators or 
unfortunate recipients with cheaters). Participants in these studies 
even forget whether those specific individuals were presented in the 
context of economically relevant welfare debates or everyday face-to-
face interaction. This process operates in a similar fashion, regardless 
of people’s political ideology, their level of political engagement, and 
whether they live in a society with an expansive welfare state (Denmark) 
or a reduced one (United States). 
This particular explanation for FEB 4 makes sense of empirical 
findings concerning the relationship between cultural factors and 
beliefs about welfare. Individuals with liberal or left-leaning views tend 
to view social welfare recipients as productive individuals. Individuals 
with conservative or right-leaning views tend to view welfare recipients 
as unproductive individuals. Similarly, in social democratic societies, 
the former belief tends to dominate, whereas the latter belief dominates 
in societies with minimal welfare states. As consequence, cultural 
explanations have largely dominated the literature. For example, 
Americans’ perception that many welfare recipients are lazy, and the 
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association with anti-welfare sentiments, has been argued to reflect an 
‘individualistic’ American culture (Gilens, 1999). Similar arguments 
have been made with regard to right-wing ideology: that it contains 
an ‘ideological script’ that binds together perceptions of laziness and 
welfare opposition in the mind of right-wing individuals (Skitka & 
Tetlock, 1993). From the evolutionary cognitive perspective, however, 
this structure is imposed by evolved mechanisms for exchange that are 
operating flexibly on the available cues. As a consequence, it should be 
easy to reverse apparently stable cultural patterns in welfare beliefs, if 
the right cues are provided. Research shows that this is indeed the case. 
Among a sample of Danish political science majors (who should be able 
to reason ideologically), ideological differences in opinions completely 
disappear when the participants form views about the deservingness of 
recipients cast as either lazy or unfortunate (Petersen et al., 2012). Even 
more dramatically, cultural differences between Scandinavians and 
Americans in support for the welfare state completely disappear when 
participants from these populations have to form views about specific 
recipients. Two sentences of text that contain evolutionarily relevant 
cues for cheater-detection are enough to displace 150 years of historical 
experience with two very different welfare systems (Aarøe & Petersen, 
2014). 
Another insight from the evolutionary cognitive perspective is that 
people’s priority with regard to welfare economy is not so much to 
ensure a particular overall distribution of resources but more to ensure 
that resources go to the right individuals. Although the notion that 
people generally prefer equal to unequal distributions of resources 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 2006) has been popular, recent research suggests 
that people are much more concerned with a fair distribution. Unequal 
distributions are perfectly acceptable, if those who are bypassed are 
viewed as cheaters (Starmans et al., 2017). 
5.4 Explaining FEBs 5 and 6: Impersonal Markets and 
Mechanisms for Partner-Choice 
A common feature across numerous FEBs is the notion that markets 
are, in different ways, ‘bad’ for general welfare. FEB 5 is an expression 
of what Rubin (2014) called emporiophobia. FEB 6 refers to the more 
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specific notion that transactions on the market are somehow ‘unfair.’ 
There is a common thread in these beliefs, the role of perceived social 
motivations. In most cases, the perceived negative effects of the market 
are seen as originating from particular sets of social motivations, believed 
to be pervasive in market transactions. From a cognitive evolutionary 
perspective, we argue, these beliefs emerge naturally due to the way 
market interactions differ from the types of social exchanges we evolved 
to value. 
Specifically, to explain these FEBs, we need to describe in cognitive 
terms, in what way market transactions are, as is often claimed, 
‘impersonal.’ This description combines several features of potential 
relevance to our intuitive systems. First, people in modern conditions 
do not in principle need information about their exchange partners, 
beyond knowledge of their positions (seller, buyer), the particular 
goods they sell or buy, and their price. Second, there is no expectation 
that considerations other than price and utility should govern people’s 
behaviors in such exchanges. That is, you may be interested in 
patronizing local stores because that helps keep the town pleasant, but 
that motivation is clearly extrinsic to the terms of exchange. Third, there 
is no expectation of reiterated transactions. One can in principle behave 
in opportunistic ways, patronizing Baker A when his prices are lower 
and defecting to Baker B when that is more advantageous. 
These features all constitute advantages of market transactions from 
an economic standpoint. Yet, for intuitive inference systems designed for 
established, long-term, cooperative exchange, these same features will 
be interpreted in a different manner—as threat-cues. First, our partner-
choice system requires that the parties in a transaction be identifiable as 
specific individuals. In small-scale interactions, the balancing of costs 
and benefits occurs over reiterated exchanges, and, in order to predict 
these long-term outcomes, information about the partner’s reputation 
and past exchanges are key. Impersonal transactions, in contrast, are often 
anonymous, and therefore make it more difficult to track the reputation 
of one’s partners. To a psychology designed for partner-choice, this is 
likely to trigger an alarm signal, indicating that such a situation should be 
avoided. Second, strictly impersonal exchange goes against motivations 
to generate bonds of cooperation with particular individuals, as a form 
of social insurance. This may reinforce the intuition that impersonal 
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transactions involve, if not danger, at least a missed opportunity. Finally, 
systems for partner-choice are set up to avoid engaging in exchange 
relationships with individuals who are much more powerful, in order 
to avoid exploitation (Petersen, 2013; Trivers, 1971). In modern markets, 
however, many exchanges take place with corporations or business that 
seem exceptionally powerful from the perspective of the individual. 
While these corporations are actually affected by consumer choice, this 
only occurs at the aggregate level. As a result, each individual can form 
the perception that powerful corporations set the terms of exchange in 
potentially exploitative ways. 
Such intuitive computations would provide the cognitive context in 
which the mind processes socially transmitted information, for example, 
to the effect that it seems true that ‘markets are cruel and selfish,’ or that 
‘a free market makes wolves free to attack sheep.’ In such circumstances, 
external information provides a context in which some of the intuitions 
described here receive an explanation or a justification. Conversely, such 
explicit discourse about the economy is attention-grabbing for people to 
the extent that it matches some of these intuitions. 
This perspective on the emergence of emporiophobia is a recent 
theoretical proposal (Rubin, 2014). There is no specific test of the 
hypothesis as yet. However, a range of evidence on related phenomena 
is congruent with this psychological description. Behavioral economics 
studies show how trust and cooperation are inhibited when social 
situations are made anonymous (Bohnet, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1996); 
neuro-economic studies show how monetary rewards elicit greater 
emotional responses if we experience the source as a human rather than, 
for example, an impersonal computer—for a review, see Petersen et al. 
(2009); and management studies show that more impersonal forms 
of interaction (e.g., e-mail rather than face-to-face interaction) reduce 
satisfaction with the interaction, in part because of a lack of emotional 
coordination (Baltes et al., 2002; Hibbing et al., 2013). 
Future research could test the proposed explanation directly by 
utilizing an individual differences approach: Do individual differences 
in attention to cooperative positive-sum games in everyday life predict 
endorsement of emporiophobia-related beliefs? This would not only 
provide a test of the link between perceptions of the market and social 
motivations, but also could illuminate some of the political implications 
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of FEBs. Emporiophobia is more outspoken among liberals than 
conservatives and, consistent with the proposed explanation, there is 
evidence that liberals in general are more oriented towards cooperative, 
positive-sum games, in particular with strangers (Hibbing et al., 2013). In 
this regard, it is important to note, again, that emporiophobia is a matter 
of stated, explicit beliefs, which may or may not reflect the intuitive 
principles that actually guide people’s economic behavior. People who 
say that markets are ‘bad’ may still behave as roughly rational agents 
in markets, and they may even detect the advantages of competition in 
their everyday economic behavior. But, if asked whether a given domain 
of activity should be left to a market of competitors, or when asked the 
extent to which markets should be regulated, they readily express the 
view that market outcomes are socially detrimental. 
5.5 Explaining FEB 7: Wages, Labor,  
and the Effects of Ownership Intuitions 
FEB 7 is the belief that labor is the source of ‘value.’ Experimental 
studies have carefully documented this effect. For instance, adults and 
even young children assume that working to transform an object carries 
a potential claim to ownership such that, for example, the artist, not the 
owner of the quarry, is the owner of a sculpture. This ownership claim is 
made stronger by the extent of the transformation (O. Friedman, 2010; 
O. Friedman & Neary, 2008; O. Friedman et al., 2011). 
From a cognitive evolutionary perspective, human ownership 
psychology reflects the features of evolutionarily recurrent environments. 
Ancestrally, most valued and owned goods were previously unclaimed 
natural resources that time and effort turned into something useable 
(whether food, tools, or shelter). In such situations, labor is indeed the 
exclusive generator of both ‘value’ and ownership. Features of modern 
economies that influences ownership and price, such as ownership of 
capital and consumer demand, were not crucial features of ancestral 
environments in the context of production. For example, claiming 
ownership over something processed by an unrelated person ancestrally 
would instead signal the existence of a clear dominance relationship. 
Although good evidence exists for the importance of labor for 
intuitions of ownership and value, future studies should seek to directly 
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test people’s intuitions about the relative contributions of labor, as well 
as capital provision and consumer demands, in determining ownership. 
The prediction that emerges from the cognitive evolutionary perspective 
is that labor should be intuitively associated with ownership, while other 
factors are represented in explicit afterthoughts rather than through 
automatic intuitions. Studies utilizing measures of explicit and implicit 
processing could tease such effects apart. 
This set of folk-economic beliefs (and, in particular, intuitions about 
value) illustrates an important point: that information that does not 
meet the input conditions of a system is simply not handled by that 
system. Here, our ownership inference system takes as its input the fact 
of original possession, the original state, and the amount of work that 
transformed a thing. These are the conceptual slots, the place-holders, 
to be filled by appropriate information. By contrast, the fact that there is, 
or is not, some demand for the work in question, does not fit any specific 
conceptual slot in our intuitive ownership system. So, it is simply not 
processed at all by the relevant intuitive system. 
These beliefs also illustrate the political importance of FEBs. 
Intuitions about ownership and value resonate with arguments about 
large wage differentials between, for example, managers and frontline 
workers being unfair, and that the latter contribute more ‘value’ than 
the former. Such arguments have particular appeal if used to argue 
in favor of higher taxation or the regulation of business. Historically, 
Marxian ideologies have also continuously framed owners of capital 
as exploitive. In this regard, the evolutionary cognitive model entails 
novel testable predictions: The underlying intuition that owners of 
companies or factories are exploiting workers may not ultimately stem 
from observed differences in wealth, or poor conditions for the workers. 
Instead, an important contribution may lie in the fact that workers are 
perceived as investing more effort, often in the form of more physically 
demanding labor. To the evolved mind, this may trigger the intuition that 
workers are natural owners of products. Future studies could directly 
test this by examining how different factors such as wealth differences 
between management and workers, differences in working conditions, 
and differences in effort, shape the view that particular corporations are 
exploiting their employees. 
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5.6 Explaining FEB 8: Large-Scale Regulation  
and Small-Scale Minds 
FEB 8 is the belief that regulation has the intended economic effects. 
Specific examples include the belief that rent controls drive down 
the average rent, that minimum wages increase average income, or 
that there is a fixed amount of work to be done, so that limiting the 
working hours will palliate unemployment by distributing that amount 
(Worstall, p. 75). Economists generally point out that, even in the best 
scenario, unintended effects occur and, in some cases, reverse the 
desired outcome. Trust in regulation seems to be based on specific 
non-economic assumptions (Hirshleifer, 2008) and, in particular, an 
assumption of stable supply. For example, people expect price-controls 
to affect market prices but have no effect on quantities supplied. 
To explain this FEB, we need to take into account the fact that 
unintended consequences of this kind are second-order effects that 
occur in large-scale social systems. They reflect aggregate market 
responses to changes in costs and benefits (e.g., if the price of the good 
is regulated downwards, the market responds by decreasing quantities 
supplied). But our psychology of social exchange is designed for small-
scale social systems, for personal exchanges between oneself and one 
or more identified others. The intuitive inference systems that evolved 
to deal with such situations do not, because of the small-scale nature of 
the situations, include any conceptual slots for aggregate dynamics such 
as origins of supply. In this way, FEBs about regulation do not emerge 
from a single set of intuitive inference systems. Rather, they emerge 
from the failure of particular pieces of information to be processed by 
any intuitive inference system. 
Let us consider the specific example of rent control to illustrate this 
interpretation in more detail. To the evolved mind, rent control can be 
intuitively construed as a form of assistance that makes sense from a 
small-scale perspective, as it seems that resources are transferred from 
richer landlords to poorer tenants. It is likely that systems designed 
for cheater-detection provides the motivational impetus to support 
such policies. The situation can be mentally represented as including 
a generic landlord who intentionally takes an extra benefit (increasing 
rent) without incurring an extra cost (providing better housing), 
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thereby meeting the input conditions for the ‘cheater’ concept. In this 
context, the regulatory state appears to redress the situation; the rent 
ideally decreases, so that the situation no longer activates free-riding 
detection. Economists have pointed out that the adverse consequences 
of rent controls (i.e., a lower supply of rental units) may offset any 
positive effects, although there is disagreement over the size of these 
negative dynamics (Jenkins, 2009). From an evolutionary cognitive 
perspective, people will fail to consider such aggregate effects, as the 
activation of evolved categories entails a perception of the situation as 
small-scale interaction. The cheater-detection system has no slot for 
information about the origin of supply and takes quantity supplied as 
a given. Indeed, in the exchange situations typical of our ancestral past, 
distribution typically had little effect on production. As described above, 
opportunity costs, insurance expectations, and reputation management 
made it possible for people to both distribute most of the game they 
caught and be motivated to hunt again. Since there is no conceptual slot 
for information about the origin of supply—for example, the incentives 
that make people offer housing for rent—this information does not 
enter into computations about regulations, thereby allowing a belief 
that regulation will have only the intended effects. 
No existing studies have directly tested this argument, and there 
is only scant evidence at present concerning the psychological 
representation of regulation (Hirshleifer, 2008). An initial set of 
evolutionary cognitive studies on regulation should test (1) whether 
the presence of evolutionarily recurrent cues (e.g., cues of cheaters) 
automatically induces the intuition that regulation in the relevant 
domain (e.g., rent) works, and (2) whether explicit information about 
second-order dynamics (e.g., decreased supply) are discounted in the 
face of such cues. 
6. Transmission and Effects of Folk-Economic Beliefs 
6.1 Intuitive Systems Create Cultural Attractors 
So far, we have analyzed the ways in which various cognitive systems 
could affect the relevance of particular pieces of information about the 
economy, making some views about, for example, unemployment or 
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trade, particularly salient because of their fit with the contents of intuitive 
assumptions. We can now examine how the agreement or discrepancy 
between intuitions and some explicit notions of the economy impacts 
the transmission of information between individuals, thereby creating 
culturally successful representations. Here we are extending the work of 
economists who emphasized some particular ways in which individual 
psychology may influence economic beliefs (Caplan, 2008; D. D. 
Friedman, 2004; Rubin, 2002). Closest to the kind of model presented 
here, David Hirshleifer proposed a ‘psychological attraction’ account 
of popular opinion on regulation, following which ‘certain beliefs […] 
are especially good at exploiting psychological biases to attract attention 
and support’ (Hirshleifer, 2008, p. 857). 
Our model extends this form of explanation to most domains of folk-
economic opinion. We predict that information about economic matters 
will be all the more widespread, easy to acquire, natural, compelling, 
and so forth, when it matches the input conditions of the inference 
systems described above, thereby creating widespread folk-economic 
beliefs. 
Human communication does not consist in ‘downloading’ 
representations from one mind to another. Rather, it consists of inferential 
processes, whereby a listener makes use of observable cues provided 
by a speaker to reconstruct that individual’s possible communicative 
intentions (T. Scott-Phillips, 2014; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Because of 
this interpretive quality of communication, cultural transmission will 
often follow unpredictable paths. We should not expect the contents 
of two minds from the same social group to be similar. And to a large 
degree, of course, they are not. Among the myriad mental representations 
created and sustained in individual human minds, only a minuscule 
fraction are shared with other individuals. Precisely for that reason, 
these common beliefs require special explanation. Why do people in 
a social group sometimes hold roughly similar representations? This 
question stands in contrast to the questions of classical social science, for 
which social change was the problem, while the continuity of traditions 
was taken for granted (Morin, 2016).
A crucial insight of evolutionary anthropology is that cultural 
transmission processes are strongly constrained by the structure 
of human psychology (Sperber, 1985, 1996). The mind is prepared 
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to acquire certain representations more easily than others. As a 
consequence, these representations are found, in roughly similar forms, 
in many different minds, becoming what we call cultural beliefs. The 
combination of expectations from our domain-specific intuitive systems, 
with communicative input from other members of our group, form what 
anthropologists call cultural attractors, positions in the space of possible 
representations where many minds seem to converge (Claidière et al., 
2014; Claidière & Sperber, 2007). Cultural transmission creates stable 
representations, not just because people discard or forget material 
that is far from the attractors, but also because human minds actively 
distort fragmentary or deviant material. In other words, transmission 
is reconstructive rather than just selective (Claidière & Sperber, 2007; 
Morin, 2013).
This perspective on cultural transmission helps make sense of the 
cultural recurrence of some folk-economic beliefs, explaining for instance 
why the belief that imports from other countries are a bad thing, or the 
notion that immigrants are welfare-scroungers, are made more salient 
by their interaction with intuitions about coalitions and communal 
sharing. It is important to notice that the effect of intuitive systems on 
the spread of cultural beliefs are probabilistic. For example, our intuitive 
free rider detection system, or our evolved set of preferences for partner-
choice, do not by themselves directly generate particular views of the 
economy. The intuitive systems only provide a context against which 
external information, provided by mass media, economists, political 
entrepreneurs, or simply other individuals, is likely to become relevant, 
attention-grabbing, and therefore susceptible of cultural transmission. 
Conversely, we are obviously not suggesting that the human mind 
is condemned to process only mental representations that are relevant 
to our intuitive systems. There are many circumstances in which 
humans have acquired and communicated thoughts that are entirely 
non-intuitive, in the sense that they do not match our evolved inference 
systems. People can, for instance, learn to think in terms of scientific 
physics, which often go against our intuitive physics. In the case at hand, 
people can learn economics and produce reasoning that diverges from 
the beliefs described here. However, acquisition of such non-intuitive 
thoughts requires effort, and in most cases institutional support for 
sustained learning (Boyer, 1998). 
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6.2 Folk-Beliefs Do Not Reveal an  
Implicit Theory of the Economy 
Is there an economic system in the mind, a set of processes specially 
dedicated to economic transactions? It would be tempting, though in our 
view seriously misleading, to consider the set of folk-economic beliefs as 
a (spontaneous, popular, perhaps misguided) alternative to economic 
theory. In this view, FEBs would be the outcome of a particular vision of 
society and the economy. 
We resist this interpretation, as there is little evidence for such an 
integrated, quasi-theoretical picture of the economy among layfolk. 
In fact, the few studies of lay models clearly suggest the opposite. 
For instance, Williamson and Wearing interviewed 95 individuals 
and extracted from this material their implicit views about economic 
processes. They conclude that ‘the outcome was 95 unique cognitive 
models’ (Williamson & Wearing, 1996, p. 3). 
Indeed, folk-economic beliefs may vary not just between individuals, 
but also within the same person, at different times or in different 
contexts. That is, people do not seem to have stable economic beliefs, 
in long-term memory, that they could pull out on demand. In the field 
of public opinion, researchers have made a strong case that we should 
dispense with such ‘file-drawer’ models of opinion formation (Wilson 
& Hodges, 1992; Zaller, 1992). People do not build and store stable, 
organized beliefs about the economy, ready to be made available when 
surveyed by a pollster. Instead, they make up their attitudes and beliefs 
‘on the spot,’ by retrieving relevant cultural representations, and (in 
our view) activating the relevant intuitive inference systems. For most 
individuals in modern mass-societies, there is little monetary incentive 
to evaluate one’s own beliefs about the economy or the political process 
(in contrast to many other domains in their everyday lives), and there is 
almost no price to pay for being factually wrong, which would explain 
why there is relatively little cognitive investment in evaluating their 
validity (Caplan, 2008). 
The exceptional range of different understandings of the model 
identified by Williamson and Wearing (1996) also suggests that, for each 
individual, the model might be different if surveyed in another context. 
Indeed, there is evidence for such systematic changes. In an analysis of 
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British voters during the recent economic crisis, Martin Bisgaard (2015) 
found that people rapidly shift their understanding of how much control 
the government has over the economy, depending on how the economy 
is doing and whether or not their favored party is in government. If 
the economy gets worse and people support the governing party, 
the government is suddenly no longer viewed as in control. From an 
evolutionary cognitive perspective, such partisan motivations most 
likely stem from the operations of coalitional psychology (Haidt, 2012; 
Petersen, 2015). People signal support to their coalition by construing 
beliefs that protect it against criticism. Experimental results show 
that, like national or ethnic identities, partisanship is processed as a 
coalitional affiliation to the evolved mind (Pietraszewski et al., 2015). 
Hence, it might matter for people whether they have the ‘right’ FEBs 
from a coalitional perspective but not whether they have the ‘true’ FEBs 
from an epistemic perspective. 
The fact that folk-economic beliefs can change rapidly should not 
be surprising, as most of them are reflective, not intuitive beliefs. To 
illustrate this reflective nature of FEBs, consider ‘emporiophobia.’ 
Information about the fact that market transactions are one-shot 
interactions can lead to the intuition ‘there is danger here,’ because our 
evolved social exchange preferences include reiterated transactions with 
known individuals. This intuition of danger can then lead to forming, 
acquiring, or accepting explicit reflective beliefs of the form ‘the market 
is bad.’ 
From an evolutionary standpoint, it should come as no surprise 
that human minds do not comprise a specific ‘economics’ module. 
Decision-making under scarcity, traditionally described as the domain 
of economic models, is not a unified domain of social interaction, 
for which evolution would have given us specific inference systems. 
Instead, the evidence from experimental psychology studies suggests 
that human evolution resulted in specialized systems for scarcity in 
food provision (foraging), in mates (sexual preferences), in social 
support (coalitional psychology), and so on Buss (2015). Even in the 
domain of social exchange, as described above, we spontaneously 
activate diverse systems with different principles and potentially 
inconsistent responses. 
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6.3 Relationship Between FEBs and Economic Behavior 
The model presented here leaves a gap in our understanding, as 
concerns the connections (or lack thereof) between folk-economic views 
on the one hand, and economic behavior on the other. Many people in 
modern societies have explicit folk-economic views that do not just fly 
in the face of economic theory, but are also incompatible with their own 
behavior in markets. For example, people may both have the explicit 
belief that ‘markets produce negative outcomes’ and an implicit trust in 
competition in their search for the best prices. 
We propose here that economic beliefs are largely constrained by 
evolved, domain-specific systems concerned with social exchange. So, 
there might be connections between FEBs and economic behavior, to the 
extent that these same domain-specific intuitive systems are activated 
when people engage in actual economic transactions. 
Unfortunately, this aspect of economic cognition is still very much 
a terra incognita. We can assume that economic decision-making is 
governed by a variety of intuitive systems, the aggregate output of 
which is an intuition that the transactions is desirable or best avoided, 
and that intuition motivates the eventual decision. Over the last 
decades, studies within behavioral economics have demonstrated how 
this intuitive output diverges, in relatively systematic ways, from the 
subjective utility maximization predictions of standard microeconomics 
(Plott, 2001; Smith, 2003). 
However, we still lack a computationally precise and reasonably 
predictive description of the cognitive processes engaged (Ross, 2005). 
Indeed, a large part of the behavioral economic literature assumes 
what could be called a person-level description of economic decision-
making, in which information about possible strategies is combined and 
evaluated by a general-purpose, centralized utility-evaluating system—
the difference from neoclassical models being that considerations of 
fairness, reputation, and other nonstandard forms of utility are added to 
the classical homo economicus agent. This notion of utility as considered 
by a centralized agent corresponds to what Dennett calls the ‘intentional 
stance,’ in which we explain behavior in terms of reasons, knowledge, 
and intentions (Dennett, 1989). This way of explaining behaviors is 
produced by our intuitive psychology, or ‘theory of mind.’ It is very 
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successful in explaining and predicting other human beings’ behavior. 
The operation of this intuitive psychology is so natural and invisible 
that it often seems difficult even to imagine another way of explaining 
behavior. 
But there is an alternative, what Dennett called a ‘design stance,’ 
in which we consider behavior in terms of the various computational 
systems involved in acquiring information about the environment and 
motivating specific behaviors (Dennett, 1989). Approaching economic 
decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory 
more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences 
(Ross, 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the 
outcome of a competition between distinct computational processes—
and this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et 
al., 2012), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie 
& Monterosso, 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher, 2009; 
Loewenstein et al., 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how 
these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often 
empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of 
rationality (Ross, 2005) and utility (Burnham, 2013). As a consequence, 
the actual connections between micro-processes of economic decision-
making on the one hand, and folk-economic beliefs on the other, remain 
unexplored. 
6.4 Political Relevance of Folk-Economic Beliefs 
In this model, because of the activation of intuitive inference systems, 
some ways of presenting economic processes are more compelling than 
others. This would constrain political communication, not just from elites 
to the rest of the population, but also among layfolk, with important 
consequences for political debate. Importantly, this would imply that 
a particular economic issue is often not discussed in the format that 
provides most information about the causes and consequences of policy, 
but in the format that is intuitively compelling, even if that obscures a 
great deal of the relevant information. 
FEBs are politically important because they act as a set of background 
assumptions that forms the basis of the formation of political opinions. 
One important area of opinions relates to political candidates. A wealth 
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of research within political science has shown that incumbent parties 
or candidates are punished and rewarded for bad and good economic 
developments, respectively. When unemployment soars, incumbents 
are more likely to lose. Importantly, however, research also shows 
that the link between economic circumstances and voting behavior is 
mediated by the perceived responsibility of the incumbents (Rudolph, 
2003a, 2003b). Assignment of responsibility for macro-economic events 
necessarily relies on FEBs and an interpretation of the relationship 
between the actions of the candidate and the economic developments. 
Beliefs about the relationship between economic hardship, on the one 
hand, and international trade and immigration, on the other hand, 
could be influential. If the economy is doing badly and the incumbent 
government has increased immigration and trade, then our analyses 
suggest that it is more likely that the government will be held accountable 
on Election Day. 
Such effects of intuitive systems are also relevant to policy choices. 
FEBs, and the intuitive systems underlying them, shape political 
behavior because they make certain ways of organizing the economy 
more compelling. Importantly, these compelling policies will in some 
cases be misguided, as the psychological systems were designed for 
small-scale exchange rather mass markets. For example, in the small-
scale environments of our ancestors, helping was a matter of transferring 
resources to a needy individual. Arguments for welfare policy that are 
framed that way should be persuasive. In modern markets, however, 
the effectiveness of any social solutions is also affected by equilibrium 
considerations. Consider the difference between targeted versus 
universal welfare programs. From a small-scale perspective, targeted 
programs should be most effective in helping the needy, because they 
bring resources specifically to those in need. Yet, in market economies, 
comparative studies provide compelling evidence that welfare programs 
are more redistributive, and help the neediest people more, when they 
are universal rather than targeted. That is due, again, to macro-level 
dynamics ignored by our intuitive systems. Research shows that it 
is possible to sustain high levels of benefits from a welfare program, 
but only when the politically influential middle-class are among those 
benefiting from that program (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998). 
When they do not benefit, most voters are persuaded that the benefits 
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should be scaled down. Because of this electoral dynamic, universal 
programs are on balance more redistributive than targeted programs. 
This net result arises from both their high benefit rates and the fact 
that higher-income groups contribute more to the program by means 
of taxation than low-income groups. But, again, evolved exchange 
intuitions would make people less likely to be persuaded by arguments 
that touch on such dynamics, compared to arguments that fit our 
intuitive systems for allocating benefits between individuals. 
Folk-economic beliefs are politically important because they 
constrain how politicians can talk about policies to the public. Political 
scientists have documented the effects of ‘framing’ on policy views 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). The model presented provides a more 
specific understanding of these processes. In our view, certain policy-
related messages are more compelling or persuasive, not just because 
they are framed in more ‘concrete’ or ‘simple’ or ‘vivid’ terms, as is 
often suggested, but also because they meet specific expectations from 
our intuitive systems. For instance, policies that increase international 
trade with rival countries or that allow more immigrants to enter the 
country can be more easily framed as economically problematic than as 
beneficial, not because the former description is ‘simpler’ but because of 
the match it offers between intuitive inference systems and a particular 
constellation of arguments (Arceneaux, 2012). 
7. Conclusion 
In 1922, the American journalist Walter Lippmann grasped the 
characteristic of modern mass societies when he wrote: ‘Our opinions 
cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, 
than we can directly observe’ (Lippmann, 1922, p. 42). If this was true 
in 1922, it is even more true in the twenty-first century. And if it is true 
about mass societies, in general, it is nowhere else as true as with the 
market. No citizen can ever observe each of the distant transactions that 
comprise the market economy. It is not just a matter of practicality. The 
market mechanism is in principle unobservable. Even if all transactions 
could be observed, one would still not observe the economy as such—
such a claim would be a category-mistake in the sense of Ryle (1949). 
The ‘hand’ that governs the causal processes of the market is, as already 
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pointed out by Adam Smith, invisible—that is, not just hidden but in 
principle difficult to detect (Nozick, 1994). As consequence, laypeople, 
when forming their internal representations of the economy, cannot rely 
on much, if any, feedback from direct experience. And without external 
experiences as a reality-check on their beliefs, they are left with what 
others report and what they themselves can imagine. 
We proposed a new explanation for the differences between 
laypeople and economists’ views on a number of economic issues. 
Instead of considering folk-economic views as irrational deviations 
from normative understandings of economic processes, we explain 
them as the outcome of principled cognitive systems. These appeared 
in human evolution as adaptive response to specific challenges, and 
they are automatically activated whenever a situation meets their input 
criteria. The intuitions provide support for deliberate, explicit, reflective 
thoughts, among which are the culturally transmitted folk-economic 
beliefs considered here. 
How and why people acquire and stabilize beliefs about the 
economy is, obviously, crucial to understanding political dynamics. 
Economic policies are central to the overt choices offered in most liberal 
democracies, but we are only starting to figure out the effects of intuitive 
systems, typical of all normal human minds, on the acquisition and 
transmission of people’s explicit beliefs about the economy. 
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6. Detecting Mental Disorder
Introductory Note 
Who do we see as mad, and why? How do people decide that some 
person (possibly themselves) suffers from a mental disorder? History 
and anthropology tell us that in all human societies, people readily 
identify some forms of behavior as evidence for some dysfunction. In 
modern societies, we delegate final decisions about such matters to 
medical specialists. But that is of course a recent phenomenon (Porter, 
2004). And, even in places with psychiatric experts, an individual 
must be identified as suffering from some disorder before medicine 
is involved. All this raises the question, how do people detect mental 
disorder?
I was surprised to find that there was very little description of these 
criteria in the literature. Anthropologists did describe various local 
interpretations and explanations of madness, e.g., as the work of spirits, 
a consequence of witchcraft, an imbalance in humors or elemental 
components of the person… but what behavior had prompted the initial 
perception of disorder? In brutal terms, what do you have to do to seem 
mad?
One might imagine that the criteria could be entirely specific to each 
culture, but that is certainly false. Manifestations of mental disorder 
are identified in strikingly similar ways in very different places. We 
can recognize what Horatio describes as Hamlet’s ‘wild and whirling 
words’ (Hamlet, I–v), as well as the hallucinations, incoherent speech, 
inappropriate emotional reactions, conversations with non-existent 
interlocutors, etc. Anthropologists who do fieldwork have little difficulty 
in perceiving mental disorder in the most exotic (to them) cultural 
environments. 
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In this article, I proposed that people in different cultures use the 
same implicit criteria for mental disorder, which derive from our 
intuitive psychology, sometimes called ‘theory of mind’ (Leslie et 
al., 2004). It provides us with interpretations of people’s observable 
behaviors, utterances, and gestures, in terms of things that we could 
not observe, such as other people’s beliefs and intentions. Our intuitive 
psychology works on particular assumptions about the way minds work, 
how perception causes beliefs, how beliefs interact with intentions, 
how intentions explain behavior, etc. Naturally, all these assumptions 
are implicit. In our everyday interactions we need not be aware of their 
content or their operation.
Intuitive psychology is present in all normally functioning human 
minds, mostly as a result of natural selection pressures for cooperation 
(Tomasello, 2009). Humans cannot coordinate their behavior on joint 
goals unless they mentally represent other agents’ intentions and 
beliefs. This evolutionary context explains why our intuitive psychology 
generally works smoothly when we interact with typical adults who 
would have been the cooperation partners that mattered most to our 
fitness, but is defeated by atypical minds, like those of infants or animals 
from another species. (Interaction with those two kinds of agents is 
handled by systems specialized in kin-selection and parenting (Hrdy, 
2009) or predator-prey relations (H. C. Barrett, 2005), respectively).
This origin in cooperation has the important consequence that 
intuitive psychology is not just a descriptive mechanism that tells us what 
happened in other minds. It is also normative—it implies a description 
of the way a mind ought to work (Stich, 1983). But that also explains 
why our intuitive psychology alone does not produce any description 
or explanation of mental disorder. It just produces a ‘mind not working’ 
signal when it is defeated, a natural equivalent of the ‘syntax error’ of 
computer systems. 
In this article I describe two consequences of these features of intuitive 
psychology. First, they allow us to predict which kinds of behaviors will 
be identified as evidence of underlying mental disorder, and which 
will remain ‘invisible’ to our intuitions. Second, the fact that intuitive 
psychology detects dysfunction but produces no representation of 
how it occurs creates an explanatory gap that is filled by all manner of 
culturally transmitted explanations, in many cases imagined agents like 
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witches or spirits. Interestingly, people imagine those mystical agents 
as endowed with the kinds of minds that our intuitive psychology 
expects—minds that perceive what happens around them, form beliefs 
on the basis of perceptions, combine desires and beliefs to form goals, 
and so forth (J. L. Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2003). So it seems that in most 
human societies, people cannot escape intuitive psychology when they 
want to explain behavior—first, it triggers the intuition of disorder, and 
second, it is used to explain disorder. 
Isn’t modern psychiatry often engaged in the same operation? 
Medical detection of mental disorder is of course framed by expectations 
of intuitive psychology. Patients are confirmed as patients because 
their behavior deviates from the expectations of intuitive psychology. 
Indeed, the catalogue of symptoms used by the American psychiatric 
profession, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1995), is mostly a list of deviations from the expectations 
of normative intuitive psychology. But beyond detection, the ideal of 
a scientific psychiatry would be to provide explanations, to describe 
the connections between observed behaviors and reported states of 
mind, on the one hand, and particular neuro-cognitive mechanisms, on 
the other (Murphy, 2006). Unfortunately, we are very far from having 
sufficiently precise computational descriptions of the neuro-cognitive 
processes that underpin mental dysfunction. Perhaps that is because 
the initial description, in terms of deviations from our theory of mind 
expectations, just does not capture the underlying similarities and 
differences in disorders. That discrepancy between our intuitions and 
possible underlying mechanisms is particularly clear in extreme cases 
of delusion, in which the patient seems to hold an irrational belief, e.g., 
that a part of their body is not actually theirs, that a relative has been 
replaced with a clone, and so forth. Interpreting delusions constitutes 
a formidable challenge, precisely because we cannot use any of the 
inferential tools supplied by our intuitive psychology (McKay, 2012). The 
most precise models for such delusions necessarily rely on neuroscience 
models that are completely alien to intuitive psychology (Gerrans, 2014). 
So intuitive psychology, which is indispensable to human interaction—
its impairment in autism, for instance, has catastrophic consequences 
for the social life of patients (Lai et al., 2014)—may also constitute the 
most formidable obstacle to our understanding of mental disorder.
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Intuitive Expectations and the 
Detection of Mental Disorder:  
A Cognitive Background to 
Folk-Psychiatries1
Abstract. How is mental dysfunction detected? How do cultural 
models of mental disorder affect this process of detection? 
Attempts to answer these questions have not often been made 
in the research, as they fall between two domains: that of cross-
cultural psychiatry (which looks at the dysfunction itself) and 
anthropological ethno-psychiatry (which looks at cultural models 
of sanity and insanity). In this paper, I set out a model to illustrate 
this ‘missing link’ between behavior and cultural models, 
founded on experiential evidence for intuitive psychology. 
Typical adult minds contain certain intuitive expectations about 
mental function and behavior, and these are used to perceive 
certain sorts of dysfunctional behavior. It appears that there is 
a ‘catalogue’ of potential behaviors that activate this intuition, 
and therefore the symptoms that are present in culturally specific 
folk-understandings of mental dysfunction are also restricted. It 
is also suggested that certain mental dysfunctions are ‘invisible’ 
to folk-understandings due to their lack of obvious breaches of 
principles of intuitive psychology. This standpoint helps us to 
1  Some of the contents of this chapter have been expressed earlier in Boyer, P. (2010) 
Intuitive Detection of Mental Disorder: Cognitive Background to Folk-Psychiatries, 
Philosophical Psychology 23(6): 821–844. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.529
049
© 2021 Pascal Boyer, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0257.11
222 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
comprehend the cultural stability and spread of certain views of 
mental disorder. 
1. Introduction 
The concept of mental disorder is one which exists across the world—
people in each and every country have a certain way of classifying 
and modelling this notion. This leads us to pose several questions: do 
those in different groups and communities view the concept of mental 
disorder as consisting of similar aspects? Are there limitless ways to 
envisage the concept or are our categorizations based on some common 
underlying principles? If these principles exist, where did they emanate 
from, and do they have influence over the purportedly scientific models 
and classifications in psychiatry?
These questions were traditionally approached by two disparate 
disciplines: cross-cultural psychiatry—a branch of mainstream 
psychiatry — and ethno-psychiatry, stemming from cultural 
anthropology. This disparity has led to various theoretical problems 
and uncertainties, which may yet be overcome by the advances in 
intuitive psychology (or ‘theory of mind’) and in the psychology of 
culture. We are now able to set forth a synthetic model which suggests 
that all normal adult minds across the world contain certain intuitive 
expectations about normative mental function and behavior, based on 
common underlying principles. These expectations are constrained by 
intuitive psychology, which influences both the detection of disorder 
(through affecting people’s recognition of certain kinds of behavior as 
symptomatic of mental dysfunction) and the explanation of disorder. 
Thus, it seems that, despite the very different cultural conceptions of 
sanity and mental dysfunction, the underlying principles are simple and 
the same. 
2. A Prototypical Scenario and a Question
The social interactions that we will consider throughout this paper 
usually take the following form:
1. An individual experiences some type of mental dysfunction.
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2. Other people begin to notice that individual’s behavior:
a. At a certain point, the individual’s behavior subverts 
the expectations of the other people involved in an 
interaction;
b. The behavior cannot be easily or logically explained or 
repaired, and/or:
c. The behavior is repeated, or similar behavior occurs, 
with similar results (lack of clear or logical explanation). 
3. People perceive the individual to be experiencing an example 
of D, a local category or set of possible categories that fit(s) 
this type of discernible behavior.
4. A causal model of D is considered, which aligns with a locally, 
personally or culturally wide-ranging explanatory model M 
for these people.
5. People contemplate how the perceived issue could be 
effectively diminished.
Cross- (or trans-) cultural psychiatry predominantly focuses on step [1], 
attempting to discover the limits of variation within mental dysfunction, 
subject to cultural background (Stein, 1993). Inversely, ethno-psychiatry 
predominantly focuses on steps [3–5], delineating the models or 
suppositions lying beneath certain kinds of nosography and etiology, 
as well as contemplating treatment, the potential for specialist care, and 
the effectiveness of different techniques (Jovanovski, 1995).
It is notable that neither of these disciplines mentions the cognitive 
processes through which mental disorders are recognized (step [2] of 
the above scenario). Georges Devereux, a founder of modern ethno-
psychiatry, comments:
The patient appears on scene—on the printed page [in ethno-
psychiatric monographs]—as an already recognized and more or less 
completely diagnosed neurotic or psychotic, with no mention of the 
manner in which this status—for a status it is!—has been assigned to 
him. (Devereux, 1980) p. 247 
While evidence from history and cultural anthropology has made 
us aware that steps [3–5] in the above scenario vary around the world, 
no principled model exists to illustrate the potential for variation in the 
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area of detection ([step 2]), and there is additionally no formal research 
on the topic.
In order for us to understand how mental disorders are detected, 
we should examine whether common principles that underlie regular 
cognitive function play a part. In doing so, we extend the existing 
research program that explores cultural phenomena as bounded 
variations within limits set by human cognitive capacities (Sperber 
& Hirschfeld, 2004). Research performed by cognitive scientists and 
evolutionary anthropologists has found that the underlying principles 
we develop at a young age lead to suppositions that help us to acquire 
our specific cultural norms and ideas — for example, in the areas of folk-
biology (Atran, 1990, 1998), kinship and ethnic categories (Hirschfeld, 
1994a, 1996), racial categories (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001), 
religious beliefs (Atran, 2002), social interaction (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992); (Fiske, 1992); (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). As a result, we would 
expect that these underlying principles would also have an influence 
over how we determine what is acceptable versus atypical behavior.
3. The Background: Intuitive Psychology Expectations 
The term ‘intuitive psychology’ straightforwardly describes the 
collection of cognitive capacities that help us to understand our own 
and others’ behavior as the result of unobservable mental states and 
processes (Baron-Cohen, 1995), (Leslie, 1987), (Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer, 1987). The majority of these capacities are subconscious in 
function — we are unaware of the inferential processes that lead us to 
establish overt explanations of other people’s behaviors. The capacities 
are likely to be situation-specific and distinct from each other, each with 
their own lower-level neural sub-capacities (C. D. Frith, 1996). We have 
only gradually begun to be able to (tentatively) describe the capacities 
involved in normal, adult intuitive psychology—our initial, more 
detailed descriptions came from instances where the system does not 
function, such as in autistic children or in animals from other species.
In this paper, we can limit our concentration to only the most 
basic intuitive principles involved in the process. Whilst there are key 
theoretical disparities between models of intuitive psychology, it is 
fortunate that its core standards are remarkably uncontroversial, and 
include: 
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[1] Intentional states; representations of our existing apparent realities. One 
notion of intuitive psychology is that people’s minds have memories, 
beliefs, and perceptions ‘inside’ them, which represent or duplicate the 
conditions in a person’s physical reality. Children realize from the age 
of three that mental representations are not physical objects (Wellmann 
& Estes, 1986). Beyond that age, we progressively cultivate the idea that 
our thoughts contain a representation of the circumstances surrounding 
us—there is a causal link between manifest states of affairs and mental 
representations (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Additionally, we 
use indirect cues — such as the extent to which people’s gaze follows 
objects and other people’s gaze—to subconsciously confirm the 
link between external objects and people’s mental states (Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998). Broadly speaking, by seeing that an object aligns with 
and seems to ‘attend’ to another object, we get a strong indication that it 
is an intentional agent (Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998). 
[2] Agency as internal causation. One of the first assumptions that infants 
make is that agents, unlike other objects, decide their own behavior from 
within (Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001); (Rochat, Morgan, & 
Carpenter, 1997). This assumption is founded on the particular psycho-
physics of animate motion (Michotte, 1963); (Schlottman & Anderson, 
1993); (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000) and on additional cues that reveal 
internal causation and production of behavior (Gelman, Durgin, & 
Kaufman, 1995); (Williams, 2000). Intentional agents’ actions relate to 
objects and states in a principled way (Blythe, Todd, & Miller, 1999), and 
even infants can decode their orientations — for example, by reaching 
a specific object of interest and avoiding obstacles (Csibra, Gergely, 
Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999); (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 
1995). Attributing more intangible intentions to objects is something 
that children learn to do at a young age, such as by emulating effective 
rather than ineffective actions in the handling of tools (Want & Harris, 
2002) and using actors’ visible emotions to deduce the effectiveness of 
the action (Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002).
[3] Memory as a store. Throughout the world, the inherent idea of 
memory as a store is pervasive and meaningful—to the extent that 
even certain scientific models of memory processes are based upon it 
(Roediger & Geraci, 2004). While research has not focused on this theme, 
intuitive psychology also appears to accept the copying of experiences 
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onto memory stores and their later retrieval in the configuration in 
which they were experienced, which is in conflict with a large amount 
of psychological research into human memory (Ross & Wilson, 2000); 
(Rubin, Schrauf, & Geenberg, 2003). 
[4] Inferential and communicate coherence. In order to communicate, 
we must make inferences and follow strict, implicit pragmatic principles 
(Grice, 1975) which we develop at a very young age. These principles 
influence infants’ communicative development (Trevarthen & Aitken, 
2001) and acquisition of new vocabulary (Bloom, 2000). We generally 
cannot interpret others’ utterances or communications without 
comprehending the speaker’s intentions—the way in which they are 
trying to influence the listener’s representations (Noveck & Sperber, 
2004); (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). During conversations, implicit 
adaptations and small ‘repairs’ allow people to sustain comparable 
representations of the circumstances they are discussing.
[5] Emotion, norms and empathy. We build much of our information 
about other people’s mental processes on the inadvertent reading 
of minute emotional cues — such as facial expressions, voice and 
gestures—and of the potential reasons behind them. Again, this ability 
evolves from a young age—at five months old, infants behave differently 
when faced with demonstrations of different emotions on a familiar 
face (D’Entremont & Muir, 1997). Different cultural groups develop 
comparable cues at similar times (Ekman, 1999). To detect and recognize 
certain kinds of emotions, specific neural circuitry is required (Kesler-
West et al., 2001), separate from broader facial identity processing.
If cues are lacking, we use our inherent psychological principles 
to deduce what the emotional repercussions of certain circumstances 
would be. A substantial database of certainties about social relations is 
necessary in order to do this—we need to recognize the emotions that 
influence the different types of relationships, from family to partners, 
friends to acquaintances, and so on. 
People tend to assume that those who are part of their cultural group 
adhere to the cultural norms to an equivalent extent—these norms 
explicitly prescribe behavior, which is connected to emotion or attitude 
(Nichols, 2002a). Assumptions about emotions originate from a broad 
ability to be empathic using simulation—such as internally simulating 
our own emotions resulting from a situation in order to perceive 
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others (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). Our inherent expectations about 
emotionally relevant hypotheticals (such as deducing how somebody 
feels when their family is threatened, or when they are abandoned by 
their friends) could also be founded on this sort of simulation (Gordon 
& Olson, 1998). 
[6] Principled motivation. Intuitive psychology comprises a particular 
model of how intentions are connected to available information and 
background preferences (Malle, 2004). It also differentiates desire and 
intention—desire is seen as a simple preference state, and intention is 
seen as the fusion of that state with available information to produce 
a plan of action (Malle & Knobe, 2001). Intentions are presupposed 
to make the attainment of desires and goals more probable. Children 
appear to develop their understanding of desire and intention before 
the age of three (Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000). They view 
desires as foundational when clarifying behavior, to a greater extent 
than physiological states (Moses, Coon, & Wusinich, 2000), but even 
young children appreciate that desires may clash (Bennett & Galpert, 
1993). 
And numerous other principles. This list of inherent principles is 
merely a summary of research in this area—it does not assert that there 
is concurrence on the functioning of intuitive psychological capacities 
in this field. With the completion of more research, we may be able to 
expand the list, but the key points at present are the generally undisputed 
findings above. Later in this paper, the restrictions of intuitive psychology 
will be further discussed, but it is now pertinent to discuss the way it is 
used to comprehend the perception of mental disorders.
4. Intuitive Catalogue of Detectable Mental 
Dysfunction 
We can now attempt to detail the potential types of evident mental 
disorder using the broad inherent principles of intuitive psychology. 
Table 1 below details a list of assumptions and behaviors that defy these 
assumptions. 
This list is not exhaustive—it is merely an initial attempt to illustrate 
that intuitive psychology does tacitly anticipate particular manifestations 
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of mental disorder. Below, the items in the list are discussed in more 
depth, correlating with the categories introduced in the previous section: 
[1] Intentional states; representations of our existing apparent realities. 
Our inherent presuppositions about intentionality are violated when 
an individual does not react to occurrences (for example, if they are 
in a vegetative state, hebetude, or coma) or to noteworthy stimuli (for 
example, if their reflexes are lacking or have declined, they neglect to 
gaze at moving objects, or display general indifference). Similarly, 
individuals who do not follow culturally appropriate types of gaze 
following and direct gaze cause a similar violation.
[2] Agency as cause of behavior. In this area, potential indications of 
atypical functioning comprise involuntary motor behavior (such as 
Vitus, tics, or alien hand), and circumstances where an individual’s 
intention and action appear not to correspond (for example, if they are 
surprised by their own actions). Involuntary speech that flouts social 
norms (such as in Tourette Syndrome) are recognized in the same 
manner.
[3] Memory as a store. This model hypothesizes that memory 
impediments would be interpreted as leakage. Unlike in scientific 
models, failing to recall a recent, common occurrence would be viewed 
as a procedure of deletion, rather than a breakdown in organization or 
encoding.
Table 1. Inherent expectations and corresponding potential violations . 
Table by P Boyer.
Intuitive assumption Potential disruption
1a. Intentional states, representation 
of external states of affairs
Vegetative, unconscious states
1b. Direct perception of what is 
manifest
Failure to register or react to what’s 
around, illusory perception of non-
existent states of affairs
1c. Perception causes belief Beliefs or other mental states causing 
perception
2a. Agency: Motor behavior as result 
of inner intentional states
Apparently unintended gestures or 
complex behaviors
2b. Agency: Speech controlled by 
intentions
Talking in strange voices, unexpected 
changes in intonation
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Intuitive assumption Potential disruption
2c. Agency: Self is the origin of 
intentions
Involuntary action
2d. Unitary self Dislocation, appearance of different 
personalities
3a. Memory as a store Loss of material
3b. Memories caused by experiences False memories, memories influenced 
by beliefs
4a. Coherence in inferences from 
states of affairs
Inferential non-sequiturs, e.g. goals 
divorced from present situation
4b. Coherence in communication Conversational non-sequiturs, 
unexpected changes of topic
5a. Emotions in tune with outcomes No emotional reaction, emotions not 
suited to outcomes
5b. Emotional empathy Failure to empathize
5c. Feelings towards kin Hostility to kin, neglect
5c. Moral feelings towards non-kin Behavior not driven by moral 
imperatives; opportunism; 
exploitativeness
5d. Feelings about cultural norms, 
within-group solidarity
Indifference to cultural norms & 
etiquette, deliberate violation
6a. Motivation towards external goals Lack of motivation
6b. Motivation in tune with valence 
of potential outcomes
Desire to bring about negative 
outcomes / not cause positive ones
6b. Motivation proportional to value 
of outcomes
Excessive investment in low-value 
outcomes or converse misjudgment
Others… Others…
[4] Inferential and communicative coherence. An inability to sustain 
coherence within a conversation would activate the perception of 
disordered mental processes, as we can see from the clinical accounts 
of many types of mental disorder—senile dementia and Alzheimer’s 
are often both detected through the manifestation of violations of the 
principles of pragmatic relevance (Hays, Niven, Godfrey, & Linscott, 
2004). As a result, caregivers must slowly modify their expectations 
of conversations with patients, adapting to their lack of responses, 
‘repairs’, or strategies to diminish ambiguity or misunderstandings 
(Orange & Zanon, 2006). Likewise, the speech of schizophrenic patients 
often contains instances of wrong speech-acts, flouting of turn-taking, 
referential ambiguity (i.e. using pronouns without their referents), lack 
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of repair, referential incoherence—where multiple subjects are covered 
in the same statement (Corcoran & Frith, 1996); (Meilijson, Kasher, & 
Elizur, 2004)—and diminished comprehension of figurative speech and 
proverbs (Brüne & Bodenstein, 2005).
[5] Emotion cues. Individuals recognize when another person seems 
impassive in response to others’ emotional cues, or exhibit unintelligible 
emotional cues themselves — for example, patients with dementia 
experience diminished control over emotional expression (Smith, 
1995). Schizophrenic patients are often impeded in the perception and 
analysis of emotional cues, and in the same way, so are autistic children, 
even high-functioning or Asperger patients (Teunisse & Gelder, 2001). 
Those with autism find it extremely difficult to recognize emotional cues 
(Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001), which is exacerbated by their struggle 
to comprehend the potential basis for others’ emotions.
Any breaches of cultural norms or other emotional expectations 
should be conspicuous. While breaches of etiquette, for example, will 
not necessarily be perceived as indicative of atypical mental processes—
they might instead indicate aggression or poor childhood experiences—
persistent breaches with no explanation may be seen as confirmation 
of disorder (see Clement, 1981, #1956 for an account of this in Samoan 
culture). Breaches of familial expectations (for example, neglect or 
abuse towards family members) may also be seen as indicators of basal 
dysfunction. 
[6] Motivation. Behaviours that seem to conflict with or oppose a 
person’s own preferences would likely be detected as a disturbance in 
cognitive functioning. Additionally, individuals with low motivation 
(‘indifference’) or, in contrast, those who are highly motivated—to the 
point of mania—would be contenders for detection. For example, those 
with schizophrenia are often found to have low levels of motivation, just 
as high-risk children do (Watt, Grubb, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1982). 
Similarly, Alzheimer’s is frequently detected at an early stage via the 
degeneration of motivation, past what would be expected for those who 
are ageing (Ready, Ott, Grace, & Cahn-Weiner, 2003).
The above table does not constitute a list of potential types of mental 
disorder—it merely looks at the circumstances or behavioral events that 
could lead to the perception of atypical mental processes. At this point, 
we have no presuppositions about whether natural or sound instances 
of mental disorder can be detected consistently via intuition.
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5. An Illustration: Mohave Cases 
In order to connect a range of observed behaviours with the intuition of 
disorder, the dysfunction-detection model is suggested. Cases outlined 
by George Devereux in ‘Mohave ethnopsychiatry and suicide’ (1961) 
are useful demonstrations of the model—Devereux details a number 
of varying case-histories, in detail, separate from his and others’ 
analyses of the behavior, which is an approach scarcely found in ethno-
psychiatric ethnography. This permits us to notice the initial perception 
of the behavior as extraordinary and the later categorisation of it as an 
example of culturally specific dysfunction. In Table 2 below, all symptoms 
outlined within case-studies are set out—only behaviors described by 
participants, excluding the ethnographer and other investigators, are 
included.
We can presuppose that the disclosure of these utterances indicates 
that individuals thought the accounts of behavior were pertinent 
and indicative of an intrinsic disorder or condition. It is significant, 
therefore, that the majority of the utterances describe obvious breaches 
of inherent psychological expectations (compare Table 2 with Table 1 
). As mentioned previously, psychological contraventions often appear 
alongside other norm-contraventions, but the list additionally indicates 
that the psychological contraventions are recognized and acknowledged 
without fail. For example, a woman is reported to be a nymphomaniac 
(case-study 14), but for a Mohave onlooker, a salient aspect of the 
situation is that she was sometimes unaware of what she was doing. 
Similarly, losing consciousness during epileptic fits (case-study 6) is 
made significant by the individual not experiencing pain. An anti-social 
person (case-study 20) is additionally reported to be misled (‘he seemed 
to believe he was going to war’).
Naturally, this is not intended as overwhelming proof for the violation-
detection model. That would necessitate a detailed examination of case-
studies pertaining to a range of cultural environments, beyond what 
can be achieved in this paper. The intention here is to exemplify that 
breaches of psychological expectations are core to the perception of 
putative dysfunction. In fact, out of all the cases detailed by Devereux, 
only one (case-study 23) describes atypical or improper behavior 
(beating one’s in-laws) that could be interpreted in any way other than 
psychologically.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































234 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
6. Scope and Limits of Intuitive Psychology Principles 
Intuitive psychology comprises a collection of critical inferential 
systems that function straightforwardly in general, giving us an analysis 
of perceived behavior with regard to beliefs, purposes, and emotional 
states—this is known and accepted. It is suggested here that, in the same 
way, intuitive psychology helps us to discern that a certain individual’s 
mind is dysfunctional; this is the only clear explanation for the 
individual’s behavior breaching the inherent psychology expectations. 
This model gives inherent psychological expectations the main causal 
role — it would thus be useful to define their key characteristics. 
Are the principles universal? The core question is whether these 
principles are replicated across the world—do individuals in different 
cultures possess the same intuitive psychology? It is clear that much of 
our cognizance of behavior originates from local norms and beliefs about 
the right way to behave. As a result, individuals’ overt interpretations 
of mind vary significantly (Lillard, 1997; Vinden, 1998), at least in the 
case of those individuals who attempt to produce an interpretation. 
However, there is no corroboration of comparable variation within the 
principles of intuitive psychology themselves—literature from around 
the world has not found that individuals in different communities 
decline to orient to the principles above (Table 1 ) or follow completely 
different principles (Leslie, 1994; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). The 
majority of applied studies have looked at developmental features of 
intuitive psychology, discovering a large amount of overlap in early 
intuitive psychology principles (Astuti, 2001; Avis & Harris, 1991; 
Tardif & Wellman, 2000; Yazdi, German, Defeyter, & Siegal, 2006), the 
timescale of their development (Callaghan et al., 2005; Wellman & Fang, 
2006), and their relationships to other mental processes (Chasiotis, 
Kiessling, Hofer, & Campos, 2006). If we observe the profuse amount 
of verification for early development of brain structures in line with 
intuitive psychology, this is to be expected (C. D. Frith, 1996; Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2007).
Are intuitive principles a conjecture of rationality? Psychological 
expectations should not be understood as an assumption of rationality, 
nor muddled with the broad presupposition that ‘people generally 
behave rationally.’ In fact, it seems clear that intuitive psychology is made 
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up of exact, situational expectations and deductions—not an inferential 
hypothesis of the way individuals behave. Research has shown, for 
example, that even at an early age, we envision that people’s beliefs are 
shaped according to their observations, rather than their observations 
being shaped by their beliefs (Leslie et al., 2004), and as a result, we 
have specific assumptions (e.g. ‘X saw a dog here, so X believes there’s 
a dog here’). However, this principle has not been shown to be related 
to a broader presupposition of people behaving logically the majority of 
the time—in contrast, we often expect others to behave illogically. Many 
cultures presuppose that in situations where an individual is angry 
(and other similar situations), they are likely to act in a way that they 
will find regrettable afterwards. 
Intuitive principles are not fixed—they can be both reinforced or 
dismissed when additional context-specific considerations are taken 
into account. For example, while small children presuppose that the 
presence of an object A will be detected by everyone in the vicinity, 
this presupposition can be overcome if there is an obvious obstruction 
to other people’s perception of object A (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007). 
Intuitive psychological analysis of behavior is, for the most part, a kind of 
relevance process, consisting of a detailed succession of presuppositions 
which lead to an optimal interpretation of the observable behavior 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995). There is an unlimited set of circumstances 
where perceptions and beliefs do not match up—the principles of 
intuitive psychology are merely preset assumptions, with ‘all else being 
equal’ (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005). 
This should also be true for the discernment of dysfunction that 
occurs when presuppositions are breached, which would explain the 
variance of behaviors that precipitate such a discernment across culture 
and history. For example, in the past, speaking aloud in public when 
no other conversational partners were present was viewed as indicative 
of dysfunction in many parts of the world, but this behavior has come 
to be expected, and it is presupposed that the individual is likely to be 
on the phone. Mental dysfunction is perceived as a result of a network 
of illative operations, which may either support or weaken the original 
intuition.
Intuitive principles are not invariably correct. In the field of 
philosophy, it is still being debated as to whether the constructs that 
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our psychological expectations predicate (such as beliefs, purposes, 
emotions, etc.) are ‘really real’—whether our intuitive psychology 
has scientific value (Churchland, 1981). However, this discussion is 
immaterial for our purposes, as we are focusing on the way in which 
intuitive psychology functions, and not whether it does so correctly 
or not. This should be noted as we move to discussing our inklings 
of dysfunction. These inklings that are activated by an individual’s 
behavior in a certain context may be erroneous. Broadly speaking, the 
set of behaviors that lead to such discernments may be divergent—in 
the fields of established neuro-psychology or psychiatry, they may be 
classified separately. Our perceptions of dysfunctional behavior might 
only have a minor overlap with true dysfunctionality. In fact, many 
types of dysfunction are likely to go undetected by intuitive psychology. 
Are presumed dysfunction and broader norm-violation alike? It could be 
questioned whether breaches of psychological expectations are actually 
the basis for the perception of dysfunctional behavior—some might 
argue that they relate back to a more general defiance of social norms. 
For example, if someone declines to respond to a question, they are not 
only breaching a psychological expectation, but also flouting the rules 
of conversation; similarly, a sociopath who lacks remorse after causing 
pain is not only behaving atypically, but also flouting the social rules 
that surround violence.
However, this straightforward, domain-general analysis is not 
supported by research findings. Studies in the areas of behavioral and 
developmental neuropsychology and neuroscience show that intuitive 
psychology is domain-specific—its inputs and principles are separate 
from those contained within other mental systems (Blakemore et al., 
2001; U. Frith, 2001; Leslie et al., 2004). There is an overwhelming lack 
of convincing affirmations for the existence of cognitive mechanisms 
that survey norms (and their violations). Instead, we find evidence 
for highly specific mechanisms that keep track of violations of moral 
imperatives as distinct from social conventions (Haidt, Kesebir, Plessner, 
Betsch, & Betsch, 2008; Turiel, Eisenberg, Damon, & Lerner, 2006); 
violations of exchange principles and economic fairness (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992; Kurzban, 2001); violations of incest revulsion (Lieberman, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007); betrayal of the implicit requirements of 
friendship (Hess & Hagen, 2006), and violations of status and manners 
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(Nichols, 2002b). These kinds of violations all transpire in a certain type 
of situation, due to certain sorts of purposes. A broad operation that 
monitors their concurrent features does not seem to exist.
These conclusions lead us to suggest that manifest breaches of 
presuppositions lead to a certain sort of ‘dysfunction intuition’ that 
differs from the contravention of other norms. This intuition might be 
supported, altered, or weakened in reality due to the contravention of 
other non-psychological expectations. Additionally, we can assume that 
there are numerous instances where an individual is assessed as atypical 
due to psychological or non-psychological violations, but neither we nor 
the person who assesses this are aware of it.
7. Prediction of ‘Invisible’ Conditions
Our intuitive psychology comprises a group of presuppositions that 
allow us to comprehend and anticipate other people’s behavior in the 
majority of everyday situations. However, it is not a fully comprehensive 
account of how and why intentional agents behave. Intuitive psychology 
wholly focuses on conspecifics. The majority of animals’ motivation and 
conceptions are significantly disparate from our intuitive expectations 
(for example, see Grandin, 2005 #3976). 
It happens that, even among conspecifics, our intuitive psychology 
frequently cannot help us to interpret behavior—for example, the 
behavior of young children, whose utterances and arrivals at certain 
conclusions can be perplexing. This can be explained by the assumption 
that, if intuitive psychology only accounts for a section of mental function, 
dysfunction within systems which it contains no presuppositions for 
will be ‘invisible’. This assumption appears to be correct, especially 
when the dysfunction pertains to certain features of cognition, excepting 
reasoning, planning, and decision-making.
The condition of prosopagnosia—the failure to associate the visual 
stimulus of a person’ face with information held in memory about the 
person (de Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991)—serves as a good 
example. This handicap only applies to the global visual trace of the face, 
not to face-details or other aspects of an individual (Farah, Levinson, 
& Klein, 1995). Consequently, patients can overcome it by heeding 
facial features, voice, gait, and other characteristics in order to interact 
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appropriately. It is improbable that this condition could be detected via 
intuitive psychology, because its only symptom is a prolonged interval 
before responding to an individual’s presence. This is unlikely to be 
recognized—if it was, it may be misinterpreted as illustrating some 
sort of difficulty with vision, memory, or social interaction (i.e. an 
unwillingness to interact with others). In a similar way, the majority of 
kinds of visual agnosia—where an individual becomes confused when 
asked to name and describe common types of objects or animals (Dixon, 
2000)—could be missed or misinterpreted. 
Specific neuro-psychological conditions are generally expected to 
activate the sense that a dysfunction of some sort is present—however, it 
is hard for intuitive psychology to define what, exactly, this dysfunction 
is. For example, Tourette’s syndrome causes breaches of etiquette that 
are detectable even in divergent cultures (Staley, Wand, & Shady, 1997), 
and these breaches are often not attributed to cognitive control, due to 
our intuitive psychology’s unfamiliarity with the idea of distinct neural 
procedures and control loops connecting them. Another example is 
aphasia, which is frequently assumed to be a kind of insanity, due to 
the lack of meaning that can be derived from their utterances. Because 
intuitive psychology contains no detailed account of the intricate ways 
in which thoughts and speech are linked, disruption of speech is often 
assumed to represent disruption of thought.
8. From Intuitions of Disorder to Folk-Models 
The operations that lead to the perception and analysis of mental 
disorder can be most accurately portrayed by describing causal links 
between disorder, the resulting behavior, the perception of behaviors 
controlled by intuitive psychology, and the patterns of acquisition 
and communication that cause models to be chosen. These links are 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
8.1 What Makes Folk-Models ‘‘Folk’’? 
Up to this point, we have mainly concentrated on how intuitive 
psychology sorts the behaviors that are notable for their breaching of 
expectations from the others. This leads us to question whether this 
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Fig. 1.  A reduced model of the detection of mental disorder. Dysfunction sets 
off behaviors (stars), of which only a few can be perceived as breaches of 
intuitive psychology (many ‘bounce off’ intuitive perception). In certain 
cases, perception may be erroneous (where the origin of the behavior is 
something other than dysfunction). Perception of dysfunction notifies and 
limits people’s models—only some of these complete the stages of acquisition 
and communication (ineffective models ‘bounce off’ transmission). Models 
which are often triggered may have feedback (‘looping’) effects both on 
themselves (transmission biases) and on certain people’s behaviors. These 
are illustrated using dotted lines. (Figure by P Boyer)
system of perception induces general cross-cultural ideas of mental 
disorder.
In order to answer this question, we must first discuss contemporary 
anthropological models that illustrate the way cultural knowledge is 
transferred. How are certain models straightforwardly and customarily 
transmitted within a group? This sort of question is handled by present-
day anthropological theory through cultural selection frameworks (Boyd 
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& Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Sperber, 1985). A key presupposition is 
that, similarly to other kinds of human interaction, cultural transmission 
does not involve ‘downloading’ notions from one mind to another; 
instead, deductive processes are necessary, in which individuals notice 
signals in other’s behavior, deduce their communicative purposes, 
and establish concepts founded on their deductions (Sperber, 1996; 
Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Consequently, people are always 
generating modifications of others’ representations. The unpredictability 
of communication and deductions leads us to seek an explanation for 
the presence of shared representations or ‘cultural’ information, where 
many varying models would be expected (Sperber, 1985). By terming 
certain representations ‘cultural’, we focus on the similar representations 
held by participants in a certain group. This similarity is indicative 
of certain notions and norms being chosen during the procedure of 
transmission, while others are altered, abandoned, and forgotten.
Cognitive predispositions go some way towards providing an 
explanation of the repetition of certain notions and norms (Sperber & 
Hirschfeld, 2004). Research and models originating from experimental 
and developmental psychology, linguistics, neuro-psychology, and 
the neurosciences are all unified in the contemporary cognitive 
anthropology approach, in an attempt to illustrate the power of cognitive 
predispositions in increasing the probability of specific types of notions 
and deductions appearing. Certain principles—the majority of which 
are implicit—accompany and arrange incoming data, which causes 
certain deductions to follow, regardless of their origin. As a result, we 
are left with statistical ‘attractors’ in the population dynamics of cultural 
transmission (Claidière & Sperber, 2007; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004).
8.2 A Basis for Dysfunction Intuition
The argument here is that a sizable amount of culturally transmitted 
folk-understandings of mental illness originates from cognitive 
dispositions, which impact cultural transmission significantly. This 
indicates that instincts about mental disorder are based on a cognitive 
network that is predominantly applicable across cultures, as opposed 
to the conventional presuppositions of ethno-psychiatry. Perceptions of 
atypical behavior are frequently called intrinsically ‘cultural’ (Gaines, 
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1992; Jovanovski, 1995) and, in all likelihood, differ to a large extent as 
a result. In the word of Anthony Marsella: ‘mental disorders cannot be 
understood apart from the [culturally specific] concept of self, because 
it is the nature of the self which serves to identify ‘reality’ for a given 
cultural group and which dictates the definition of what constitutes a 
symptom [italics added]’ (1981, p. 362; see also Good, 1994 #3892 and 
Sadowsky, 2003 for similar arguments). 
It is useful to explore this statement in more detail. Here, the word 
‘symptom’ could be interpreted in two ways—it could mean ‘behaviors 
that people believe to be triggered by the mental dysfunction’ or, 
alternatively, ‘behaviors triggered by the mental dysfunction which 
are overtly built into a model of mental dysfunction’. Marsella appears 
to have intended the second meaning—in this sense, the statement 
seems totally justified. Our ‘cultural models’ of mental dysfunction 
unquestionably differ according to culture, within certain confines, as 
we will discuss below. However, we cannot assume that local models 
govern whether behaviors are or are not perceived as potential proof of 
mental dysfunction. 
An assortment of the behaviors recounted above—including 
breakdowns in appropriate communication or motor control, 
incomprehensible emotions and self-destructive behaviors) could 
activate the instinct that an individual may have a mental disorder, no 
matter whether that can be related back to or clarified by a local cultural 
model or not. All European or Western individuals, even those who are 
not familiar with psychiatry, can interpret the motions of a Tourette’s 
patient as indicative of dysfunction, though they often cannot diagnose 
what this dysfunction might specifically be. This is also true in other 
cultures—a range of other atypical behaviors are recognizable as 
symptomatic of mental disorder, even without the ability to carry out 
further analysis of it.
8.3 An Illustration: Haslam’s Model of Folk-Psychiatry 
Certain kinds of behavior are highlighted as representative of mental 
disorder in the majority of human groups—they correlate across cultures. 
The steps through which mental disorder is brought about are also 
hypothesized and locally agreed upon. Conventional ethno-psychiatry 
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details these two stages in comprehending dysfunction (Kleinman, 
1988), but may face the topic of culture in an overly ‘culturalist’ manner, 
believing culture to be an extrinsic network of representations that 
is considered from a theoretical point of view, separate from actual 
cognition (Jovanovski, 1995). Therefore, there is very little structured 
research into the cognitive procedures incorporated within it.
One anomaly is a sequence of conceptual and experiential papers 
by Haslam and colleagues that propose a psychological description of 
Western ‘folk-psychiatry’ (Giosan, Glovsky, & Haslam, 2001; Haslam, 
2005; Haslam & Giosan, 2002). Their model details four different ways 
that perceptions of behaviors may fluctuate: [1] pathologizing, or in 
other words, the degree to which the behavior is interpreted as atypical 
due to it being difficult to clarify; [2] moralizing, where the behavior 
is thought to be governed by the person and having a certain moral 
valence; [3] medicalizing, where the behavior is thought to be a direct 
consequence of an implicit natural condition; [4] psychologizing, where 
the behavior is thought to be produced mentally but not intentionally — it 
is the consequence of a mental dysfunction, and the cornerstone is its 
origin, not its reasons, with decreased moral judgment (Haslam, 2005). 
Haslam and colleagues also recorded significant cultural variation 
in the comparative significance of these measurements. While US 
participants are more likely to prefer an ‘internal’ perspective of mental 
dysfunction (particularly ‘psychologized’ internal disputes), Romanian 
and Brazilian participants highlight external explanations for it (Giosan 
et al., 2001).
This model gives us a good foundation for exploring the cognitive 
procedures that are the basis of Western folk-understandings of mental 
disorder. Additionally, it gives us a guide for carrying out further 
experiential studies that build on conventional ethno-psychiatry—in 
other words, those that build on the accounts of the cognitive procedures 
involved in individuals considering mental disorder. In future research, 
it is important to appreciate that pan-specific aspects of human minds 
are probable authorities over cultural models.
8.4 ‘‘Looping Effects’’ from Models to Behaviors 
Ian Hacking detailed the intricate network of links between pathology, 
its cultural context of appearance, its typical manifestations within that 
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context, its popular categorization, and its scholarly description in a 
sequence of inquiries into past ‘ways of being mad’ (Hacking, 1995b, 
1998). A ‘looping effect’ exists, where certain symptoms that have 
become core to scientific understanding of a condition guide people 
towards standard exemplifications of mental dysfunction. An instance 
of this phenomenon comes from Western psychiatry, when conditions 
such as female hysteria, long-lasting fugue states, and multiple-
personality disorder were recognized in the research and thereafter 
spread throughout the culture (Hacking, 1995a). This examination of 
looping effects adds to the wealth of research focusing on historical and 
cultural procedures within the displays and models of dysfunction (see, 
for example, Porter, 1987 #7829 and Porter, 2004).
We can assist our comprehension of these feedback loops by looking at 
feed-forward links between the procedures discussed above. Hacking’s 
statements about ideas of mental dysfunction actually constitute a broad 
evaluation of ‘epidemiological’ models of cultural transmission. The 
reality of a highly diffused representation within a certain group helps 
us to foresee the ways in which it might be transmitted in the future. 
For example, there is a ‘frequency bias’, in which it is probable that 
individuals will acquire and pass on representations that are already 
popular (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Instances of disordered behavior 
overtly noted by others as being dysfunctional have a high probability—
all else being equal—of being more salient and more memorable than 
other atypical behaviors. Just as in other areas of cultural transmission, 
behaviors that match up with an established pattern are much more 
likely to be understood and recalled (Bartlett, 1932), where alternative 
types of atypical or surprising behavior might be brushed off as 
behavioral ‘noise’. Contemporary cognitive anthropology recounts the 
looping effect of popular ideas and norms in the area of ‘race’ concepts 
(Hirschfeld, 1994b), religious and supernatural beliefs (Boyer, 1994), 
and many more (see e.g. Hirschfeld, 1994 #4583).
9. Conclusion 
Our models of behavioral dysfunction originate from culture, in the 
same way that narratives, scholarship, etiquette, politics, cuisine, musical 
traditions, and religious rituals do. Mental dispositions that make up 
a section of our common cognitive architecture govern these cultural 
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formations (Sperber, 1996). This is the foundation of my argument that 
intuitive psychology should be considered to be the prime point of 
derivation of implicit presuppositions about other agents’ behaviors and, 
as a result, a prime component in making us discern that an individual 
may have a mental disorder. While intuitive psychology does not 
describe why a behavior is atypical or the reasons behind its occurrence, 
it leaves a gap in which we can place a causal process that gives rise to 
this particular dysfunction. We may or may not fill the gap with a model 
of mental disorder that others in our cultural group subscribe to. Since 
some dysfunctions are invisible, and certain types of causal models are 
inherently more credible than others, intuitive psychology restricts the 
manner in which individuals form culturally pervasive ideas of mental 
disorder in two areas. 
One objective of this model is to supply the ‘missing link’ between 
the incidence of certain behaviors (including those ascribable to 
mental disorder) and pervasive cultural models of mental disorder. 
The majority of cross-cultural psychiatry is centered around mental 
disorder without considering why certain forms of dysfunction are 
more noticeable than others, or why some recognizable atypicality is 
salient but some is not, or why certain recognizable atypicality is the 
focus of culturally transmitted models. In contrast, the majority of ethno-
psychiatric research presupposes that the cultural models supply us 
with a notional grid, anything external to which will not be perceived as 
atypical or indicative of dysfunction. However, this is not correct—there 
are many instances where the detection of atypical behavior cannot be 
traced back to a shared model. The most plausible explanation for this 
is that inklings of mental disorder come from manifest, repetitive, and 
unaccountable breaches of implicit psychological expectations.
It is as yet unclear whether this proposal can clarify why such a high 
level of variation in individual and shared interpretations of mental 
disorder exists. However, it is suggested that a useful approach to 
further research is to involve intuitive psychology and its well-founded, 
intricate, early-acquired, implicit principles within our attempts to relate 
and comprehend the causal links between mental disorder and cultural 
representations. 
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7. The Ideal of Integrated  
Social Science
Introductory Note
This essay starts with the question of why the discipline of cultural 
anthropology is marginal in public debates, when it should and might 
be central. (I provide data that may seem dated, but the trends described 
here have if anything become stronger.) The diagnosis is that this is a 
self-inflicted wound—and perhaps more interestingly, I try to describe 
how some kinds of social science do contribute to public discourse.
But this is not intended as a series of recommendations for 
anthropologists. To understand why, we must keep in mind a simple 
distinction between disciplines and intellectual projects. Disciplines 
are associated with university departments, teaching appointments, 
professional associations, etc. There is a discipline of anthropology, in 
that sense, in the same way as chemistry or biology. Intellectual projects 
are about a set of questions and methods. One example of such a project 
is the idea of explaining the diversity of human cultures in the context of 
the unity of human motivations and mental capacities. This was a central 
project for many (not all) professional anthropologists of the twentieth 
century. But the project of course existed long before that, in the works 
of Montesquieu or Ibn Khaldun, and many others before and after them. 
So the idea of explaining cultures in terms of human nature pre-existed 
the profession of anthropology, and persists, nowadays, largely outside 
professional anthropology, being pursued by people labeled biologists, 
linguists or economists, as well as historians in some cases.
This evolution is not uncommon. Projects can migrate into or out of 
disciplines. The idea of constructing mathematical models for genetic 
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evolution was first handled by professional mathematicians like Fisher, 
and only gradually became central to the discipline of biology. The 
arrival of some projects and departure of others is the reason why 
most academic disciplines, like the ship of Theseus, are incrementally 
modified to such an extent that in some cases nothing remains of the 
original set of ideas or methods.
In this essay, I try to describe the separation between professional 
anthropology (the discipline) and the goal of explaining the diversity 
of human cultures in terms of our common human nature (the project). 
This does not entail that actual anthropologists should abandon their 
current pursuits and join my favorite project—although I of course wish 
my tribe will increase and prosper. No, the only negative comment on 
the discipline of (cultural) anthropology is that it tends to create its own 
intellectual isolation.
What matters, then, are the projects. At the end of the chapter, I sketch 
a version of a research program that was advocated and implemented 
by many before me—a cognitive explanation of human cultures that 
is based on evolutionary principles (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Sperber, 
1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). I described the main achievements of 
that research program in some detail elsewhere (Boyer, 2018). 
Just as they crisscross or transcend disciplines, intellectual projects 
also ignore such common divisions as that between the sciences and the 
humanities, or Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften, which are descendants 
of those highly misleading and highly persistent distinctions between 
nature and culture, innate and acquired traits, etc. These segregation 
principles do not make much sense, as social sciences continue to 
become closely integrated, gradually realizing the ideal of consilience 
described by E.O. Wilson (1998).
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Modes of Scholarship in  
the Study of Culture1
Why is it that the majority of cultural anthropology is no longer relevant? 
The debates within this specific field are generally absent from wider 
academic conversations, its scholars no longer rank amongst the most 
renowned and significant intellectuals of their day, and its contribution 
to non-academic discourse is basically nonexistent. This third aspect 
is even more alarming, given that the actual subject matter of cultural 
anthropology situates it at the core of pressing social issues. 
Although I will qualify this stern appraisal, the aim of the present 
chapter is to investigate the causes and to propose a possible solution 
for (rather than to lament) the current status of cultural anthropology. 
My suggestion is that this condition is in large part self-inflected. 
Cultural anthropology lacks any function in wider discourse, since 
many cultural anthropologists have spoken and written themselves out 
of popular debates. This situation is on the verge of changing, although 
this change is occurring at the margins (rather than the mainstream) of 
the discipline. 
I will begin by emphasizing that there is a considerable amount of 
reputable, and indeed, brilliant research in cultural anthropology—
this is hardly in question. What is, however, of concern is a particular 
academic style (which entered the field of cultural anthropology 
relatively recently, but has dominated other fields for much longer) that 
has curtailed the creative vitality and social relevance of the discipline. 
It is also evident that by no means all anthropology scholarship is 
1  Some of the contents of this chapter have been expressed earlier in Boyer, P. (2003). 
Science, Erudition and Relevant Connections, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 3(4): 
344–358.
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irrelevant: biological anthropology and archaeology are both alive 
and well. It is also worth noting that evolutionary biologists and 
economists are currently rejuvenating the established concerns of 
cultural anthropology in the public consciousness, which indicates the 
potential for a ‘science of culture’ field, or some emergent shift towards 
an integrated discipline of this sort. 
1. Public Decline
Let us consider questions of public debate, such as the organization of 
marriage, gender and familial relations, the formation of social trust and 
cooperative norms, the outcomes of mass immigration, the impact of 
global cultural contact, the functions of religious persuasion, the links 
between civil society and religious institutions, or processes of ethical 
dispute. A whole range of disciplines—from history to evolutionary 
biology, and from neuroscience to economics—have much to contribute 
on all of these topics, but cultural anthropology is, for the most part, too 
readily introspective and concerned with obscure academic fads. 
This is not merely an opinion. A brief scan of references to cultural 
anthropologists and anthropological themes within popular debates 
corroborates the field’s declining relevance. For example, Richard 
Posner’s painstaking study, Public Intellectuals, which lists prominent 
contributors to public debates (in books, magazines, newspapers, and 
journals) over the last twenty years in the United States, is instructive 
(Posner, 2001). Somewhat remarkably, in a list of 416 public intellectuals, 
only five are anthropologists, and four of these five (Margaret Mead, 
Ruth Benedict, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ernest Gellner) are no longer 
alive. One could be forgiven for assuming that Posner prefers pundits 
to specialists, and politics to broader social debates, but this would be 
wrong. The study lists educational psychologists Jerome Bruner and 
Howard, psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker, literary critic and 
moral philosopher Tzvetan Todorov, philosopher Robert Nozick, and 
economist Thomas Sowell. It is worth observing that, save for Mead, 
the five renowned anthropologists listed are quite detached from the 
relativist, ‘textual’ trends of contemporary cultural anthropology. 
Why this stark lack of influence? It is possible that cultural 
anthropology’s recent propensity for academic fads is responsible for 
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its declining relevance. Treatises on culture as text, postcolonialism, 
or more arcane and reflexive topics likely are not of much use to those 
concerned with matters of serious public debate, such as how non-
traditional family units will raise children, how mass immigration 
might result in harmonious co-existence, or how we might overcome 
religious hatred. 
‘Mission creep’ is the process by which a finite strategic goal 
snowballs into an excessively ambitious project, and is greatly feared 
by members of the military and certain politicians. Over the last fifty 
years, cultural anthropology has encountered the inverse issue, which 
we might term a dramatic ‘mission shrink’. In contrast to its original 
scope and what is often referred to in textbooks as its ‘mission’, the focus 
of cultural anthropology has gradually waned to a few minor problems. 
Anthropology’s official mission over the last century, as emphasized 
in most textbooks on the subject, has been to understand human nature 
through the lens of the most challenging and typical features of the 
species, specifically, the production of vastly different norms, concepts, 
and social structures. Interestingly, however, nobody working in 
cultural anthropology pays much attention to these questions, and the 
majority of cultural anthropologists in fact consider such an approach 
to be either outdated or audacious. They have for the most part 
renounced the ‘nature’ aspect of human nature and cultural diversity. 
Instead of confronting so-called ‘big’ questions, the majority of cultural 
anthropologists gladly confine themselves to geographically specific, 
narrowly defined analyses. 
What it worse is that this shift took place at exactly the moment 
when other fields began to produce many methods and results that 
could, when paired with cultural anthropological scholarship, revive 
our understanding of human cultures. Cultural anthropology has, 
far from embracing such advances, seemingly severed ties with other 
fields that could aid this progress (even the related fields of biological 
anthropology and archaeology). It has also doggedly ignored dramatic 
breakthroughs in the fields of psychology, economics, linguistics, and 
cognitive science. 
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2. Modes of Scholarship—Scientific and Erudite
What prompted this shift? I have a provisional diagnosis for this state 
of affairs that demands us to consider what I term modes of scholarship. 
These are the means by which we distinguish scholarly works from 
one another and acknowledge them as legitimate contributions to 
a given field, or recognize their authors as genuine members of the 
academy. In the present inquiry, the question is: how do scholars of 
cultural anthropology reach a decision on whether an individual may 
be awarded a position as a cultural anthropologist, or on whether their 
publications constitute valid contributions to the field? 
The humanities-science binary is far too general and simplistic for a 
comprehension of the present situation. Instead, there are three different 
modes of scholarship: science, erudition, and salient connections. 
2.1 The Science Mode 
The science mode should not take too long to describe. This is not 
because scientific authority and authoritativeness are simple matters—
far from it. Philosophy of science is difficult precisely because it is not 
easy to explain what this particular mode of scholarship consists of and 
what really makes it different from (and vastly more successful than) all 
other ways of gathering knowledge (Klee, 1999). This does not matter 
for present purposes, however, because the scientific mode, if difficult to 
explain, is very easy to recognize. You know it when you see it. Here is a 
short list of the common ‘symptoms’ by which we recognize a field that 
employs the science mode of scholarship: 
a. There is an agreed corpus of knowledge. What has been achieved 
so far is taken as given by most practitioners. The common corpus also 
includes a set of recognized methods, and a list of outstanding questions 
and puzzles to solve. People also tend to agree on which of these 
questions are important and which only require some puzzle solving 
and some tidying up of the theoretical landscape. 
b. The fundamentals of the discipline and its results are explained 
in textbooks and manuals that are all extraordinarily similar, as the 
essential points and the way to get there are agreed in the discipline. 
c. It does not really matter who said what or when. Indeed, many 
practitioners have a rather hazy picture of the history of their disciplines. 
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Many young biologists would have a hard time explaining what the New 
Synthesis was, who was involved, and why a synthesis was needed in the 
first place. Revered figures from the past may be a source of inspiration, 
demonstrating how to make great discoveries, but they are not a source 
of truth. Darwin believed in continuous rather than particulate heredity 
and in some transmission of acquired traits—on both counts we think 
he was simply wrong, great man though he was (Mayr, 1991). 
d. People typically publish short contributions. They do not need to 
establish why the specific problem addressed is a problem or why the 
methods are appropriate, since that is all part of the agreed background. 
e. The typical biographical pattern is that the aspiring member of the 
guild is intensively trained from an early age in the specialized field and 
makes important contributions after only a few years of training. 
f. There is a large degree of agreement (because of the various features 
already mentioned) on whether a given person meets the requirements 
for being a practitioner of the particular field, and there is also a large 
agreement on how important each individual’s contribution is. Again, 
let me emphasize that this is by no means a description of science, but 
only of the scientific mode of scholarship, identified here on the basis 
of fairly superficial but sufficient criteria. By the same token, I am not 
claiming that all ‘scientists’ work in that way (more on that later) or that 
‘science’ only occurs when these features apply. The point of all this is to 
draw a contrast with other modes of scholarship, where legitimacy and 
standards are established quite differently. 
2.2 The Erudition Mode 
Another mode of scholarship is erudition, understood as the requirement 
that specialists of the discipline should have detailed knowledge of a 
particular domain of facts. Consider, for instance, Byzantine numismatics 
or the history of Late Renaissance painting. We expect specialists of 
these fields to have knowledge of the corpus of coins or paintings. We 
turn to them to identify new findings. The erudition mode was essential 
to (and still plays a great part in) the development of many scientific 
fields. For instance biology started as natural history and still includes 
a large part of it. 
The features of erudition are partly similar and partly different from 
those of science, as we can see by listing some of erudition’s key features: 
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a. There is an agreed corpus of knowledge. There is also a large 
agreement on what remains to be done. For instance, only a small part 
of the extant corpus of Mesopotamian tablets has been deciphered. A 
great number of languages remain to describe. So the remaining tablets 
or languages are offered to the aspiring specialist as a possible domain 
of study. 
b. A great deal of knowledge is not made explicit in manuals. 
One picks it up by working under the tutelage of more experienced 
practitioners and immersing oneself in the material for many years. 
c. The history of the field matters and practitioners generally know 
it. There are some great masters, whose intuitions matter a lot, although 
they may have been wrong. For instance, to this day classical scholars 
know their Bachofen or Straus, religious scholars cite Otto or Eliade. But 
these are not considered infallible sources. 
d. People often publish short descriptive contributions, e.g., the 
first description of a new insect genus or the phonology of a specific 
language. They also compile monographs that incorporate vast amounts 
of information about a particular domain (e.g., the comparative 
morphology of ant species, an encyclopedia of New-Guinean languages, 
a concordance of Ben Jonson’s plays, a catalogue raisonne of Guido 
Reni). 
e. Age is a necessary component of competence. Older experts are 
generally better, because expertise consists in the accumulation of 
vast amounts of specific facts, also because an expert needs the kind 
of intuition that is only shaped by long-lasting familiarity with the 
material. Only a seasoned Renaissance scholar can tell you that this 
particular painting is from the Venetian not the Milanese school. A 
younger scholar may be misled by superficial features. 
f. Within a narrow field, people agree on whether a given individual 
is competent or not, generally based on that person’s knowledge of a 
monograph-sized subfield. 
Now, as I said earlier, there is nothing essential about these distinct 
modes—indeed, as we shall see, they are often found in combination, and 
this may be an index of ‘healthy’ disciplines. Also, whether a given field 
uses more or less of one of these modes can change with time. Technical 
change can have dramatic effects on the mix of modes. Classics used to 
be strongly based on erudition in the corpus. Knowing obscure (but 
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relevant) textual sources was a sine qua non, and the outcome of many 
years of sustained training, the way it still is for, say scholars of Indian 
philosophy. Now that the entire Greek and Latin canon is available (and 
searchable) on CD-ROM, this particular form of knowledge cannot be 
used as a criterion for admission. 
3. How Science and Erudition Combine
In healthy empirical disciplines, the science and erudition modes very 
often co-exist harmoniously. Two illustrative examples are biology and 
linguistics. 
Today, molecular biologists principally employ the scientific mode. 
Conversely, evolutionary biologists often have a defined ‘field’ of 
research (for instance social organization amongst wasps, or lekking 
in antelopes), therefore necessitating a combination of both scientific 
and erudition modes. The two are not mutually exclusive, and certain 
fields, such as ecology, often demand scientific knowledge (such as how 
to apply optimal foraging models, how to run simulations, or awareness 
of epidemiological techniques) alongside erudite knowledge (such as 
the ways in which different species interact, the predators or prey of 
a certain genus, or the minimal density of resources required). Often, 
a productive information exchange between these two modes can take 
place. Natural history and evolutionary theory inform one another. E. 
O. Wilson is simultaneously one of the most significant evolutionary 
theorists of the last century and one of the world experts on ant behavior, 
to give just one example (Hölldobler & Wilson, 1990; Wilson, 1975). 
Linguistics nowadays also combines these two modes in multiple 
ways, according to the particular sub-field. Whilst certain linguists 
exclusively work in the science mode (for instance, exploring which 
formal models might account for linguistic regularity), others employ 
a more field-oriented approach (for instance investigating Amazonian 
languages), and many others marry the two approaches. Erudite 
comparisons of creoles and pidgins have for example inspired certain 
scientific models of linguistic evolution (Bickerton, 1990). 
Whilst we may observe these two modes within a single field, or even 
within the scholarly approach of a single person, their purposes and the 
manner in which they are applied nonetheless remain distinct. Biologists 
264 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens
and linguists rely on empirical evidence for a proposed theory, as well as 
generating the relevant evidence, through experimentation or selection 
from a corpus, for example testing the notion that all languages have a 
noun-verb distinction by analyzing a large number of separate grammar 
systems. The erudition mode is driven by description, rather than by 
hypotheses or explanations. The aspirant scholar must catalogue the 
many forms of a particular genus of orchid, or the various coins found 
in a certain Byzantine palace because the given genus or collection has 
not previously been taxonomized. A ‘pure’ or ‘a-theoretical’ description 
does not exist, and particular hypotheses about what is or is not deemed 
to be relevant are usually established in a given discipline’s existing 
descriptive methods.
It is crucial that the distinction between different modes of 
scholarship should not be conflated with the other (in my opinion) 
extremely confusing distinction between academic fields belonging to 
the humanities, the sciences or the social sciences. This institutional 
distinction operates on a different axis to the modal distinction. Examples 
of the erudition mode abound in the sciences, and there are also a fair 
few instances of the scientific mode found in the humanities.
In Humanities fields, scholars may for instance be working on a 
catalogue raisonné of a particular painter, a documentation of Greek 
coins (erudition), while others study how ecology constrains state 
formation or how visual perception influences aesthetics (science). In 
the social sciences, we find projects such as a study of comparative forms 
of nationalism (erudition) and formal models of cooperation and trade 
(science). In the so-called STEM fields, one could map the geological 
formations of England (erudition) while others study the physics of 
plate-tectonics (science). As I mentioned, erudition and science projects 
overlap. But the distinction between these styles of scholarship clearly 
cuts across the familiar humanities/sciences division.
4. A Third Mode of Scholarship: Salient Connections
The third mode of scholarship is the most elusive one, as it has 
not been systematically described, yet it is also most important to 
our understanding of many modern disciplines, including cultural 
anthropology. In this mode, people assess new contributions in terms 
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of the connections they establish between facts or ideas which, by 
themselves, are not necessarily novel or even interesting. Although this 
way of judging new work has been around for a long time, it has become 
characteristic of many academic fields of a recent vintage and of the 
recent evolution of older disciplines. I call this the ‘salient connections’ 
mode. Again, I should provide examples before a model, because 
this is a phenomenon, we all know when we see it, even if we do not 
always reflect on the mechanism at work. For instance, a recent book 
reframes the discourse of love in Shakespeare’s plays and sonnets as an 
expression of the colonial outlook. The lover’s loving gaze transparently 
expresses the conqueror’s prospect on a recently discovered, clearly 
gendered, and mythically virginal New World. A student is planning to 
work on Indian public executions during the Raj as a form of theater, a 
ritualized performance that constructs colonial power at the same time 
as it undermines it by exhibiting the gossamer of its dramatic texture. 
Another colleague has recently finished a study of gay fathers in the 
Caribbean in the framework of Benjamin’s and Bourdieu’s accounts of 
culture, technology, and late capitalism. Steel drums and strong rum 
prop up the local habitus of globalized self-empowerment. 
What is the common thread in these disparate examples? They all 
seem to offer a new connection between elements that were previously 
known to everyone in the field and indeed, in many cases, to any 
educated reader. For instance, all literary scholars presumably know 
their Shakespeare and educated folk know a little about the conquest 
of America. But they (supposedly) had never considered Ophelia as 
American. In the same way, most historians know about the political 
organization of the Raj and its fondness for state pageantry. They are 
also cognizant of the ‘comedian’s paradox’ from Diderot or some other 
source. The author’s hope is in the fact that the connection between the 
two—between state ceremonial and precarious theatrical mimesis—is 
new. In the same way, most cultural anthropologists have some notion 
of the Caribbean as a place of contrasting influences and original 
cultural mixes. They also know a little about the various ways in which 
homosexuality is construed in different places, as well as cultural 
variation in fathers’ duties or roles. The innovative point is to put all 
these together, creating salient associations, especially by throwing in 
Bourdieu and Benjamin—two rather dour, bookish, and strait-laced 
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dead Europeans who would seem far removed from your typical 
Trinidadian gay dad. 
One could multiply the examples, but it may be of more help to 
compare the features of this with the other two modes: 
a. In salient-connections fields, there is no agreed corpus of 
knowledge. Indeed, there is no ‘knowledge’ in the sense of accumulated 
and organized information, but rather a juxtaposition of different views 
on different topics. 
b. There are no manuals, no agreed techniques or methods. Indeed, 
each contribution constitutes (ideally) a new paradigm or method, each 
author is an island. 
c. The history of the field, its self-definition, as well as the reframing 
of past theories, are crucial. A lot of scholarly activity in salient 
connections-based fields consists in citing various masters, commenting 
on their texts, finding some connection between what they said and the 
issue at hand. In cultural anthropological studies, authors like Walter 
Benjamin or Pierre Bourdieu or the entire Frankfurt school are part 
of this Pantheon (a very ephemeral one, with a high turnover rate). 
The masters are generally invoked as validating authority. That is, the 
particular fact that one is describing (the gay Caribbean father, etc.) is 
presented as illustrating the general principle laid down by Benjamin 
or some other luminary. (Incidentally, these authors are never shown 
to have been wrong. Indeed, their work is never discussed as having 
any connection to empirical fact that could make them right or wrong. 
Benjamin’s or Bourdieu’s conceptions of culture are not judged in terms 
of how much they explain). Also, there is a great deal of emphasis on 
the self-definition of the field, the ideas various practitioners have about 
what they do and what they ought to do, compared to what others do. 
Indeed, most important works are supposed to be not just contributions 
to the field, but also reflections on the field itself. For instance, a study 
of German post-Expressionist 1960s cinema will be praised, not just 
because it tells us a lot that we want to know about that specific genre, but 
also because it reframes our views of the connections between cinema or 
society. A study of recent rock songs is good because it establishes a new 
approach to popular culture. 
d. Books are more important than articles. This, in part, reflects the 
fact that each contribution should ideally reframe a field as a whole, 
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introduce a new way of looking at issues, and so on, something that 
cannot be done in a short article. 
e. There is no specific developmental curve. Some authors produce 
interesting connections in their first piece of work, others are seasoned 
specialists of the erudition mode who, at some point, decide to let their 
hair down, as it were, and let salient connections govern their next 
project. 
f. There is no agreement whatsoever on who a competent performer 
in this mode is, apart from the (generally dead) masters like Bakhtin or 
Benjamin or Raymond Williams for cultural studies, Derrida or de Man 
for literary criticism. A consequence is that there are tightly coalitional 
cliques and exceedingly bitter feuds about who should get what jobs, 
who is allowed to publish and where, and so on. 
In the last three decades or so, some fields have dramatically evolved 
from almost pure erudition mode to the salient-connections mode. 
Literary criticism is a case in point. In the past, one could not really 
expatiate on Shakespeare’s plays without thorough knowledge of the 
First Folio and Quartos and other such recondite source criticism. This 
kind of erudition is still practiced, but it is not the major criterion of 
a relevant contribution to Elizabethan studies (Garber, 2004). Saying 
something new about the plays is what matters. One could say that the 
specialists have (perhaps excessively) taken to heart Forster’s dictum. 
They only connect. 
There are various accounts of why this happened to literary studies, 
whether this is a Good Thing or not, and if not, whether it is all the fault 
of that awful Leavis or of the dreaded French structuralists (Kermode, 
1983). I am not enough of an erudite to adjudicate between these 
normative interpretations of history. I can only comment that polemical 
narratives generally get in the way of a proper explanation. Neither 
jeremiad (‘No-one knows the Canon anymore!’) nor triumphalist epic 
(‘We have overcome! The Canon is dead’) is of great help here. 
5. Effects of Salient Connections
The particular mode of scholarship I have described above could be 
explained by some as merely the outcome of a specific framework of 
ideas. For example, readers of earlier drafts of this essay highlighted 
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similarities to postmodernist thought. This comparison is flawed, 
since the mode of scholarship I outline extends well beyond a certain 
intellectual trend (Gellner, 1992). Furthermore, and perhaps more 
significantly, assuming that an individual’s actions (in this instance, 
the means by which academics validate scholarly contributions or 
acknowledge new academics) may be adequately accounted for by their 
own explanation of their rationale (in this instance, a certain intellectual 
trend). Such trends are no more intelligible than other social tendencies, 
and consequently we should also seek to explain them.
The results of the salient connections mode of scholarship are of 
greater concern than its sources, and are quite easily observed. For 
people with the correct grounding, the connections are salient, but 
they do not translate easily. Imagine explaining to a biochemist that the 
essays of Walter Benjamin provide an excellent context for a description 
of gay fathers in Trinidad. There is, understandably, a somewhat limited 
audience for salient connections, and these often pose a challenge 
even for scholars of a given field. Ernest Gellner mocked the pitiful 
Wittgensteinian philosophers propagating the idea that linguistic issues 
lay at the heart of any epistemological or metaphysical philosophy 
problems. They generally ended up teaching pupils who had never 
been particularly interested in philosophical problems per se, whether 
epistemological or not, and who consequently took on this idea with 
calm impassivity (Gellner, 1959). David Lodge has also drawn on the 
ample comic material in such a setup, through fictional professors 
forced to teach poorly-read students unfamiliar with the concept of the 
Canon that the margin is text, or the Canon is dead (Lodge, 1988).
An arguably more pressing concern is that writing like this does not 
solve any issues. It does not seek to generate a more accurate explanation 
of the world, nor even to highlight the boundaries of our knowledge. 
Salient connections ultimately are not sturdy or flexible knowledge. So 
what can we do about it? 
6. Integrated Study of Cultures—An Incipient Program
Integrated scholarship is the basis of the most promising breakthroughs 
in comprehending human behavior. By ‘integrated’, I mean explanatory 
models that move beyond established oppositions between ‘levels’ or 
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‘domains’ of reality (Bechtel, 1993), so in this instance I have in mind 
‘culture’ rather than human psychology, genetics, or economics. I also 
have in mind models that are steadfastly adaptable in using any available 
explanatory tools, irrespective of the specific disciplinary context from 
which those tools have originated.
There is now much greater potential for an integrated study of 
human culture, thanks to rapid progress on the three fundamental fronts 
of human cognition, economic models of behavior, and evolutionary 
biology. Contemporary findings in all three of these arenas are already 
changing perspectives on the study of culture:
One may regard the spread of cultural representations, concepts, and 
norms as forms whose limits are dictated by human cognitive abilities 
(Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). As evolutionary anthropologists and 
cognitive scientists have shown, cognitive principles that are developed 
early on form a framework of expectations that enable the acquisition of 
specific cultural concepts and norms (Boyer & Barrett, 2005) in a diverse 
array of domains, from folk-biology (Atran, 1990, 1998), to kinship and 
ethnic categories (Hirschfeld, 1994, 1996), to racial categories (Kurzban, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001), to religious beliefs (Atran, 2002), and social 
interaction (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Fiske, 1992; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1996).
Economic theory gives us the most accurate tools for describing 
opportunities and predicting options, and these tools are undoubtedly 
applicable beyond the bounds of exclusively economic issues (Gintis, 
2000a). In particular, experimental and behavioral economics have 
demonstrated how we might move pas strict rationality assumptions 
(Smith, 2003), and how we might incorporate factors such as reputation 
(Sperber & Baumard, 2012) punitive feelings (Fehr, Schmidt, Kolm, & 
Ythier, 2006; Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002) and intuitive standards of 
fairness (McCabe & Smith, 2001) into economic models. These models 
are responsible for the dissemination modes of cooperation specific to a 
given culture (Gintis, 2000b). 
If we do not situate human culture within an evolutionary context, 
we cannot provide a thorough account of it. Evolution in humans (and 
other species) generates decision-making processes that are extremely 
context-dependent, meaning that environmental and social aspects 
may dictate the limits of an individual’s personal preferences. An 
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evolutionary framework can give a useful explanation of a wide range 
of cultural phenomena, e.g., reproductive strategies including teenage 
pregnancies (Ellis et al., 2003; Quinlan, 2003), different responses or 
uniform objections to cheating in social exchange—in both forager 
and industrial societies (Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002); local 
particularities of ‘race’ categories (Kurzban et al., 2001; Sidanius & 
Veniegas, 2000); and many others (Barkow et al., 1992; Buss & Kenrick, 
1998).
7. Back to What Matters
A vast domain is open to cultural anthropological investigation, 
provided that the practitioners accept substantive re-tooling and discard 
old fetishes. If slogans are needed, an integrated study of culture should 
proclaim the great values of reductionism, the ambition to understand 
the causal processes underpinning behaviors; opportunism, the use of 
whatever tools and findings get us closer to that goal; and revisionism, 
a deliberate indifference to disciplinary creeds and traditions. The 
integrated view of human culture—what some may call a ‘vertical 
integration’ in the field—will allow cultural anthropology to return to 
the highly ambitious set of questions it should have addressed all along. 
For the sake of illustration, here is a far from exhaustive list of such 
questions:
• What are the natural limits to family arrangements? Will they 
shift with new reproductive techniques and economic change?
• Can we have an intuitive understanding of large societies? 
Or are our intuitive understandings of the social and political 
world limited to the small groups in which we evolved?
• Why are despised social categories essentialized? Why is it so 
easy to construct social stigma?
• What logic drives ethnic violence? Ethnic conflicts are more 
violent and seem less rational than traditional warfare. 
They sometimes involve whole populations as victims and 
perpetrators. What psychological processes fuel this violence?
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• Why are there gender differences in politics? What explains 
womens exclusion from group decision making in most 
societies, and their reduced participation in other societies?
• How are moral concepts acquired? How do locally significant 
parameters affect general concepts of right and wrong?
• What drives peoples economic intuitions? Does participation 
in market economies create an understanding of market 
processes?
• Are there cultural differences in low-level cognition? Or do we 
find very similar ways of categorizing and assigning causation, 
with variable explicit cultural theories?
• What explains individual religious attitudes? Why are some 
individuals more than others committed to the existence of 
supernatural agents?
• Why is there religious fundamentalism and extremism? Why 
should people want to oppress or kill others in the name of a 
supernatural agency? 
The list is not exhaustive but it is indicative, at least, of the potential 
scope and diversity of a vertically integrated approach to cultural 
anthropology. The list should also suggest why an integrated program 
is a Good Thing: because it finally allows cultural anthropology to talk 
about things that matter. Cultural anthropology is simply not heard in 
the public forum, and the simplest explanation is that it is not talking—
or rather, not talking about anything of great importance. This should 
change soon. 
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